mercredi 28 octobre 2015

La majorité des recrues turques de l'EI sont ethniquement kurdes

"The Ankara Bombings and the Islamic State’s Turkey Strategy
October 23, 2015
Author(s): Metin Gurcan

Abstract: Although the investigation is in its early stages, Turkish authorities suspect the Islamic State was responsible for the October 10, 2015 attack in Ankara that killed more than 100 people. The two suicide bombers are believed to be part of a cell responsible for two attacks in Turkey this year. Turkey’s decision to join the anti-Islamic State coalition has exposed it to a growing threat from the group because of its significant presence inside the country, its large number of Turkish recruits, and its growing attractiveness to Turkish Islamist extremists of Kurdish descent. (...)

The Islamic State has had particular success recruiting ethnic Kurds into its ranks. Of its more than 3,000 Turkish recruits, around 65% are ethnic Kurds,[d] as are nearly all the members of the Dokumacı network. Given the Islamic State’s atrocities against Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, the group’s attractiveness for Kurdish-Turks may surprise some Western observers, but it reflects the fact that many Kurds live in southeast Turkey, the most religious part of the country. In the last 20 years, Salafi Islam has become significantly more popular in south-eastern Turkey. Secular political and militant groups such as the HDP, PKK, and YPG do not have a monopoly over Kurdish support despite dominating much of the literature on the Kurdish cause.

For Kurdish Salafis joining the Islamic State, its religious arguments have trumped the Kurdish nationalist message. The Islamic State claims to be uninterested in ethnic and national differences, and a significant number of Kurdish-Turkish Islamist extremists believe that if the Islamic State extends to Kurdish areas, Kurds will be equal citizens of the caliphate. It is worth noting that Islamic State propaganda has never denigrated Kurds as a people. Some Kurdish supporters of the group appear to have also fused nationalist and religious motivations, hoping that the Islamic State may create a Kurdistan province in Kurdish areas of Iran, Syria, and Turkey.[e]

Despite increasingly hostile language toward the Turkish government, the Islamic State’s leaders have not formally declared war against Turkey, nor have they claimed responsibility for any attacks inside Turkey. The first volume of its Turkish propaganda magazine Konstantiniyye’nin Fethi (The Conquer of Constantinople),[20] published in June, suggests that the Islamic State does not regard Turkey as a Dar el Harb (land of war) in the same way that it views the West. Instead, its leaders apparently view Turkey’s Sunni majority as targets for recruitment through propaganda, and Turkey as a center for recruitment, logistics, and financing.[21] The Islamic State appears to be following a calibrated strategy in Turkey, in which it carries out, but does not claim responsibility for acts of violence designed to further its aims. With a focus on winning hearts and minds, claiming responsibility for attacks risks alienating potential supporters inside Turkey.

The focus on winning hearts and minds fits with the Islamic State’s interpretation of Islamic prophecies, which has always been a powerful driving force for the group’s actions. The lead article of the first issue of Konstantiniyye’nin Fethi states that Istanbul has to be conquered again by the “armies of Islam,” but argues that, as foretold in the hadith (Mohammed’s sayings), it would be conquered “without weapons and bloodshed, only chants of God is Great,” after Islamic armies had engaged with Romans in a major war in Aleppo, close to the Day of Judgment.

The group has nonetheless made clear that it regards Erdogan’s AKP as apostates, and therefore by implication worthy of attack.[f] A video of Turkish fighters in Syria posted online the day after the Ankara bombing encouraged Turkish Sunnis to either join the Islamic State in Syria or remain in Turkey to “revolt and reckon with the infidels,” with exactly what that means being left vague. (...)

[d] Author interview with Ankara security source in Ankara on September 13, 2015. Several other reports have noted the high proportion of Kurds joining the Islamic State in Turkey. See: Michael Kaplan, “Kurds joining Islamic State? ISIS finds unlikely supporters among Turkey’s disgruntled Kurds,” International Business Times, July 30, 2015. From the Bingol province of Turkey alone, reportedly around 600 Kurds joined the Islamic State. Mahmut Bozaslan, “Kurds fight Kurds in Syria,” Al-Monitor, June 25, 2015.

[e] The Islamic State leadership have tried to maximize Kurdish recruitment by appointing Kurds to senior positions and sending Kurdish imams to northern Syria and Iraq to indoctrinate Kurds. There are also indications the group may reconstitute a Kurdish Islamic Front battalion, which had been dissolved in 2014. Author interviews with Kurdish community leaders in south-eastern Turkey, 2015; “Bagdadi ‘Kürt açılımı’ yaptı!,” Gazete Vatan, October 26, 2014. See also Denise Natali “Islamic State infiltrates Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, June 4, 2015.

[f] The most recent issue of the English-language magazine Dabiq states, “The Turkish government is one that legislates, executes, and judges by manmade laws. Its army is assembled in defense of the Turkish tagut and their crusader allies. This government and army is one of blatant apostasy.” Dabiq Issue 11, posted by the Islamic State online on September 9, 2015."

Source : https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-ankara-bombings-and-the-islamic-states-turkey-strategy

Voir également : Attentat d'Ankara : les indices convergent vers la piste des Kurdes pro-EI d'Adiyaman

Juillet-août 2015 : la vague de terrorisme en Turquie (PKK, EI, DHKP-C)

Diffusion de "Konstantiniyye" : l'EI cherche à séduire les Kurdes de Turquie

Syrie : des Kurdes affrontent des Kurdes

L'émir de l'EI "Abu Osama al-Kurdi" : un Kurde de Konya

Attentat contre le meeting du HDP : le suspect (Orhan G.) est né dans une famille kurde alévie

Palmyre/Tadmor : un Kurde originaire de Muş (Turquie) est mort dans les rangs de l'EI

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Allemagne : l'Etat islamique attire de jeunes Kurdes

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Islamisme et vocations djihadistes chez les Kurdes

Le particularisme anthropologique kurde en Turquie (et ailleurs)

Peu de Turcs parmi les djihadistes en provenance d'Europe de l'Ouest

Allemagne : la remarquable sous-représentation des Turcs chez les djihadistes