mercredi 28 octobre 2015

Irak : plus de 80 Kurdes ont été enlevés par des milices chiites, selon un parlementaire kurde

More than 80 Kurds Kidnapped by Shi’ite Militia: Kurdish MP
Hashd al-Shaabi Demand $280,000 Ransom to Release Iraqi Presidential Guards


Basnews  |  Shwan Barzinji
views
27.10.2015  16:42

BAGHDAD – The Shi’ite militia group Hashd al-Shaabi continues to kidnap civilians in areas under their control. Amnesty international has previously accused the group of committing war crimes against Sunni Muslims.


Member of the Iraqi Parliamentary Committee for Security and Defence Affairs Shakhawan Abdullah told BasNews that they have launched an investigation into the cases of several Kurdish civilians kidnapped by Shi’ite militias.

Abdullah revealed that in the most recent case, Hashd al-Shaabi kidnapped a Kurdish resident of Erbil and demanded $100,000 for his release.

“His family paid the ransom but he is yet to be released.” He said.

“More than 80 people have so far been reported to be detained by the Shi’ite militias, some of which have been released for huge amounts of money while others’ fates remain unknown.”

Abdullah explained that their committee has interrogated people in charge of several checkpoints but all refuted the allegations of wrongdoing by the Shi’ite militias.

Four Kurdish members of the Iraqi presidential guard were kidnapped near Khurmatu earlier in May. Kurdish officials accuse Hashd al-Shaabi of arresting the guards.

Kurdish Member of the Iraqi Parliament Adil Nouri told BasNews that they have obtained information confirming that the Shi’ite militias have kidnapped presidential guards and they are developing negotiations with the militias.

“They are asking $280,000 for the release of the four guards which their families cannot afford,” Nouri added.
Source : http://www.basnews.com/en/news/2015/10/27/more-than-80-kurds-have-been-kidnapped-by-shiite-militias-kurdish-mp/

Voir également : Diyala : encore des tensions entre peshmerga kurdes et forces chiites

Kurdistan irakien : plusieurs partis kurdes rejettent les ingérences du PKK et des milices chiites

Selon un parlementaire kurde irakien, les milices chiites sont plus dangereuses que l'EI

Kirkouk : hostilité des peshmerga au déploiement de forces chiites

Le GRK veut enquêter sur une vidéo censée montrer le meurtre sous la torture d'un officier peshmerga par une milice chiite

La nouvelle menace pour les peshmerga : les milices arabo-chiites

Touz Khourmatou : des manifestants accusent les miliciens chiites du meurtre d'un imam kurde

Un officiel du PDK : les milices chiites "incendient les maisons des Kurdes et des Arabes sunnites"

Jalawla : rivalité entre peshmerga kurdes et milices chiites

Les autorités religieuses du Kurdistan irakien accusent les milices chiites de provocations dans la région de Garmiyan

Diyala : un commandant des peshmerga se plaint du problème posé par les milices chiites

Le Kurde Hoshyar Zebari (PDK) reproche au pouvoir arabo-chiite de Bagdad d'avoir soutenu à fonds perdus des milices chiites ultra-violentes

Le PYD-YPG a empêché plus de 4.000 peshmerga syriens de rejoindre le combat contre l'EI

Political rifts prevent more than 4000 Syrian Kurdish fighters from joining war on ISIS

October 24, 2015

ARA News

QAMISHLI – Leadership of the Kurdish forces of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) said in a statement that the so-called Rojava’s Peshmerga (dissident Kurdish soldiers from the Syrian amy who have been trained in Iraqi Kurdistan) are not allowed to enter the territories run by the Auto-Administration in northern Syria.

“Our position on this issue was explicit since the beginning. We will not allow those fighters to enter our territory,” the YPG’s General Command said.

“To those who arouse chaos and perplexity regarding this issue, we again emphasize that we will not allow the entry of any person or group under this name (Rojava’s Peshmerga), and violators will be held accountable under the law,” the YPG leadership added.

In an earlier interview with ARA News, Saleh Muslim, co-president of the Democratic Union Party in Syria (PYD) –which leads the Auto-Administration– said: “We do not recognize any military force under the name of Rojava’s Peshmerga.”

“We only recognize the Ministry of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and officially deal with it,” he added.

Speaking to ARA News, lawyer Farzat Shekho said that the mentality of the YPG’s military and political leadership will continue monopolizing power and will bring the Kurdish people into a misfortune that is greater than all the calamities they experienced.

“The one who talks about legitimacy of any force should rethink his own legitimacy first. No one can remove legitimacy and give it except the Kurdish people in this region,” he added.

In a separate context, the YPG leadership pointed out that the Turkish fears “regarding our presence” on its southern border have no justification.

“Turkey’s ire about its southern border is unjustifiable.”

“Over the past four years of war in Syria, our border with the Turkish state was the safest one and was not subjected to any risks since the establishment of the Auto-Administration,” the statement read.

The “Rojava’s Peshmerga fighters” were involved in the battlefront along with the Peshmerga forces in the Kurdistan Region against the radical group of Islamic State (ISIS) in several areas of the region.

The Rojava’s Peshmerga force consists of more than 4000 Kurdish fighters, who deserted the Assad army with the outbreak of war in Syria. The force has been trained and equipped by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. Despite several attempts to enter Syria and join the war against ISIS there, the PYD and its allied YPG forces denied them access.

“Our fighters of Rojava’s Peshmerga are eager to joint the battlefronts against ISIS terrorists in northern Syria, but the PYD insists to monopolize the political and military power in Rojava,” an officer in the Rojava’s Peshmerga told ARA News on the phone on Friday.

“In such a sensitive and decisive phase of the history of the Kurdish people we need to unite in order to defeat the barbaric group of ISIS and save humanity in the region and the world from the atrocities of this terror group. However, the political disputes are preventing our fighters from entering Rojava,” he said.

“We have been fighting ISIS alongside the Peshmerga in northern Iraq, and we have proudly given dozens of martyrs. But our main duty is to fight in Rojava,” the officer concluded.

Reporting by: Jan Nasro, Ahmed Shiwesh

Source: ARA News
Source : http://aranews.net/2015/10/political-rifts-prevent-more-than-3000-syrian-kurdish-fighters-from-joining-war-on-isis/

Voir également : Un commandant des YPG menace les peshmerga syriens de procès en cas de retour 

Salih Muslim réitère son hostilité à l'égard des peshmerga syriens 
 
Salih Muslim (leader du PYD) exprime son opposition au retour des peshmerga du PDK syrien 
 
 
Pression d'Erbil sur le PYD, pour permettre le retour des peshmerga du PDK syrien
  
 
Syrie : le PYD-YPG ne veut pas que les peshmerga du PDK syrien retournent chez eux

Ibrahim Biro (secrétaire général du parti kurde Yekiti) : les combattants des partis kurdes ont été "détenus, harcelés et exilés" par le PYD
 
 
Mustafa Osso (Conseil national kurde) dénonce l'enrôlement forcé de centaines de jeunes Kurdes (et non-Kurdes) dans les YPG
 
 
Sheran Ibrahim (un ancien leader du PYD) : "la politique volontariste du PYD pour dominer le Rojava a eu pour résultat l'avancée de l'EI dans les zones kurdes"
 
Francesco Desoli : "le PYD n’a pas hésité à utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition pour éliminer ou marginaliser ses rivaux politiques"
 
 
Massoud Barzani (novembre 2013) : "le PYD essaie par la force des armes et en accord avec le régime syrien d'imposer un état de fait"
 
 
Kobanê : des Kurdes réfugiés à Suruç (Turquie) critiquent le PKK-PYD
 
 
Amnesty International dénonce les arrestations arbitraires opérées par le PYD
 
 
Syrie : la répression du PKK-PYD-YPG contre les partisans du PDK de Barzani
 
 
Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions

N'en déplaise à Obama, ni le PYD ni la tribu des Shammar (pro-Assad) ne font de Raqqa leur priorité

Middle East

October 27, 2015
New allies in northern Syria don’t seem to share U.S. goals

Neither Kurdish YPG nor Arab Sanadid militia see Islamic State stronghold of Raqqa as a priority

Sanadid leader instead sees dissolution of Saudi Arabia as a key goal

Meanwhile, another Arab militia vows to take Raqqa but has been excluded by U.S.


Sheikh Humaydi Daham al Hadi, head of the Shammar tribe in Syria and Iraq, is one of the Arab leaders whose militias are supposed to be among the recipients of U.S. military resupply. His palatial compound, in the middle of a wheat field in north eastern Syria, features an enormous reception room. Roy Gutman McClatchy

By Roy Gutman

rgutman@mcclatchydc.com

TEL ALO, Syria

After the failure of its $500 million program to stand up a Syrian volunteer force to battle Islamic State extremists, the Obama administration has begun an effort to enable Arab militias to fight alongside a Kurdish force that has gotten U.S. air support for the past year.

The stated U.S. aim is to oust the Islamic State from its de facto capital of Raqqa in Syria. But if the Shammar tribal militia, the biggest in Hasaka province, is any example, many Arab forces on the ground have a different agenda. For that matter, so does the Kurdish People’s Protection Force, or YPG, which dominates this area and has worked closely with the United States since the siege last year of the border town of Kobani.
 
The road to the palace of Sheikh Humaydi Daham al Hadi, the head of the Shammar tribe, winds through vast wheat fields in this isolated corner of eastern Syria, past checkpoints manned by YPG fighters, and then by his own guards.

Hasaka, an oil, gas and grain producing area, is now part of what the YPG calls Jazera, one of three cantons that comprise Rojava, or west Kurdistan, a 200-mile-long corridor on Syria’s border with Turkey. The Syrian government, which still has troops in at least two cities, has acquiesced to YPG control.

Because Turkey views the YPG as a terrorist group and has closed its borders because of the YPG’s affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the only way into Rojava is by a ferry across the Tigris River from Iraq and hours of driving on secondary roads.

Welcoming visitors in his vast reception room, Sheikh Humaydi says his goal is to lead a Shammar tribal uprising against the Islamic State “to liberate Syria, Iraq and beyond.” But he also wants to carry on a 2-century-old struggle against conservative Wahabi Islam, which he said destroyed the last Shammar emirate, and he favors the breakup of Saudi Arabia, where the puritanical sect dominates. “We are already working on that,” he said.

The U.S. dropped 50 tons of ammunition into Syria’s Hasaka province on Oct. 11.


According to his son, Bandar al Humaydi, who heads the al Sanadid militia, the immediate priority of is “to liberate al Hawl and Ash Shaddadi from the Islamic State,” a reference to two towns in the oil- and gas-producing parts of Hasaka province. Bandar says he has 600 to 700 front-line fighters and 2,000 reserves but is in need of ammunition and better weapons, including TOW anti-tank missiles.

But any moves by al Sanadid depend on the YPG, which named Sheikh Humaydi co-president of the canton and recommended the al Sanadid militia to the U.S. military to receive military aid airdrops, the only known one of which took place Oct. 11.


In fact, every major decision in Rojava is up to the YPG, including the actual distribution of U.S. aid. Bandar al Humaydi said YPG military commanders told him that they had received the first U.S. shipment of 50 tons of ammunition, but that so far the Kurdish militia hadn’t distributed it. It’s not clear if the Kurdish militia supports Bandar’s plan to liberate al Hawl and Ash Shaddadi.

If al Sanadid has no immediate plans to attack Raqqa, which lies about 150 miles southeast of here, it reflects the view of the YPG, which controls territory as little as 35 miles from the Islamic State stronghold.

“We in the YPG have a strategic goal, to link Afrin with Kobani,” said Polat Can, a senior militia official, referring to two Kurdish enclaves in Rojava that are separated by 60 miles of territory controlled by the Islamic State. “We will do everything we can to achieve it.”

Other areas, such as Raqqa, “are not so important,” he said in an interview in Suleimaniyah, Iraq. Humaydi supports the YPG plan.

American military officials say the U.S. won’t back any such operation, and officials in Ankara say Turkey would block it, by force if necessary. Turkey fears that if the YPG seizes the corridor, millions more Syrian Arabs and Turkmans will flee to Turkey.

The statements by Humaydi and Can are the latest sign that Obama administration decisions to fix one problem could have long-term and unintended implications.

The airdrop of ammunition took place just two days after the administration declared an end to its “train-and-equip” program, which had widely been declared a failure. But how the Arab groups were selected to be part of the new program is hardly clear.

The process appears to give the YPG veto power over the buildup of Arab forces. It was Can who announced the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces on Oct. 11, just hours before the arms airdrop. The al Sanadid militia was among the groups he named.

U.S. officials visited northern Syria in early October to meet with the YPG’s proposed partners. But they declined to meet Sheikh Humaydi at his compound.

One day later, Can told McClatchy that the YPG would retain overall command of the joint Kurdish-Arab force. “The international community has assigned this mission to the YPG,” he said.

U.S. officials visited YPG-dominated northern Syria in early October to meet with the Kurdish militia’s proposed partners. Bandar al Humaydi said the vetting session took place on a farm in the region after the Americans declined to call on him and his father at their compound, on the advice of the YPG, whose personnel sat in on the discussion, he said.

“The Americans said they will transfer our case to their leadership and that they hoped we could be invited,” Bandar told McClatchy.

Still unclear is how many volunteers the local forces, all with their own agendas, can actually muster. Can estimated there are 30,000 Arabs already fighting and 40,000 YPG fighters. But U.S. officials put the YPG numbers at closer to 20,000 and the Arabs at as few as 5,000.

But according to Bandar, “if the Americans support us, we will be able to reach Damascus. We have men, tens of thousands, who might join us in Syria and in Iraq.”

It isn’t only Turkey that is likely to question the U.S. approach to fighting the Islamic State in northern Syria. The method of selecting military aid recipients seems to favor forces with the agenda to remake the map of the Middle East. But backing such forces could put the U.S. into conflict with the stated national interests of regional powers like Turkey, which is loath to see Syria break apart; Iran, which wants Iraq to stay together; and Saudi Arabia, which can be expected to defend its own territorial integrity.

Meanwhile, a force that didn’t make it through the YPG’s first round of vetting turns out to be the only major militia in the region that supports the U.S. goal of attacking Raqqa.

That is the Liwa Thurwar al-Raqqa, or the Raqqa Revolutionaries, led by a Raqqa merchant who goes by the nom-de-guerre Abu Issa, or “Issa’s father.” The group captured large parts of northern Syria before the Syrian government handed the rest to the YPG and includes many fighters from Raqqa itself.

“We are now preparing for the battle of Raqqa,” Abu Issa told McClatchy in his first interview given to Western news media. “But we have very limited resources. We need to have the same equipment as our enemy has,” he said, referring to the tanks and armored personnel carries the Islamic State seized from the Iraqi army. “All our weapons are spoils from the regime.”

More than 15 of his fighters even have been trained by the U.S. in the use of TOW missiles, though none have in fact been supplied to his forces.

“We have been fighting ISIS for almost two years,” he said. “We were the first to fight them. The most important thing is we need weapons, to encourage people to come for training. If I had weapons, ammunition and support, I could gather 10,000 fighters.”

Unlike the Shammar leadership, Abu Issa was silent when asked if he supported the YPG’s goal of capturing another 60 miles of territory along the Syrian-Turkish border. “Our goal is to go to Raqqa,” he said.

But he said the U.S. had not been in contact with him. “We didn’t get anything from the Americans. They don’t even contact us,” he said. “We are waiting to be supported.”

U.S. officials acknowledged that the Raqqa Revolutionaries are not being supplied. “He’s making a lot of noise,” said one U.S. military official, who could not be identified because he is not authorized to speak on the record. “We’re working through the Syrian Democratic Forces there. He’s not part of the vetted Arab force.”

Special correspondent Zakaria Zakaria contributed from Tel Alo.

Roy Gutman: @roygutmanmcc
Source : http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article41559747.html

Voir également : Obama arme les YPG à Hassakeh, en dépit de leurs crimes de guerre 

Furat al-Wafaa (RSF) : "Les YPG utilisaient la même stratégie que l'EI contre les habitants [de Tell Abyad]"

Syrie : l'offensive des YPG est au point mort

Tell Abyad : l'incompétence administrative du PYD-YPG et ses conséquences pour la population
 
Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes
 
Ayn al-Arab/Kobanê aujourd'hui : une ville détruite et sous la coupe de terroristes
 
Selon Siraj al-Din al-Hasakawi (activiste syrien), les YPG veulent modifier la carte démographique de la région d'Hassaka
 
Des volontaires américains témoignent : le combat contre l'EI n'est pas la priorité des YPG
 
YPG : les désillusions des volontaires occidentaux (incompétence militaire et médicale, haine anti-arabe)
 
Soutien au PYD-YPG : pourquoi Obama a misé sur le mauvais cheval en Syrie
 
Les problèmes posés par le soutien d'Obama aux YPG en Syrie

Kobanê : un père de famille s'immole pour protester contre les YPJ

Man Self-Immolates in Kobani Protest Against YPJ
Faisal Mustafa took action at administration HQ on Monday


Basnews
views
27.10.2015  15:02

KOBANI – Kurdish father Faisal Mustafa set himself on fire at the headquarters of the canton administration in Kobani on Monday in a protest against the YPJ, independent Kurdish news website Welati reports.

Since Mustafa’s daughter joined the YPJ, he has not been able to see her despite several attempts with local officials.

Mustafa was immediately taken to hospital in Turkey.

Many families of YPJ and People’s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters have been prevented from making contact by the Kurdish militias.

In August 2014, Syrian Kurdish refugee Walid Abdulrahman set himself on fire in front of the Democratic Union Office in Sulaymaniyah after his 15-year old son was recruited by the YPG and transferred to the Qandil mountains for training.
Source : http://www.basnews.com/en/news/2015/10/27/man-self-immolates-in-kobani-protest-against-ypj/

Voir également : Nord de l'Irak : un réfugié syrien s'immole pour protester contre l'enlèvement de son fils par le PKK

Ayn al-Arab/Kobanê aujourd'hui : une ville détruite et sous la coupe de terroristes

Témoignage d'une adolescente kurde sur l'exécution d'une jeune femme par le PKK dans le nord de l'Irak

Ahmad Mustafa (révolutionnaire syrien d'origine kurde) : "Je souhaite que les organisations de défense des droits de l'homme fassent pression sur le PYD afin qu'ils me rendent mon fils"

Afrin : le PYD enlève et torture une adolescente, puis pousse sa famille à l'exil en Turquie

Recrutement forcé par le PYD : deux Kurdes syriens ont tenté de fuir au Kurdistan irakien

Syrie : le Conseil national kurde dénonce la "loi" sur la conscription dans la Djézireh

Déclaration de 125 personnalités kurdes condamnant l'enrôlement de mineurs par le PYD-YPG

Mustafa Osso (Conseil national kurde) dénonce l'enrôlement forcé de centaines de jeunes Kurdes (et non-Kurdes) dans les YPG

Kobanê : des Kurdes réfugiés à Suruç (Turquie) critiquent le PKK-PYD

Amudah : nouvelle manifestation contre le recrutement de mineurs par les YPG, menaces des YPG contre la mère d'Hamrin Husain

Qamishli : la police politique du PYD (Asayish) attaque une manifestation contre l'enrôlement forcé dans les YPG

Ad-Darbasiyah : de jeunes hommes sont enrôlés de force par le PYD

Ad-Darbasiyah : la police politique du PYD (Asayish) abat un "conscrit" qui s'était évadé d'une prison

Syrie : le PKK-YPG "recrute" toujours des enfants soldats

Tell Abyad : le PYD a nommé un conseil des anciens avec des membres liés au régime d'Assad

Tall Abyad: Arab activists criticize PYD-appointed council of elders

KurdWatch, October 21, 2015—After taking over Tall Abyad, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) appointed a council of elders to help it administer the city and the surrounding areas. Arab activists accuse its members of being »PYD puppets«. Many members are also criticized for having close ties to the regime. »The Arab members of the council are not representing their tribes,« activist Ahmad Hajj Salih told KurdWatch. Another activist, Subhi Sukkar, said that the council of elders is not recognized »by the Arab side« and also has no decision-making authority. According to Sukkar, »The YPG [the PYD’s People’s Defense Units] and PYD have sole military and political control.«
Source : http://www.kurdwatch.org/?e3643

Voir également : Tell Abyad : décès d'un activiste arabe, après son emprisonnement par le PYD
 
Une faction de l'ASL rejette un projet visant à inclure Tell Abyad dans l'administration de Kobanê

Pris en étau entre l'EI et les YPG : le drame des réfugiés de Tell Abyad
    
Furat al-Wafaa (RSF) : "Les YPG utilisaient la même stratégie que l'EI contre les habitants [de Tell Abyad]"
   
 
Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes
 
 
Tell Abyad : l'incompétence administrative du PYD-YPG et ses conséquences pour la population
 
L'opinion des Turkmènes et Arabes qui ont fui l'avancée des YPG

Tell Abyad : après enquête, la Coalition nationale syrienne confirme que le PYD-YPG a commis de graves abus sur les civils arabes et turkmènes

Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes

Une quinzaine de groupes rebelles syriens accusent le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique à Tell Abyad

Les problèmes posés par le soutien d'Obama aux YPG en Syrie

La majorité des recrues turques de l'EI sont ethniquement kurdes

"The Ankara Bombings and the Islamic State’s Turkey Strategy
October 23, 2015
Author(s): Metin Gurcan

Abstract: Although the investigation is in its early stages, Turkish authorities suspect the Islamic State was responsible for the October 10, 2015 attack in Ankara that killed more than 100 people. The two suicide bombers are believed to be part of a cell responsible for two attacks in Turkey this year. Turkey’s decision to join the anti-Islamic State coalition has exposed it to a growing threat from the group because of its significant presence inside the country, its large number of Turkish recruits, and its growing attractiveness to Turkish Islamist extremists of Kurdish descent. (...)

The Islamic State has had particular success recruiting ethnic Kurds into its ranks. Of its more than 3,000 Turkish recruits, around 65% are ethnic Kurds,[d] as are nearly all the members of the Dokumacı network. Given the Islamic State’s atrocities against Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq, the group’s attractiveness for Kurdish-Turks may surprise some Western observers, but it reflects the fact that many Kurds live in southeast Turkey, the most religious part of the country. In the last 20 years, Salafi Islam has become significantly more popular in south-eastern Turkey. Secular political and militant groups such as the HDP, PKK, and YPG do not have a monopoly over Kurdish support despite dominating much of the literature on the Kurdish cause.

For Kurdish Salafis joining the Islamic State, its religious arguments have trumped the Kurdish nationalist message. The Islamic State claims to be uninterested in ethnic and national differences, and a significant number of Kurdish-Turkish Islamist extremists believe that if the Islamic State extends to Kurdish areas, Kurds will be equal citizens of the caliphate. It is worth noting that Islamic State propaganda has never denigrated Kurds as a people. Some Kurdish supporters of the group appear to have also fused nationalist and religious motivations, hoping that the Islamic State may create a Kurdistan province in Kurdish areas of Iran, Syria, and Turkey.[e]

Despite increasingly hostile language toward the Turkish government, the Islamic State’s leaders have not formally declared war against Turkey, nor have they claimed responsibility for any attacks inside Turkey. The first volume of its Turkish propaganda magazine Konstantiniyye’nin Fethi (The Conquer of Constantinople),[20] published in June, suggests that the Islamic State does not regard Turkey as a Dar el Harb (land of war) in the same way that it views the West. Instead, its leaders apparently view Turkey’s Sunni majority as targets for recruitment through propaganda, and Turkey as a center for recruitment, logistics, and financing.[21] The Islamic State appears to be following a calibrated strategy in Turkey, in which it carries out, but does not claim responsibility for acts of violence designed to further its aims. With a focus on winning hearts and minds, claiming responsibility for attacks risks alienating potential supporters inside Turkey.

The focus on winning hearts and minds fits with the Islamic State’s interpretation of Islamic prophecies, which has always been a powerful driving force for the group’s actions. The lead article of the first issue of Konstantiniyye’nin Fethi states that Istanbul has to be conquered again by the “armies of Islam,” but argues that, as foretold in the hadith (Mohammed’s sayings), it would be conquered “without weapons and bloodshed, only chants of God is Great,” after Islamic armies had engaged with Romans in a major war in Aleppo, close to the Day of Judgment.

The group has nonetheless made clear that it regards Erdogan’s AKP as apostates, and therefore by implication worthy of attack.[f] A video of Turkish fighters in Syria posted online the day after the Ankara bombing encouraged Turkish Sunnis to either join the Islamic State in Syria or remain in Turkey to “revolt and reckon with the infidels,” with exactly what that means being left vague. (...)

[d] Author interview with Ankara security source in Ankara on September 13, 2015. Several other reports have noted the high proportion of Kurds joining the Islamic State in Turkey. See: Michael Kaplan, “Kurds joining Islamic State? ISIS finds unlikely supporters among Turkey’s disgruntled Kurds,” International Business Times, July 30, 2015. From the Bingol province of Turkey alone, reportedly around 600 Kurds joined the Islamic State. Mahmut Bozaslan, “Kurds fight Kurds in Syria,” Al-Monitor, June 25, 2015.

[e] The Islamic State leadership have tried to maximize Kurdish recruitment by appointing Kurds to senior positions and sending Kurdish imams to northern Syria and Iraq to indoctrinate Kurds. There are also indications the group may reconstitute a Kurdish Islamic Front battalion, which had been dissolved in 2014. Author interviews with Kurdish community leaders in south-eastern Turkey, 2015; “Bagdadi ‘Kürt açılımı’ yaptı!,” Gazete Vatan, October 26, 2014. See also Denise Natali “Islamic State infiltrates Iraqi Kurdistan,” Al-Monitor, June 4, 2015.

[f] The most recent issue of the English-language magazine Dabiq states, “The Turkish government is one that legislates, executes, and judges by manmade laws. Its army is assembled in defense of the Turkish tagut and their crusader allies. This government and army is one of blatant apostasy.” Dabiq Issue 11, posted by the Islamic State online on September 9, 2015."

Source : https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-ankara-bombings-and-the-islamic-states-turkey-strategy

Voir également : Attentat d'Ankara : les indices convergent vers la piste des Kurdes pro-EI d'Adiyaman

Juillet-août 2015 : la vague de terrorisme en Turquie (PKK, EI, DHKP-C)

Diffusion de "Konstantiniyye" : l'EI cherche à séduire les Kurdes de Turquie

Syrie : des Kurdes affrontent des Kurdes

L'émir de l'EI "Abu Osama al-Kurdi" : un Kurde de Konya

Attentat contre le meeting du HDP : le suspect (Orhan G.) est né dans une famille kurde alévie

Palmyre/Tadmor : un Kurde originaire de Muş (Turquie) est mort dans les rangs de l'EI

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Allemagne : l'Etat islamique attire de jeunes Kurdes

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Islamisme et vocations djihadistes chez les Kurdes

Le particularisme anthropologique kurde en Turquie (et ailleurs)

Peu de Turcs parmi les djihadistes en provenance d'Europe de l'Ouest

Allemagne : la remarquable sous-représentation des Turcs chez les djihadistes

Diyarbakir : la police turque a procédé à des arrestations de Kurdes pro-EI

Police officers who died during raid on ISIS terrorists killed by suicide bomber
DAILY SABAH WITH ANADOLU AGENCY
ISTANBUL
Published October 26, 2015

Two Turkish police officers who died during a raid on ISIS militants in Turkey's southeastern Diyarbakır province, were killed by a suicide bomber, police said Tuesday.


The officers, identified as Gökhan Çakıcı, 22, and Sadık Özkan, 25, were killed when officers stormed an address Diyarbakır on Monday. Five other officers were wounded in the blast.


Authorities initially said the officers died from booby-trap bombs while breaking down the door. But a statement released Tuesday by the governor's office of the region said: "Two policemen were killed and five security force members were injured during the operation as a result of a suicide bomber blowing himself (or herself) up."

Bomb-making materials and arms were seized during the raid, the statement added.


The police reportedly sent numerous special operation teams as reinforcement to the operation scene after the incident.

Seven suspected ISIS members were killed at the property and another in Diyarbakır as armed police carried out simultaneous raids on 17 addresses, the police's security directorate added.

Another 15 suspects were seized during the operation, including two women and a girl.


On Monday, the provincial governor's office showed off the arsenal of weapons and explosives captured by police during the operation, including two Kalashnikov assault rifles, eight pistols, a hunting rifle, military-grade explosives, ammonium nitrate and hand grenades.

Five of the dead ISIS members were Turkish nationals registered in the eastern province of Bingöl, police said. Officials are still trying to identify the two others through facial recognition technology.

The governor's office said they had entered Turkey from Syria two months ago and had been closely monitored by police and intelligence officers.

The dead militants had all been trained as suicide bombers, police said.

The raids come two weeks after two suicide bombers linked to ISIS killed 102 people at a rally in Ankara.
Source : http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/10/26/police-officers-who-died-during-raid-on-isis-terrorists-killed-by-suicide-bomber

Analyse de Wassim Nasr :



Voir également : Attentat d'Ankara : les indices convergent vers la piste des Kurdes pro-EI d'Adiyaman

Juillet-août 2015 : la vague de terrorisme en Turquie (PKK, EI, DHKP-C)

Diffusion de "Konstantiniyye" : l'EI cherche à séduire les Kurdes de Turquie

Syrie : des Kurdes affrontent des Kurdes

L'émir de l'EI "Abu Osama al-Kurdi" : un Kurde de Konya

Attentat contre le meeting du HDP : le suspect (Orhan G.) est né dans une famille kurde alévie

Palmyre/Tadmor : un Kurde originaire de Muş (Turquie) est mort dans les rangs de l'EI

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Allemagne : l'Etat islamique attire de jeunes Kurdes
 
Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Islamisme et vocations djihadistes chez les Kurdes

samedi 24 octobre 2015

Hakkari : un attentat à la bombe du PKK a endommagé un hôpital

PKK bomb attack hits public offices, hospital in Turkey’s southeast

HAKKARİ – Anadolu Agency

Militants from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) detonated a bomb-laden vehicle in the Şemdinli district of the southeastern province of Hakkari late on Oct. 21, damaging a number of state buildings including a hospital.

PKK militants detonated the bomb-laden car in the Sermet Street of Şemdinli, which houses the district governorate, district police department and district state hospital buildings. A number of houses, workplaces and vehicles were also damaged in the explosion.

As a result of the attack, the three-story district state hospital building - which includes newborn and hemodialysis units as well as operating theaters - was substantially damaged.

Photos from the scene taken on the morning after the attack revealed the extent of the damage. (AA photos)

October/22/2015
Source : http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pkk-bomb-attack-hits-public-offices-hospital-in-turkeys-southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90197&NewsCatID=341

Voir également : Şırnak : le PKK tue un ambulancier

Mardin : le PKK a tiré sur 6 ambulances en l'espace de 20 jours

Turquie : encore des civils tués et blessés par le PKK

Adana : des terroristes du PKK attaquent un mariage, tuant un civil et en blessant un autre

Bitlis : un attentat du PKK tue un civil et en blesse deux autres

Province de Batman : un civil et un policier tués par une attaque du PKK

Diyarbakir : deux fillettes tuées par des tirs de mortier du PKK

Juillet-août 2015 : la vague de terrorisme en Turquie (PKK, EI, DHKP-C)

L'historien "libéral" turc Halil Berktay critique les mensonges et omissions de la BBC sur le PKK

Répression contre les journalistes au Kurdistan irakien

ANALYSIS: A battle for power in Kurdish Iraq
#IraqatWar

Baram Maaruf
Wednesday 21 October 2015 01:59 UTC
Last update:
Friday 23 October 2015 12:14 UTC

The ruling KDP of Massoud Barzani has cracked down on opposition parties, and is suppressing journalists from reporting dissent


The Kurdish region of Iraq, long the example of stability and resilience in the post-Saddam world, is descending into crisis.

On 12 October, the chairman of the Iraqi Kurdish parliament in Erbil was denied access to the city. Yousef Mohammed, of the Change Movement (Gorran), arrived at the southern outskirts of Erbil to find himself blocked by armed forces belonging to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). They forced him to head back to Sulaimanya, which the KDP considers as a Gorran stronghold. Additionally, ministers belonging to Gorran were denied access to the city and parliament.

This incident comes a few days after anti-government demonstrations in cities throughout the governorates of Sulaimania, Kirkuk and Halabja. Five people died and several more were injured in violent clashes between protesters and riot police. KDP offices were plundered and burned by protesters, and their staff had to abandon the buildings. The KDP blames Gorran for the attacks on their buildings.

“I was covering a peaceful demonstration in Sulaimani on Sunday, when an Asayish officer came up to me and told us to stop filming," said Baban Anwar, a reporter for NRT, an independent Kurdish news agency.

"We were standing before the Sulaimani Directorate of Education covering the teacher’s protests. He didn’t give us time to react. He punched me and broke our team’s camera. He pulled it out of our cameraman's hands and threw it to the ground, shattering it.”

This was not the first time soldiers had attacked journalists and reporters trying to cover protests in the region.

“Sunday’s incident was the fifth attack on NRT journalists since the protests started,” the agency reported. “On 10 October a team covering protests in Sulaimani city was attacked by security forces who seized three of our journalists’ cameras. In addition to that our offices in Erbil and Duhok were stormed by security forces who arrested our staff and deported them to Sulaimani.”

Reporter Wrya Karim was also attacked while live on air from protests that turned violent in the town of Said Sadiq, east of Sulaimani, on 11 October.

The reason for the public outrage in the region lies in several factors. First of all, due to declining oil prices, an ongoing fight with the Islamic State group and a political dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdish government has been unable to pay its large number of employees for more than a year now. Given that most of the Kurdish population in the region works for the government and prices of food and petrol have soared in recent months, tensions have run high among them.

Second, the Kurdish president’s term expired on 20 August. Massoud Barzani, the head of the KDP, still considers himself president although the constitution states that he can serve only two terms. Barzani's time in office has already been extended by two years.

So far the political parties have tried to reach an agreement, but months of negotiations have not secured an agreement and Barzani shows no sign of stepping down.

Before the presidential issue, public outrage increased amid rising allegations of corruption among the oil and finance minsters of the KDP, the intimidation and abduction of activists and journalists, and the banning of parliamentarians from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran from entering Erbil. All these factors add up to the chain of events currently happening inside the region.

There are three possible outcomes for the political crisis in the Kurdish region of Iraq.

First, the parties, under internal and international pressure, will compromise and give up some of their demands to find a possible solution for the presidency and other internal issues.

Second, the parties may disregard internal and international pressure and return to two administative regions, as seen before the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Third, the government could be lifted and the KDP could attempt to establish a new government along with the other parties but without Gorran. One thing to be considered is whether the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will agree to participate in a government established without Gorran. This last outcome is very unlikely since the PUK and Gorran worked very closely together with other parties to resolve this political issue and to keep Barzani from extending his term as president of the Kurdistan region.

So far the opposition parties have said that if they cannot convince the KDP to make any compromises, their only option is to declare the two governorates of Sulaimania and Halabja as semi-independent, as before 2003.
Source : http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-war-against-journalists-kurdistan-2038679912

Voir également : Irak : les autorités kurdes arrêtent un activiste yézidi pour des propos tenus sur Facebook

Selon Matthew Barber, les peshmerga ont réprimé une manifestation de Yézidis dans le camp de Dohouk

Le PDK empêche des parlementaires du parti Gorran de se rendre à Erbil

Manifestations et violences dans le Kurdistan irakien

Kalar (Kurdistan irakien) : des Kurdes pro-PKK incendient les bureaux du parti PDK

Kurdistan irakien : réseaux clientélistes et pratiques politiques autoritaires

L'indépendance du Kurdistan irakien demeure un "rêve" lointain

Les partis UPK et Gorran demandent à la Turquie d'ouvrir un consulat à Souleimaniye

L'Iran encouragerait l'UPK et le parti Gorran à créer une région autonome à Souleimaniye

Irak et Syrie : les Arabes et Turkmènes sont victimes des exactions des forces nationalistes kurdes

Victims of the oppressed: Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria
#HumanRights

Tallha Abdulrazaq
Wednesday 21 October 2015 11:08 UTC

Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen have suffered enough at the hands of dictators, militia and IS – they shouldn't be oppressing each other now


Last week, Amnesty International published a scathing report about the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) committing war crimes against non-Kurdish Syrians in al-Hasaka and al-Raqqa governorates. The PYD, often seen as the Syrian offshoot of Turkey’s PKK terrorists, have had their dirty laundry aired after Amnesty exposed their forced displacement campaign against predominantly Arabs and Turkmens, likely in order to create an ethnically homogenous Kurdish-controlled region in areas of northern and north eastern Syria.

This latest report is among a growing body of literature by human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, that expose how Kurdish nationalist groups of all flavours and from all geographies are committing crimes motivated by racist nationalist ideologies. Will the world take action like they did for the Yazidis? Not likely. It is simply much too inconvenient.

Although the United States government has stated that it is looking into reports of Kurdish war crimes in Syria, there is every chance that this could all soon be swept under the rug. After all, America’s Kurdish allies in Iraq have repeatedly committed crimes against their Arab and Turkmen neighbours, and nothing has ever happened. Last winter, Kurdish Peshmerga and Asayish forces refused to allow Arabs displaced in the fighting against the forces of the Islamic State (IS) from returning to their homes, whilst at the same time allowing Kurds to resettle in those areas. This was reported in several areas, particularly Makhmur in northern Iraq.

In January, and in full view of Peshmerga forces, Yazidi militias, themselves only recently victims of IS atrocities, proceeded to attack Iraqi Arab villages like Buhanaya, killing civilians, burning down homes and generally terrorising the populace. There were also separate reports that showed that these same Yazidi terrorists were abducting Iraqi Arab women in order to subject them to the same sexual slavery and mistreatment that Yazidi women were forced to endure when IS forces kidnapped them.

Yazidis, who are a sub-category of the Kurdish people, are somehow immune to Western criticism and outrage. After all, it is inconvenient when those that the Western governments have painted almost as being an endangered species suddenly turn around and commit atrocities and war crimes like IS. The only difference between the two is that Yazidis are a minority who happen to be non-Arab and non-Muslim, trumping even Muslim Kurds, and therefore the kind of minority the West can really get behind.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which holds sway over large areas of northern Iraq, has denied any ethnic cleansing in Makhmur and other areas. But last May at the Al Jazeera 9th Annual Forum, I personally challenged Hemin Hawrami, head of foreign relations for Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) about this issue, and he said that it would be a simple matter of arranging a visit to the areas in question to prove that the KDP’s story was true. My attempts to have this arranged have gone unanswered for almost half a year, and even international news agencies have reported on the sorry state of Iraqi Arab residents displaced by Kurdish militias.

So what are the root causes behind these Kurdish ethnic cleansing campaigns? Simply put, it is racism, and not merely the more academically sterile phrase of “ethnic conflict”. Even Arabs who are lucky enough to have escaped from the sectarian bloodbaths in other parts of Iraq to KRG-controlled regions complain of outright racism. Muhammad (not his real name), an Arab from Mosul now living in Erbil, told me that he is frequently harassed by Kurdish security forces, particularly officers of the Asayish. “They threaten me with arrest and call me Arab terrorist scum coming to ruin ‘their’ Kurdistan,” Muhammad told me, adding: “Isn’t Erbil a part of Iraq? Am I not Iraqi? Several of my aunts and uncles married Kurds, so my cousins are Kurds…but the politicians see me as a demographic threat."

Muhammad’s view that Kurdish politicians see Arabs as a demographic threat certainly rings true, otherwise there would be no reason to ethnically cleanse entire areas and communities of Arabs and Turkmens in Syria and Iraq. Of course, these racist sentiments are intentionally peddled by the political class in order to distract the Kurdish populace from threats to their own freedom, such as Massoud Barzani refusing to leave his office as President of the KRG. Kurdish journalists and TV stations have been shut down by KRG forces loyal to Barzani, opposition politicians barred from entering Erbil, and yet there is hardly an outrage from the international community.

It is politically inconvenient for Western powers to put real pressure on their Kurdish allies into curtailing their violence against other Kurds, let alone Arabs or Turkmens, because it contradicts their narrative of a squeaky clean oppressed minority.

The Kurds today are freer from state oppression against their identity and language in Syria, Iraq or Turkey - although, again, the international silence on Kurdish rights in Iran is deafening and quite telling. Indeed, the Kurds are now power holders and power players in some areas. Some Kurdish political factions in Syria, Iraq and beyond now feel that the “boot is on the other foot,” and are proceeding to enact a decades-long yearning for bloody vengeance.

For some reason, they are exacting retribution on those who did not harm them, whilst hinting at making deals with their murderers such as the Assad regime in Syria. Moreover, one has to question the veracity of claims that the likes of Barzani are true leaders of the Kurdish people. After all, he fought side by side with Saddam Hussein against Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, himself backed by Iran. Now that Saddam is gone, both Iraqi Kurdish factions have been making a song and dance about his atrocities against the Kurds, and framing it within a wider anti-Arab discourse.

If there was ever any need for further proof of the danger of nationalism and how it is used to manipulate the masses into supporting the murder of other human beings, it is the misplaced vengeance of some Kurds against non-Kurds as they ignore the despots who have been murdering them both for decades. Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen have suffered enough at the hands of dictators, militia leaders and IS. It's high time that they stop being the cannon fodder of wars they had never ignited.

 - Tallha Abdulrazaq is a researcher at the University of Exeter's Strategy & Security Institute, and winner of the Al Jazeera Young Researcher Award. He blogs at thewarjournal.co.uk and tweets from @thewarjournal

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Photo: Turkman, Arab and Kurdish residents of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk prepare for playing the "Siniya" or tray game, a tradition during the long evenings of the holy fasting month of Ramadan on 4 August, 2012 (AFP).
Source : http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/victims-oppressed-509307126

Voir également : Amnesty International documente les nombreux crimes de guerre du PYD-YPG dans le Nord syrien

Syrie : le PKK-YPG tue des dizaines de civils à Hasaka
 
La Coalition nationale syrienne maintient que le PKK-YPG a commis un massacre de civils dans la région d'Hasaka
 
13 personnes d'une même famille tuées dans le village de Matiniya : un nouveau massacre de civils par le PKK-YPG ?

Irak : diverses sources confirment l'existence d'exactions perpétrées par le PKK-YPG dans des villages arabes

Amnesty International confirme l'existence des exactions commises par des miliciens yézidis en janvier dernier

Robin Beaumont : "une politique de kurdification particulièrement autoritaire [dans le nord de l'Irak]"

Nord de l'Irak : d'après des témoignages, les peshmerga empêchent les déplacés arabes de revenir dans les territoires disputés et pillent les maisons des Assyro-Chaldéens

Barzan/Barzanke : les nationalistes kurdes craignent que les lourds soupçons de crimes de guerre n'entachent leur image
 
Barzan (Irak) : un Kurde de nationalité néerlandaise admet en off que les peshmerga ont procédé à des exécutions systématiques de prisonniers de guerre

Un peshmerga dans la ville de Makhmour : "Nous les tuerons [les Arabes] dès que les caméras ne seront plus là"
 
Donatella Rovera (Amnesty International) : "Les Arabes ne sont plus autorisés à entrer dans les régions kurdes [d'Irak]"

Kirkouk : grave insécurité et vide administratif

Kirkouk : les déplacés arabes se plaignent de mauvais traitements de la part des Kurdes

Pris en étau entre l'EI et les YPG : le drame des réfugiés de Tell Abyad



Caught Between the Islamic State and the Kurds: Exiled From Tal Abyad
October 22, 2015 | 5:45 pm

In June 2015, Kurdish forces — supported by the Free Syrian Army and US-led coalition airstrikes — drove out the Islamic State (IS) from the northern Syrian town of Tal Abyad — a strategically important gain in the battle against the jihadists. Yet the fighting also forced waves of refugees to cross the border into the Turkish town of Akcakale.

The advance on Tal Abyad, containing a diverse population of Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds, provoked the Turkish government and a coalition of rebel groups to accuse Kurdish forces of "ethnic cleansing" and displacing Arabs and Turkmen — an accusation strongly denied by the Kurdish forces.

Yet allegations of forcible displacement persist among refugees, with some telling VICE News that their hometown is now under another hostile occupation, and others stating that life under IS rule was better.

Many refugees in Akcakale have had to set up camp in parks, or rent overcrowded housing. There is a lack of food and a number of children require immediate medical attention.

VICE News meets the refugees and activists of Tal Abyad, where they describe their new life in Turkey, as well as their fears for the future.
Source : https://news.vice.com/video/caught-between-the-islamic-state-and-the-kurds-exiled-from-tal-abyad

Voir également : Amnesty International documente les nombreux crimes de guerre du PYD-YPG dans le Nord syrien
  
Furat al-Wafaa (RSF) : "Les YPG utilisaient la même stratégie que l'EI contre les habitants [de Tell Abyad]"

Tell Abyad : décès d'un activiste arabe, après son emprisonnement par le PYD

Une faction de l'ASL rejette un projet visant à inclure Tell Abyad dans l'administration de Kobanê
 
 
Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes
 
Tell Abyad : l'incompétence administrative du PYD-YPG et ses conséquences pour la population

L'opinion des Turkmènes et Arabes qui ont fui l'avancée des YPG

Tell Abyad : après enquête, la Coalition nationale syrienne confirme que le PYD-YPG a commis de graves abus sur les civils arabes et turkmènes

Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes

Une quinzaine de groupes rebelles syriens accusent le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique à Tell Abyad

Les problèmes posés par le soutien d'Obama aux YPG en Syrie

La responsabilité des YPG dans le pillage des Antiquités syriennes (Nord-Est et région de Kobanê)




"WorldViews
The Islamic State isn’t the only group looting Syrian archaeological sites

By Adam Taylor October 21 (...)

Jesse Casana, an associate professor of anthropology at Dartmouth, has found a way to get around that problem, using extensive archives of satellite imagery to examine nearly 1,300 archaeological sites in the country. What his research found was surprising – while it was clear that there had been significant looting in areas controlled by the Islamic State, looting may have been even more widespread in areas controlled by opposition forces or the Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG).

“Most media attention has focused on the spectacles of destruction that ISIS has orchestrated and posted online, and this has led to a widespread misunderstanding that ISIS is the main culprit when it comes to looting of archaeological sites and damage to monuments,” Casana said in a statement, using an acronym to refer to the Islamic State.

In areas controlled by the Islamic State, Casana found around 21.4 percent of the sites showed some evidence of looting. Remarkably, this was lower than in areas controlled by opposition forces (26.6 percent) or by the YPG (27.6 percent). The lowest percentage of sites looted could be found in areas controlled by the Syrian regime, where around 16.5 percent appeared damaged by looting.

The report does make clear that some of this looting may have occurred while a different group controlled the area, given the shifting front lines of fighting over the past few years, and in some cases where it was unclear who controlled the site it was counted twice. It is also important to note that the Islamic State controlled the greatest number of the sites Casana was able to examine and that the largest number of looted sites were found in Islamic State-controlled territory.

Additionally, the majority of damage in YPG-held territory was classified as "minor looting," meaning that evidence had been found of  fewer than 15 holes had been dug with pickaxes for the purpose of finding artifacts. In contrast, 22.9 percent of looted sites in territory held by the Syrian regime and a remarkable 42.7 percent of those held by the Islamic State appeared to have evidence of "severe looting" – a classification that indicates the scale of the looting could only have been performed by a group of laborers operating heavy machinery."

Source : https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/21/the-islamic-state-isnt-the-only-group-looting-syrian-archaeological-sites/

Voir également : Frontière turco-syrienne : les contrebandiers syriens ont de bonnes relations avec l'EI... mais aussi avec le PYD, l'ASL et le régime d'Assad
 
Selon une carte, le trafic de pétrole de l'EI passe par Hassakeh (contrôlée par le PYD et Assad) et le Kurdistan irakien

Terrorisme : Metin Karasular (un trafiquant de drogue et d'armes proche du PKK) avoue avoir été en contact avec Amedy Coulibaly

Le PKK et le trafic de drogue

La protection du patrimoine sous les Jeunes-Turcs

Osman Hamdi Bey

Un commandant des YPG menace les peshmerga syriens de procès en cas de retour

YPG: Syrian Peshmerga Forces Still Not Allowed into Rojava
They will face trail if they return: YPG commander


Basnews
views
22.10.2015  11:36

KOBANI – The Syrian Kurdish forces has once again said that they won’t allow Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga forces to come in to Syrian Kurdistan.


The People’s Protection Units (YPG) continue to insist that Syrian Peshmerga forces trained by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and armed by the US, are not allowed to return to Syrian Kurdistan (also known as Rojava).

In a statement released on Wednesday October 21st, a YPG military commander warned that any armed groups under the name of Syrian Peshmerga will face trail if they attempt to move into Syrian Kurdistan.


In a statement that also addressed Turkey’s concerns about its borders with Syrian Kurds, the YPG pointed that during the last four years no threats have been posed to Turkey by the YPG.

The KRG has trained over 5,000 Syrian Kurds, whom the US has armed. The KRG and Syrian Kurdish officials have discussed their return on several occasions, but they are yet to be allowed to join the fight against Islamic State on their land.
Source : http://www.basnews.com/en/news/2015/10/22/ypg-syrian-peshmerga-forces-still-not-allowed-into-rojava/

Voir également : Salih Muslim réitère son hostilité à l'égard des peshmerga syriens 

Salih Muslim (leader du PYD) exprime son opposition au retour des peshmerga du PDK syrien 
 
Pression d'Erbil sur le PYD, pour permettre le retour des peshmerga du PDK syrien
  
Syrie : le PYD-YPG ne veut pas que les peshmerga du PDK syrien retournent chez eux
    
 
Syrie : les YPG veulent recruter des Arabes pour compenser l'émigration massive des Kurdes locaux et le manque de combattants
 
Afrin : la police politique du PYD (Asayish) avait enlevé un combattant du PDK syrien
 

Ibrahim Biro (secrétaire général du parti kurde Yekiti) : les combattants des partis kurdes ont été "détenus, harcelés et exilés" par le PYD
 

Mustafa Osso (Conseil national kurde) dénonce l'enrôlement forcé de centaines de jeunes Kurdes (et non-Kurdes) dans les YPG
 

Sheran Ibrahim (un ancien leader du PYD) : "la politique volontariste du PYD pour dominer le Rojava a eu pour résultat l'avancée de l'EI dans les zones kurdes"
 
Francesco Desoli : "le PYD n’a pas hésité à utiliser tous les moyens à sa disposition pour éliminer ou marginaliser ses rivaux politiques"

 

Massoud Barzani (novembre 2013) : "le PYD essaie par la force des armes et en accord avec le régime syrien d'imposer un état de fait"
 

Kobanê : des Kurdes réfugiés à Suruç (Turquie) critiquent le PKK-PYD
 
Amnesty International dénonce les arrestations arbitraires opérées par le PYD
 
Syrie : la répression du PKK-PYD-YPG contre les partisans du PDK de Barzani
 
Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions

Syrie : le PYD tente d'endoctriner les enfants dans les écoles qu'il contrôle ("apoïsme", ethno-nationalisme et militarisme)



New PYD curricula in northern Syria reveal ideological, linguistic fault lines
Tweet


Oct. 21, 2015

AMMAN: New Kurdish-language primary school curricula introduced by the PYD-led Kurdish authorities in northern Syria last month are generating controversy for being too ideological and “prioritizing a single view over all others.”

That single view is the democratic confederalist ideology of the PYD, or the Democratic Union Party, a Kurdish political party founded in 2003 by Syrian Kurdish activists, of which Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey currently serving the 16th year of a life sentence for treason, is the ideological leader.

The PYD is the strongest political party in the Kurdish self-administration, which currently controls a large swathe of de facto autonomous Kurdish territories running west to east along the Turkish border in northern Syria, which as of Wednesday also includes the new canton of Tal Abyad.

With the start of the 2015-2016 school year in September, Kurdish is now replacing Arabic as the sole language of instruction for the first three years of primary education in Kurdish schools in the autonomous territories.

Accompanied by newly printed books and teachers fresh out of a three-month PYD training course, the curriculum is the first step in a plan for an eventual Kurdish- language educational system.

“Just like the Syrian government’s textbooks,” Kadar Ahmad, a Kobani-based Kurdish activist told Syria Direct, the texts used in the new curricula “prioritize a single view over all others, the difference being that these curricula adopt Ocalan’s thought rather than Baathist ideas.”


Ocalan’s philosophy revolves around democratic confederalism, or what he termed “a non-state political administration” in a 2012 publication.

It is a vision of a grassroots governing system that rejects the structure of a traditional nation state and is “flexible, multi-cultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus oriented.” Feminism and a socialist economic structure are key parts of what he calls a “democracy without a state.”

But the PYD is not ruling northeast Syria alone. Other parties within the Kurdish self-administration include the Kurdish National Council (KNC) coalition aligned with Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq, who are criticizing alleged bias in the books, which include subjects such as “Ocalan philosophy” and “the Democratic nation,” Kurdish-owned Bas News reported late last month.

Cheerful images of Ocalan, juxtaposed with the Rojava flag and speaking with a young child, fill some of the pages of textbooks used as part of the new curricula, in pictures given to Syria Direct.

Opposition to the new curricula is not only partisan, however. Educators have also pointed to the content of the new texts as an attempt to embed a “totalitarian ideology” into school lessons by “sanctifying the leader and militarizing the schools,” Jian Zakaria, the secretary of the West Kurdistan Teachers’ Union said.

In an interview with the Kurdish Rihab news agency, Zakaria characterized the new curricula as “an educational disaster and a crime against future generations.”

Students and young people voice similar critiques. “Teaching in Kurdish is a fundamental part of the Kurdish movement,” the unaffiliated Students and Youth Union of Democratic West Kurdistan wrote in an announcement late last month, but the new curricula “consolidate PYD ideology at the expense of the rest, and sanctify a particular political thought and philosophy.”

Kurdish supporters of the new curricula describe them as the culmination of a decades-long struggle for the inclusion of the Kurdish language in public institutions after decades of restrictions and discrimination by multiple Syrian governments.

“The Kurdish dream of reading and learning in the mother tongue has become a reality,” Raman Yousef, a Kurdish activist based in Al-Hasakah and director of the Al-Hasakah is Being Slaughtered Silently media campaign told Syria Direct.

“Naturally, there will be difficulties, but today the Kurdish language has been liberated from the prison of Arabic once and for all,” said Muhammad Nabou, a Kurdish media activist in Kobani.

Regime backlash

In response to the Kurdish self-administration’s new curricula, the Syrian regime has closed primary schools teaching it in at least three al-Hasakah towns since the beginning of the school year, Kadar Ahmad told Syria Direct last week, while schools teaching regime materials have remained open.

The closures make good on threats made by the Syrian government’s Ministry of Education in a decision issued late last month “to withdraw educational personnel completely” from elementary schools teaching the new curricula and stop their salaries, a source from the regime’s educational directorate in Qamishli told ARA News.

PYD officials doubled down on the merits of the new self-administration curricula in response to the threats.

“We will not allow the regime or anybody else to close the schools in Rojava,” Muhammad Saleh Abdo, president of the governing body’s education commission pledged during a tour of Qamishli schools last month.

Those opposing the curricula, Abdo said, “Will not be allowed to keep Kurdish students from their mother tongue.”

Calling the regime response “an expected move” to the change in the educational status quo of Kurdish-administered territories, Kobani-based activist Nabou says the self-administration plans to step in and pay any lost salaries in order to continue the project.

Reported regime closures of schools teaching the new materials in the northern al-Hasakah town of Amouda sparked a demonstration by dozens of mostly Kurdish schoolchildren and their relatives last week, who also criticized the curricula for pro-PYD “ideological recruitment,” ARA News reported.

The Amouda residents also criticized the separation of Kurdish schoolchildren from their Arab peers and the loss of English and Arabic as part of the new program.

“We want to learn our Kurdish language, and we want to learn Arabic and English also,” a sign in the protest read, calling for a more inclusive educational program than the one offered by the PYD.

In Qamishli, 28 kilometers east of Amouda, administrators of a private Syriac Christian school sent Kurdish students home from class on Monday with a message asking their parents to “completely refrain from sending your children to the school.”

The school’s request came after the PYD-led self-administration asked multiple private Christian schools in Qamishli to teach Kurdish students the new materials, which they have refused, Evin Sheikhmous, an independent journalist in Qamishli told Syria Direct.

“Dozens” of Kurdish families had reportedly chosen to send their children to private schools at the beginning of the school year to avoid the PYD curricula, meaning that the decision could affect “approximately 500 [Kurdish] students” attending private schools in the city, Osama Ahmad, a Qamishli-based Kurdish activist told Syria Direct on Wednesday.

 In last week’s Amouda demonstration, a boy held up a sign with a simple request: “Return me to my school, far from your politics!”
Source : http://syriadirect.org/news/new-pyd-curriculum-in-northern-syria-reveals-ideological-linguistic-fault-lines/

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