samedi 27 juin 2015

La question des droits des minorités dans la région kurde d'Irak

MERI firmly advocates the incorporation of minorities’ rights in the Kurdistan Region’s Constitution

June 24th, 2015

In a meeting between MERI’s team, headed by its President, and the special parliamentary committee that is tasked to draft the future constitution of Kurdistan Region, the constitutional rights of ethnic and religious minorities were debated.
The two sides emphasized the vital importance of enshrining the principles and practice of protecting the rights of all communities, no matter the size, in any future constitution. Addressing the concerns of minority groups will ensure greater levels of social cohesion.

MERI’s team provided the committee with the outcomes and conclusions of the recent study conducted in Kirkuk on the future of the Province. With Kurdistan Region’s Security Forces present in large areas of Kirkuk and the Disputed Territories, it is important for the fears and concerns of all communities to be allayed through confidence building measures such as legal and constitutional recognition of rights. MERI’s research indicate that one of the major problems in Kirkuk that blocks moving forward towards any solution is the absence of trust among the communities. Constitutional rights may well serve as an important tangible measure that can increase the potential of bringing the communities together with better levels of trust.

To this end MERI’s team reiterated that a very important step for the Kurds to win the trust of the Turkmens, Arabs and Christians in Kirkuk is the provision of constitutional rights; adding “Kurds should implant for the minorities in Kurdistan Region’s constitution what they wanted to be enshrined in the Iraqi constitution.” This should include incorporating the minorities’ symbols in the Kurdistan Region’s flag and national anthem, officially recognizing their distinct languages, promoting their cultural heritage and guaranteeing their right of power-sharing and active role in the overall decision-making process.

Professor Dlawer Ala’Aldeen, President of MERI, emphasized the importance of the task shouldered by the committee while at the same time referring to its sensitivity. He stated that “the different ethnic and religious minorities are closely watching what it is being written while drafting the constitution in relation to their rights.” He also mentioned that the marginalization of communities, whether perceived or real, will only lead to social discord. To avoid this, the Kurdistan Region must build on its reputation as a protector of minorities and guarantee the social, political and cultural rights of all ethno-religious communities.

Present at the meeting was the head of the Committee, Mr. Shorsih Haji, and a large number of committee members, including experts representing different political parties and the Kurdistan Region’s diverse ethnic communities. Besides valuing MERI’s efforts in initiating important projects, the majority of the attendees agreed with the points raised by MERI’s team with regards to the rights of the minorities to be incorporated in the constitution.
Source : http://www.meri-k.org/?p=19951

Voir également : Robin Beaumont : "une politique de kurdification particulièrement autoritaire [dans le nord de l'Irak]"

Massoud Barzani ne veut pas de force militaire yézidie indépendante, ni de drapeau yézidi

Nord de l'Irak : d'après des témoignages, les peshmerga empêchent les déplacés arabes de revenir dans les territoires disputés et pillent les maisons des Assyro-Chaldéens

Nord de l'Irak : les visées territoriales des peshmerga suscitent la colère des Arabes sunnites

Barzan/Barzanke : les nationalistes kurdes craignent que les lourds soupçons de crimes de guerre n'entachent leur image

Barzan (Irak) : un Kurde de nationalité néerlandaise admet en off que les peshmerga ont procédé à des exécutions systématiques de prisonniers de guerre

Université de Kirkouk : tensions entre Kurdes et Arabes à l'occasion de la "journée du drapeau du Kurdistan"

Un peshmerga dans la ville de Makhmour : "Nous les tuerons [les Arabes] dès que les caméras ne seront plus là"

Diyala : des tribus arabes sunnites se retournent contre l'Etat islamique... et contre les peshmerga

Donatella Rovera (Amnesty International) : "Les Arabes ne sont plus autorisés à entrer dans les régions kurdes [d'Irak]"

Kirkouk : grave insécurité et vide administratif

Kirkouk : les déplacés arabes se plaignent de mauvais traitements de la part des Kurdes

Manifestation d'opposants assyriens et turkmènes à Erbil

Selon Matthew Barber, les peshmerga ont réprimé une manifestation de Yézidis dans le camp de Dohouk

Les chrétiens d'Irak : "Les Kurdes ne nous ont pas protégés, le gouvernement irakien ne nous a pas protégés"

Le problème kurde : le nettoyage ethnique dans le "Kurdistan" irakien

Irak : la persécution des Assyro-Chaldéens par les Kurdes

Les réfugiés turkmènes dans le Kurdistan irakien : "Nous ne voulons pas rester dans la région kurde parce que nous ne sommes pas bien traités par les Kurdes"

Mardin : un imam contraint d'abandonner son village à la suite des menaces de mort de partisans du HDP

Imam deserts village after threats for not voting for HDP
FATIH ŞEMSETTIN IŞIK
ISTANBUL
Published June 25, 2015

After numerous pre-election attacks by the PKK, this time an imam was driven to leave a village in a southeastern province, as pro-PKK Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) supporters have threatened him for not casting his vote for the HDP in June 7 general elections.


Since pressure and death threats by pro-PKK HDP supporters still continue to target locals living in Turkey's southeastern provinces after the June 7 general election results were announced, some people have had no choice but to abandon their homes. Halil Özdemir, the imam of Örencik village in the southeastern Mardin province, left the village after being subjected to death threats following the election results that revealed there were two votes not cast for the HDP.

Indicating that he had to relocate due to fear for his life after the elections, Özdemir said, "The elections were not free here. Pro-PKK HDP supporters were saying ‘There won't be a vote for any other party except the HDP in the village; they will only be for HDP.' After it was found that one vote was for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and one for the Free Cause Party (HÜDA PAR), they started to spread rumors. They wanted to point out people as targets." He also remarked that some pro-PKK HDP supporters began to slander him, claiming that he is affiliated with ISIS.

The fact that the AK Party reportedly received one vote only in 1400 ballot boxes of three Kurdish-populated cities in the June 7 general elections casts doubt on the reliability of the conditions of the elections in southeastern Turkey. Regarding the reliability of the elections, AK Party's Mardin deputy Orhan Miroğlu stated before that there is a mechanism to maintain pressure on local people that hindered the elections from being called free and fair. "In many provinces, locals were accounted for four to five votes favoring the AK Party. In Kızıltepe, because of this issue, the AK Party received zero votes in 70 polls. Even one vote is accounted for," he said.
Source : http://www.dailysabah.com/kurdish-issue/2015/06/25/imam-deserts-village-after-threats-for-not-voting-for-hdp

Voir également : Derrière le vote HDP dans le Sud-Est : le poids du tribalisme/féodalisme kurde

Le particularisme anthropologique kurde en Turquie (et ailleurs)

Diyarbakir : meurtre d'un Kurde islamiste et nouveaux affrontements entre Kurdes

Violences : l'hypocrisie de Selahattin Demirtaş

Şırnak (Turquie) : affrontements meurtriers entre partisans du HDP et du Hüda-Par (parti islamiste kurde)

Le "nettoyage idéologique" du PKK

Cizre : accrochages entre Kurdes pro-PKK et Kurdes islamistes

Turquie : affrontements meurtriers entre Kurdes pro-PKK et Kurdes islamistes du Hizbullah

Turquie, EI et PKK : quand les médias dérapent au détriment de l'éthique journalistique

Turquie : des familles kurdes endeuillées par la faute des suppôts du PKK

Manifestations violentes en Turquie : le député Altan Tan (HDP) critique son propre parti et salue l'attitude responsable de Devlet Bahçeli (leader du MHP)

Turquie : des intellectuels kurdes critiquent le parti HDP pour son appel irresponsable à manifester (et ce alors qu'il a voté contre la motion parlementaire turque)

Syrie : des Kurdes affrontent des Kurdes

Kurds fight Kurds in Syria

Mahmut Bozarslan
Contributor,  Turkey Pulse

Mahmut Bozarslan is based in Diyarbakir, the central city of Turkey’s mainly Kurdish southeast. A journalist since 1996, he has worked for the mass-circulation daily Sabah, the NTV news channel, Al Jazeera Turk and Agence France-Presse (AFP), covering the many aspects of the Kurdish question, as well as the local economy and women’s and refugee issues. He has frequently reported also from Iraqi Kurdistan. On Twitter: @mahmutbozarslan

The impoverished province of Bingol, home to some 267,000 people, has emerged as a major IS recruitment base in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. Official figures are not available, but locals estimate at least 600 young men have joined the jihadist group, lured through religious indoctrination and various promises, including money and marriage.

The 18-year-old son of a local grocery owner is one of them. The man, who spoke on condition of anonymity and agreed only to a telephone interview, said he was able to speak only once to his son since he vanished earlier this year.

“My son was a quiet boy. He disappeared two months ago. We wouldn’t have even known he was there [Syria] if he hadn’t called us,” the bereft father told Al-Monitor. “I think he was influenced by friends. I’m just waiting, helpless. I just hope he turns up one day.”

Bingol stands out as a strongly conservative region whose population is overwhelmingly Zaza, an ethnic subgroup in the Kurdish fold. It has long been a major electoral reservoir for conservative and Islamist-leaning parties. The region’s social fabric, however, has propped up not only legal political parties but also outlawed Islamist groups. Militants from Bingol have figured prominently both in the leadership and lower ranks of the Turkish Hezbollah, a Kurdish-dominated Sunni Islamist group with a bloody past. Prominent Hezbollah leader Haci Bayancuk — sentenced to life in 2011 for his role in running the group’s violent campaign in the 1990s — is a native of Bingol. He has been succeeded by his son Halis Bayancuk, known also as Abu Hanzala.

Mehmet Kurt, a Bingol University academic who studied radicalization in Turkey’s southeast during his doctoral studies at London’s Queen Mary University, told Al-Monitor that a complex mix of “strong historic and social dynamics” nourish radicalization in Bingol.

Kurt said that the question of whether Zazas are really Kurdish or not — a debate that has intensified in recent years — contributed to an identity crisis among the Zazas, which often resulted in religious affiliation superseding ethnicity. “This is something the state’s rhetoric has also encouraged,” he said.

“The people’s senses of belonging are often confused and broken. Placing religious identity above ethnic identity becomes easier. For Kurds, in particular, religious identity prevails over ethnicity. Turkey’s assimilationist policies have also contributed to that,” Kurt said. “A Turk could easily define himself as both Muslim and Turkish. For Kurds, however, being Muslim is often perceived as an obstacle to Kurdishness due to historic dynamics and the state’s assimilationist policies. This is especially true for the Zazas in Bingol. Thus, religious identity often takes precedence over ethnic identity and completely obscures it.”

Kurt believes the number of IS militants from Bingol could be lower than 600, but stresses that a large number of people remain potential recruits. To stem the flow, he said, the government needs to step up security measures in the short term and follow up with long-term measures in the socio-economic realm, including education and job creation, to curb radicalization.

While many in Bingol are reluctant to speak openly about relatives with IS, others, like Filit Batir, are not. A retired employee of the local electricity authority, Batir told Al-Monitor how his son Musa, 19, traveled twice to Syria to join first IS and then al-Qaeda before being killed last year in an unknown location.

Batir believes his son was “deceived” into joining the war in Syria, saying he had sought help from the Turkish authorities to get him back, but to no avail. After a first short stint in Syria in 2013, the young man returned to Turkey, but Batir failed to convince him to stay home. Musa ultimately returned in a coffin.

“Shortly after he first went [to Syria], he suddenly came back one day. He didn’t come home but went to his sister in Ankara. I begged him to come home and he finally acquiesced,” Batir said. “He stayed here several months but they took him back again. And one day I got news he was in the hospital in [the Turkish border province of] Hatay. But when I went there, what I received was his body. I brought him home and buried him in our native village.”

Though Bingol has come under the spotlight, Kurds from other regions and various walks of life have also joined IS. In one striking case, an academic at Diyarbakir’s Dicle University, known as a liberal intellectual, lost his three young sons to IS in March.

Tensions between Islamist and nationalist Kurds escalated in October 2014 when some 50 people were killed on both sides in street clashes that erupted during demonstrations against the siege of Kobani and Ankara’s alleged support for the jihadists.
The polarization is perhaps best illustrated in a story of a Kurdish family in Adana, as reported in the Turkish media. The family’s elder son spent a stint with the Kurdistan Workers Party, which has long fought the Turkish state and is closely affiliated with the YPG in Syria. The younger son, meanwhile, joined IS last year. “We’ll behead the YPG guys,” the younger brother reportedly wrote on social media under a picture of himself brandishing a gun.

An estimated 500 Kurds from Iraqi Kurdistan have also joined IS. Most of them are said to be from the Halabja region, which, like Bingol, is known as a conservative stronghold.
Source : http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-kurdish-is-militants-fight-brethren.html

Beaucoup de Kurdes/Zazas de nationalité turque (notamment de Bingöl) ont rejoint le groupe djihadiste al-Nosra, lequel combat l'EI.

Voir également : L'émir de l'EI "Abu Osama al-Kurdi" : un Kurde de Konya

Attentat contre le meeting du HDP : le suspect (Orhan G.) est né dans une famille kurde alévie

Palmyre/Tadmor : un Kurde originaire de Muş (Turquie) est mort dans les rangs de l'EI

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Diffusion de "Konstantiniyye" : l'EI cherche à séduire les Kurdes de Turquie

Allemagne : l'Etat islamique attire de jeunes Kurdes

Islamisme et vocations djihadistes chez les Kurdes

Syrie : davantage de djihadistes en provenance de Russie et de France que de Turquie (pays majoritairement musulman et contigu)

Peu de Turcs parmi les djihadistes en provenance d'Europe de l'Ouest

Allemagne : la remarquable sous-représentation des Turcs chez les djihadistes

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Des mosquées d'Erbil à l'EI : parcours de Kurdes radicalisés

Plus de 250 Kurdes de la région kurde d'Irak sont morts au combat dans les rangs de l'EI

Au total, 500 Kurdes du Kurdistan irakien ont rejoint l'EI, dont trois mollah employés par l'administration kurde

Kobanê : les assaillants (en partie kurdes) de l'EI sont entrés via le territoire syrien, et non via la Turquie

"L'EI attaque Kobani en Syrie, entre dans Hassaka

Par par Tom Perry et Sylvia Westall | Reuters – jeu. 25 juin 2015

par Tom Perry et Sylvia Westall

BEYROUTH (Reuters) - Les djihadistes de l'Etat islamique (EI) ont lancé dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi des offensives simultanées contre l'armée gouvernementale syrienne et les forces kurdes, tentant de reprendre l'initiative après avoir perdu du terrain face aux milices kurdes dans la province de Rakka, bastion de l'organisation islamiste. (...)

Un porte-parole de l'YPG, Redur Xelil, a précisé que les hommes de l'EI étaient entrés à Kobani en venant de l'ouest, à bord de cinq voitures et arborant le drapeau de l'Armée syrienne libre (ASL) afin de tromper les défenseurs de la ville.

"Ils ont ouvert le feu au hasard, ils ont tiré sur tout ce qui bougeait", a dit Redur Xelil à Reuters. Selon l'OSDH, les assaillants portaient des uniformes de l'YPG.

Sur sa page Facebook, l'YPG affirme qu'au moins 15 hommes de l'EI ont été tués à Kobani."

Source : https://fr.news.yahoo.com/offensives-lei-contre-les-kurdes-et-contre-larm%C3%A9e-071801152.html

Footage disproves ISIS car bomb attacker entered from Turkey

Security footage negates ISIS car bomb attacker entered from Turkey border to Syrian town of Kobane
Jun 25, 2015 10:06 GMT

Security camera footage from Turkey’s Mursitpinar border gates - showing the moment of the car involved in the bombing of the Syrian border town of Kobane - shows that the ISIS militants who blew up the cars did not arrive from Turkey’s borders.

Reuters had claimed the cars that exploded had entered from Turkey, attributing the information to “Syrian sources.” It withdrew the allegation later on.

Separate video footage from a security camera in the Suruc district of Turkey's border province of Sanliurfa shows smoke rising after an explosion on Thursday.


According to Anadolu Agency, 18 were killed and at least 40 were injured by the two car bombings executed on Thursday by ISIS in the Syrian border town of Kobane.

The opposition Syrian Revolution Coordinators' Union (SRCU) issued a statement saying that ISIS militants carried out the attack with two bomb-laden vehicles while disguised as Kurdish fighters.

A number of the wounded from the blast were rushed to Suruc State Hospital and other facilities in Sanliurfa, Turkey, via ambulances after crossing through the Mursitpinar crossing into Turkey.

Meanwhile, a crowd has gathered on the Syrian side of the Turkish frontier, prompting security forces to step up measures on the border line.

The governor of Sanliurfa released a statement on Thursday strongly denying the allegations claiming that Turkey allowed militants from ISIS to enter Kobane through the Turkish border.

Related Story
Turkey denies claims of allowing ISIS militants into Kobane

Stating that the allegations are certainly untrue, governor Izzettin Kucuk said, “According to our visual data, it is proven that ISIS militants entered to Kobani from the Syrian province of Jarabulus, located in the west of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border. We will publish the footage within the shortest time.”

One of the biggest battles against ISIS took place in Kobane last year. Supported by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, Syrian-Kurdish fighters from the YPG – the military wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party – regained control over Kobane near the end of January after four months of fighting.

Source: TRT World and agencies
Source : http://beta.trtworld.com/news.php?q=turkey-footage-disproves-isis-car-bomb-attacker-entry-from-turkey-3680

Voir également : Kobanê attaquée par des Kurdes de l'EI

Contrairement au mensonge des ultra-nationalistes kurdes sur les réseaux sociaux, la Turquie d'Erdogan ne soutient pas l'EI à Tell Abyad mais l'ASL (équipement)

Kobanê : réfutation des allégations autour d'une attaque de l'EI depuis le territoire turc

Frontière turco-syrienne : l'activiste kurde Saradar K. admet qu'il n'y a rien de suspect dans l'attitude des soldats turcs

Turquie, EI et PKK : quand les médias dérapent au détriment de l'éthique journalistique

Le mythe de l'abandon des Kurdes syriens par la Turquie

RAPPEL : la Turquie a déjà bombardé à plusieurs reprises les positions de l’Etat islamique (EIIL)

Terrorisme : Metin Karasular (un trafiquant de drogue et d'armes proche du PKK) avoue avoir été en contact avec Amedy Coulibaly

Selon une carte, le trafic de pétrole de l'EI passe par Hassakeh (contrôlée par le PYD et Assad) et le Kurdistan irakien

Selon le journaliste kurde Reshid Sekvan, il est arrivé à l'EI de passer des accords pragmatiques avec les "combattants kurdes" (YPG ou peshmerga ?)

Quand les forces nationalistes kurdes s'acoquinaient avec l'EIIL

Kobanê attaquée par des Kurdes de l'EI

Islamic State attacks Kobane 5 months after ouster; scores reported killed

By Liz Sly June 25

SANLIURFA, Turkey — Islamic State militants stormed into the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane on Thursday, launching suicide attacks and gunning down civilians five months after the extremists were driven from the area with the help of U.S.-led airstrikes.

Assailants in five cars penetrated Kurdish defenses shortly before dawn, carried out a suicide bombing and then fanned out in an apparent attempt to blast their way into the town on the Syrian-Turkish border, said Redur Xelil, a spokesman for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which reclaimed Kobane in January.

The attackers — numbering about 30 — wore YPG uniforms and flew the flags of the opposition Free Syrian Army on their vehicles, Xelil said. They moved through the streets randomly shooting at civilians, killing and wounding scores, then detonating suicide vests as Kurdish forces closed in, according to Xelil and witnesses.

Authorities in Turkey said 63 civilians from Kobane were admitted to Turkish hospitals.


By nightfall, most of the militants had been captured, killed or surrounded, and Kurdish forces were reported to be restoring order. But the attack was a reminder of the Islamic State’s continued ability to upset the battlefield even when it appears to be on the defensive.

In recent weeks, the group has suffered defeats in nearby Raqqa province. The capture last week of the border town of Tal Abyad, the militants’ most important conduit for trade and the flow of foreign fighters, was followed by a Kurdish-Syrian rebel force’s advances farther south toward the city of Raqqa, the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed capital.

[Map: Foreign fighters flow to Syria]

Xelil said the Kobane attack by the Islamic State — also known as ISIS, ISIL and Daesh — was intended to divert attention from the group’s recent setbacks.

“This is related to the success we achieved. Daesh wants to raise the spirits of its fighters, but I don’t think they can succeed,” he said.

One of the targets of the attack appeared to be the leader of the main Syrian rebel battalion fighting alongside the Kurds, according to Abu Shujaa, a spokesman for the battalion, Thuwar al-Raqqa, or Raqqa Revolutionaries. During the attack, Kurdish-speaking assailants in Kurdish uniforms went to the home of the leader, known as Abu Issa, asked for him and then opened fire, wounding six of his female relatives, Abu Shujaa said.

The assault represents the first major setback for Kurdish forces in Kobane since the Islamic State initially launched an offensive to capture the town in September, triggering the most intense airstrikes so far in the U.S.-led campaign against the group.

[Graphic: Visualizing the 220,000 lives lost in Syria]

Kobane became a symbol of both Kurdish and American determination to confront the Islamic State, and U.S. officials regularly point to the victory there as an example of the progress that can be made when resolute ground forces are backed by concerted U.S. air power.

The location of Thursday’s attack — on the northern edge of town adjoining the Turkish border — drew allegations of Turkish involvement from Kurdish activists. The Kurds have long accused Turkey of covertly helping the Islamic State to prevent the Kurds from consolidating control over territory adjoining the country. On its Facebook page, the YPG accused “the fascist Turkish army” of facilitating the attack, and on Twitter, the hashtag #TerroristTurkey trended worldwide.

Turkey strenuously denied the charge and released CCTV footage from its side of the border showing that the first suicide bomber drove his car from the Syrian side.

“By using the latest attack in Kobane as a pretext, some dirty circles are attempting to put Turkey on the target board,” Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus said.

Tanju Bilgic, a Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, said the government had evidence that the convoy of assailants was dispatched from the Islamic State-controlled Syrian town of Jarablus farther west, on the opposite bank of the Euphrates River. “We deny the allegation ISIS crossed the border from Turkey,” he said.

According to Abu Shujaa, all the assailants were Kurdish, many of them from Iraq, and they infiltrated Kobane by mingling with refugees returning to the devastated town.


Xelil said the convoy of cars originally approached Kobane from the southwest, but he disputed the idea that the assailants could have come from Jarablus, saying bridges across the Euphrates have been blown up.

“Where they came from is a confusing question,” he said. “There are still ongoing investigations.”

Also Thursday, a coalition of mostly moderate rebel units launched an offensive to capture the southern Syrian city of Daraa from the government. If successful, the offensive would effectively leave President Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly beleaguered forces without a major foothold in southern Syria and further shift the balance of power.

The United States announced Thursday that it would send more than $360 million in additional assistance for those affected by the conflict, which began in 2011.
Source : http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/islamic-state-returns-to-kobane-five-months-after-it-was-driven-out/2015/06/25/43498253-efce-44f8-bc6d-3000acc87d4e_story.html

"Wladimir ‏@vvanwilgenburg 25 juin

Kurdish IS social media accounts are celebrating IS-attacks in Kobani and Hasakah."

Source : https://twitter.com/vvanwilgenburg/status/614004131821408256

Voir également : Kobanê : des Kurdes (irakiens et syriens) apportent une aide cruciale à l'EI

"Génocide" des Kurdes ? Abou Khattab al-Kurdi (un Kurde d'Halabja) commande l'offensive de l'EI sur Kobanê

Le frère du commandant Abou Khattab al-Kurdi (EI) était lui aussi djihadiste

Le Kurde de l'EI qui a décapité un peshmerga a été identifié : il appartient à la tribu des Zebari

Décapitation d'un peshmerga par l'EI : l'histoire du djihadiste kurde Mouafak et de ses deux frères

Selon un commandant des peshmerga, l'EI a utilisé des Kurdes comme éclaireurs pour son offensive sur le Kurdistan irakien

Attentat-suicide de l'EI à Erbil : l'auteur est Abdulrahman al-Kurdi, un Kurde

Kulajo (Irak) : le kamikaze de l'EI aurait été kurde

Plus de 250 Kurdes de la région kurde d'Irak sont morts au combat dans les rangs de l'EI

Au total, 500 Kurdes du Kurdistan irakien ont rejoint l'EI, dont trois mollah employés par l'administration kurde

Wassim Nasr : "on trouve même des Kurdes, notamment dans la ville d’Halabja, qui rejoignent les rangs des djihadistes de l’Etat islamique"

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

samedi 20 juin 2015

L'émir de l'EI "Abu Osama al-Kurdi" : un Kurde de Konya

"The Turkish unit that Peri was assigned to was led by an “emir” whose nom de guerre was Abu Osama al-Kurdi. An ethnic Kurd from Konya in central Anatolia, Kurdi had fought in Afghanistan. He “was the general emir," Peri recalled. "He also decided how the units were divided, like ‘Ten people go here and 10 people there.'” Kurdi’s brother Abdussalam was also part of the brigade. “He was the military emir, that is, the person who commanded us militarily.”"

Source : http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/turkey-syria-iraq-isis-new-turkish-unit-lures-kurds.html

Voir également : Attentat contre le meeting du HDP : le suspect (Orhan G.) est né dans une famille kurde alévie

Palmyre/Tadmor : un Kurde originaire de Muş (Turquie) est mort dans les rangs de l'EI

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Diffusion de "Konstantiniyye" : l'EI cherche à séduire les Kurdes de Turquie

Allemagne : l'Etat islamique attire de jeunes Kurdes

Islamisme et vocations djihadistes chez les Kurdes

Syrie : davantage de djihadistes en provenance de Russie et de France que de Turquie (pays majoritairement musulman et contigu)

Peu de Turcs parmi les djihadistes en provenance d'Europe de l'Ouest

Allemagne : la remarquable sous-représentation des Turcs chez les djihadistes

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Des mosquées d'Erbil à l'EI : parcours de Kurdes radicalisés

Plus de 250 Kurdes de la région kurde d'Irak sont morts au combat dans les rangs de l'EI

Au total, 500 Kurdes du Kurdistan irakien ont rejoint l'EI, dont trois mollah employés par l'administration kurde

Qamishli : les chrétiens résistent au recrutement forcé dans les YPG

Al-Qamishli: Christians resist forcible recruitment

KURDWATCH, June 12, 2015—On June 4, 2015, fighters for the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) People’s Defense Units (YPG) tried to recruit young men at an internet café in the predominantly Christian district of al‑Wusta in al‑Qamishli. When the men resisted, shots were fired and one YPG fighter was reportedly seriously injured. The situation escalated further with the arrival of vehicles of the regime-affiliated Christian Sootoro militia. Fighters on both sides fired into the air. Civilians were removed from the vicinity. The outcome of the conflict is unclear.
Source : http://www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3455&z=en&cure=1029

Voir également : Les Gardes assyriens de Khabour cessent de participer au combat contre l'EI, en raison des exactions du PKK-YPG

Les fédérations assyriennes d'Allemagne et de Suède accusent les YPG de l'assassinat d'un leader assyrien en Syrie
  
 
Syrie : un leader assyrien a été assassiné par les YPG
 
Syrie : la dernière famille chrétienne syriaque a fui la ville d'Amouda (contrôlée par le PYD)

Un chrétien assyrien d'Hassaka : "Ni l'armée syrienne, ni les Kurdes [YPG] ne nous protègent"

 

Plusieurs volontaires chrétiens occidentaux quittent les YPG car rebutés par leur idéologie communiste
 
Sud-est de la Turquie : le gouvernement turc tente de protéger les chrétiens de Tur Abdin des attaques kurdes (notamment du PKK et du Hizbullah kurde)

Abus des YPG dans le nord de la Syrie : les témoignages et les craintes des Arabes et Turkmènes

"Malgré les risques, les réfugiés de Tall Abyad pressés de retrouver la Syrie

turquie

"Nous avons survécu, mais nous avons peut-être tout perdu dans notre fuite".
OLJ/AFP/ Dilay GUNDOGAN
17/06/2015

Ils reconnaissent le risque d'une reprise des combats et d'un retour des jihadistes. Mais dès que la bataille a cessé, les réfugiés qui ont quitté la ville syrienne de Tall Abyad pour se mettre à l'abri en Turquie n'ont eu de cesse que d'y retourner. Au plus vite. (...)

Fahriye Behedi, 40 ans, se presse elle aussi devant les policiers turcs qui laissent passer un à un les Syriens de retour à Tall Abyad. Même si elle avoue avoir toujours peur de possibles frappes aériennes de la coalition internationale antijihadiste.
"Je rentre, j'ai laissé mon mari là-bas", explique-t-elle, le visage dissimulé sous un foulard islamique noir. "Mais j'ai toujours très peur des bombes. Qui ne serait pas effrayé par les bombes ? Quand j'ai entendu le bruit qui venait, c'était effrayant". "Nous avons survécu, mais nous avons peut-être tout perdu dans notre fuite", poursuit Fahriye, "je ne sais pas si ma maison de deux étages est toujours debout et je me prépare à être obligée de partir une nouvelle fois".

Dans la masse des quelque 23.000 réfugiés qui ont passé la frontière depuis deux semaines, tous ne sont pas pressés de rentrer. Les vainqueurs kurdes de la bataille de Tall Abyad n'inspirent pas confiance à sa population en majorité arabe. Seyh Deham Haseki, 60 ans, assure même que les militants kurdes sont "pires" que les jihadistes. "Nous n'accepterons pas les Kurdes parce que ce n'est pas leur terre", proclame-t-il, "c'est la terre des Arabes et nous les combattrons jusqu'au bout"."

Source : http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/930212/malgre-les-risques-les-refugies-de-tall-abyad-presses-de-retrouver-la-syrie.html

"Kurdish forces deny claims of abuse in towns they liberate from IS

Date
    June 19, 2015

Ruth Pollard
Middle East Correspondent

View more articles from Ruth Pollard

Akcakale, Turkey: The people of Tel Abyad know what it is to bend to the political will of the day.

In the last three years they have been ruled by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Free Syrian Army, al-Qaeda's Nusra Front, the Islamists of Ahrar al-Sham, the Islamic State and now the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG). (...)

When the YPG captured the border town of Ras al-Ayn in July 2013 some families, like that of schoolteacher Basma, say they experienced a months-long campaign of harassment that eventually drove them to flee.

Her husband, also a schoolteacher, was involved in the movement to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from the beginning of the 2011 revolution.

"When the YPG took control of the town my husband left and fled to Turkey," Basma says in the sitting room of the small flat in the Turkish city of Sanliurfa she shares with 14 other family members.

"The YPG would send out a patrol every day to let us know we were no longer welcome in our village," she says. "They turned our lives into a nightmare."


"I asked them 'what is this if it is not ethnic cleansing?' They replied 'call it what you like, you have to leave'."

Another told her: "You Arabs here are not welcome, you used to be with the Free Syrian Army and now you may be against us."

In the meantime, officials from the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) tried to convince her to join, promising her a peaceful life and even offering to ensure her an 85 per cent vote if she ran in local elections, Basma recounts with some incredulity.

The taunts, Basma says, continued to escalate until the situation passed the point of no return.

"A local commander of the YPG said to me 'how long did it take you to build this very nice house?' I replied it had taken my husband and I 13 years to build our house and he said 'watch how fast it will burn'."

"I watched it burn. We lost everything, including all my official papers, my ID, my mother-in-law's and my father-in-law's ID. Everything."


Then on February 5, 2014, the final straw: a YPG patrol again came to her door, grabbed her then five-year-old son Assadullah and threatened to hold him until her husband returned to Syria.

"I took Assadullah and my two other children and we went the a nearby village the next day … the YPG patrols were passing by the house every day, so we had to hide to make sure we were not discovered."

By now they had lost everything, she says: 1000 dunams [one square kilometre] of land, their wheat and barley crops, their agricultural equipment, generators, their house and the houses of her brothers-in-law.

Bringing her elderly parents-in-law with her, Basma took the family to Turkey, where they live in the uncertainty that is a constant for refugees. Her children cannot go to school and her husband and his brothers have been warned they "may" be on a YPG wanted list, like so many who supported the Free Syrian Army.

Giving up all hope of returning to Syria, her husband paid a smuggler to take him to Sweden and the family is awaiting word on their application for reunification.

At least three other families interviewed by Fairfax Media – from Tel Hamis, Tel Tamer and Tel Abyad – also made allegations that the YPG had driven them out of their villages. In each case the increasing intensity of air strikes from the US-led coalition and the Syrian regime was also a significant factor in forcing the families to flee.

The accusation of ethnic cleansing - made both by families and by a coalition of Syrian rebel groups - is not supported with evidence of ethnic or sectarian killings.

Regardless, it is further fuelling tensions between Arabs and Kurds in a country that is in its fifth year of a civil war that has left more than 220,000 dead, up to 9 million internally displaced and just under 4 million as refugees.

Kurdish political and military officials vehemently deny the allegations that their forces are attempting to drive Arab populations out of  Kurdish-controlled areas in Hasaka province and now Tel Abyad.

Describing the allegations as "fabricated", YPG spokesman Redur Khalil wrote on his Facebook page: "We have liberated about one thousand [villages] recently, you can come here and … [see] how they live with dignity."

Mr Khalil encouraged people to stay in their homes or seek the safety of other provinces under YPG protection. "They can return to their villages and property when security comes back to the region," he wrote.

Fairfax Media made repeated attempts to contact Mr Khalil but he did not respond by the time of publication.

Human rights groups have expressed concern about the allegations.


"We're concerned about a growing number of reports of abuses by YPG forces which we are seeking to investigate further," Neil Sammonds, Amnesty's Syria, Lebanon and Jordan researcher said.


"These include multiple incidents of forced displacement over a number of months, at times based on ethnicity, and forced conscription without potential access to alternative civilian roles."


The capture of Tel Abyad gives the Syrian Kurds control of around 400 kilometres of the Syrian-Turkish border, one of the main pathways used by foreign fighters joining IS, who now control just one border crossing east of the town of Jarabulus.

After their successful push on Kobane [also known as Ayn al-Arab] and later Tel Hamis, the YPG has emerged as a significant partner for the US-led coalition that is conducting air strikes against IS in Syria and Iraq – a coalition of which Australia is a member.

A Defence Departmen spokesman said Australia had not provided military supplies to the YPG and that there was an Australian arms embargo on Syria.

"In support of the international effort against [Islamic State], and with the consent of the Iraqi government, the Australian Defence Force has completed six military store supply missions from Europe via Baghdad to Erbil since September 2014, to deliver arms and ammunition to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq," the spokesman added. "The Kurdistan Regional Government is providing assurances to the US and other international partners regarding the use of this military equipment."

The Pentagon acknowledged this week that it was aware of the allegations against its Kurdish partners.


"We certainly have seen these reports, and it is something that we are watching for," Pentagon spokesman Colonel Steve Warren said. "Without question it is something that we'll find unacceptable, if true.""

Source : http://www.smh.com.au/world/kurdish-forces-accused-of-ethnic-cleansing-on-syrias-northern-frontier-20150619-ghs7uo?stb=twt&skin=dumb-phone

PYD did not allow us to return back home: Syrian refugees

Syrian refugees speak of their ordeal in the Turkish border town where they found a shelter after being driven out from their home by the Kurdish YPG militia

Yeni Şafak |  | 18 June 2015, 17:24

Syrian refugees, who crossed into Turkey after run out of town by the Kurdish YPG militia during the military campaign targeting Tel Abyad, say that the Syrian Democratic Union Party, or PYD, did not let them stay in their land.


Mehmet Halef, a Syrian Turkmen refugee who found a shelter in the Akçakale town, said his family was forcibly evacuated from the country they had been living ln.


“We were continuously changing our location due to the air strikes. When armed Kurdish groups came into the location where we were staying, they forced us to leave the area. They did not allow us to return back to our home," he said.
“They didn't even speak to us and ask our names."

Popular Protection Units, or YPG, the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, or PYD, has been conducting a large-scale offensive since late May. The purpose of the campaign, supported by the U.S.-backed strikes, is apparently to capture Tel Abyad province in order to link Kurdish-held cantons in northern Syria. Many of the Turkmen commanders suggest the PYD's ambition of claiming a strong autonomy in northern Syria will gain momentum after Tel Abyad falls to the Kurdish militia.

Halef's wife Rima said she failed to overcome the fear she had been caught up with when the armed Kurdish groups forced them to leave, taking with them only their children. “They were attacking and looting. We did not dare to look around to see who were killed and who survived," she explained.

Rima said that the Turkish military offered a warm welcome to her family. “They have given us new garments and food. Even a Turkish soldier who was holding my two children."

Another Syrian Turkmen refugee, Muqtad Hafi, who took shelter in the same refugee camp in Akçakale, said that the coalition jet fighters were bombing everywhere on their route. “PYD's armed forces raided our village and dispersed innocent people from their homes," he said.

“A huge number of people were driven out from their homes. They sent away innocent people from their homes,"
he said, adding that he was working as an English teacher before being dispersed from his home town.

The Şanlıurfa municipality has teamed up with the military, local NGOs and relief agencies to cover humanitarian needs of refugees, who fled into the Turkish border town, Akçakale. The Turkish Red Crescent, or Kızılay, has sent mobile kitchen equipment to the refugee camp, to serve food three times a day by cooperating with the local authority.

Doctors, sent by the Health Ministry, have examined and offered free medicines to every refugee who needs a certain remedy. Young children, considered as a risk group, have been allowed into the Turkish territory, after being vaccinated against polio and measles.

An estimated 1.7 million Syrian refugees have found shelter in Turkey as of April 2015, according to the United Nations Human Rights Council, UNHRC. The UN's refugee agency suggests 804,000 more Syrians may cross into Turkey as refugees by the end of 2015' as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levants, or ISIL, poses a security risk for those living in the areas near the Turkish-Syrian border.
Source : http://english.yenisafak.com/news/pyd-did-not-allow-us-to-return-back-home-syrian-refugees-2169336

Syrian Kurdish YPG threatens Arab populations with coalition airstirkes

YUSUF SELMAN İNANÇ
@yusufsinanc
ISTANBUL
Published 18 hours ago

After seizing the town of Tel Abyad near the Turkish border, YPG fighters, who have been accused of ethnic cleansing, have reportedly been threatening local people with coalition strikes, a group of Syrian activists has claimed


The Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Protection Units (YPG) have been alleged to be systemically attacking Arab and Turkmen residents of Tel Abyad and setting dozens of villages into fire, Anadolu Agency reported based on a claim in a report, published by a group of Syrians. The group claimed that Kurdish fighters attack Arabs, confiscate property and force them to leave the towns that they capture. The expansion of Kurdish influence in Syria, however, comes at a price, according to various reports, which indicate that Arab and Turkmen populations in the regions have been targeted by the Kurdish forces.

One of these reports is the recently released 'Save Cezire canton from YPG' named campaign, according to which YPG militia have been appropriating Syrian Arabs' houses in El Haseke and placing others in them. One of the officials of the campaign, Ali el-Haris told Anadolu Agency reporter: "There have been many violations in El Haseke's suburbs. Rasulayn village, its rural areas, and southwestern areas have been evacuated." Haris claimed that YPG militia has joined forces with the Syrian regime and massacred the people in the regions they have occupied. He said, "YPG forces are threatening the people with giving their villages' coordination to U.S.-led coalition for their bombardment in case the villagers resist against them."

According to the report, 60 people have been killed, and 80 houses have been burned down in YPG's 22 February 22, 2014 dated attacks in El Haseke's villages. The report has also claimed that tens of people from the Tel Berrak village, among which were children and women, have been put into YPG prisons, under allegations that they were ISIS militants. Among these, five have died in the prison, according to the report. Also, Tel Hamis district's Arab villages have suffered various attacks in YPG's March 2014 operation, the report said. In these attacks, the houses have been reportedly plundered, and the people trying to flee have been shot down.

After Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants lost the battle in Tal Abyad against the PKK-linked PYD and its armed wing, the People's Protection Unit (YPG), ISIS has intensified attacks on Azaz, which is near the Turkish border and controlled by the Free Syrian Army FSA. Azaz is strategically important for moderate rebel groups for keeping the supply line with Aleppo and Idlib alive. If it is captured by ISIS, the rebels will have received a blow to their recent advances both in Idlib and in Aleppo's north.

Although the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition has conducted aerial attacks on the militant group in Raqqa and Tal Abyad, there has been no attack near Azaz. FSA brigades that were pushed back had to retreat as ISIS militants were eagerly fighting after fleeing from Tal Abyad. Some pro-FSA activists on Twitter asked why the U.S. has not hit ISIS targets near Azaz. Some activists shared posts saying that the U.S. does not launch airstrikes when the FSA fights ISIS but immediately hits the targets if the YPG is battling ISIS.

While the battles have intensified, Turkey is preparing for a new wave of refugees, as thousands may flee if ISIS captures Azaz. Turkey is also concerned about the YPG's advance in the region, as a new de facto Kurdish state may be created by the PKK and its Syrian branch. Turkey considers the two groups a national security threat. Turkey accepted thousands of refugees after the YPG captured Tal Abyad. According to activists reporting from close to the border, the YPG is blocking the return of refugees to Tal Abyad. However, some pro-YPG sources claimed that Kurdish fighters welcomed the local people.

A refugee who fled to Turkey from Tal Abyad said, "The bombing was very intense. I was scared that a blockade might be established, or that the YPG might kick us out or might accuse us of supporting ISIS. I read many news reports that documented systematic ethnic cleansing campaigns against Arabs in the areas now controlled by the YPG." Many other comments from different refugees have been reported by several media outlets as well.

As part of its Syrian policy, the U.S. directly supports the armed Kurdish factions. U.S. officials consider as the PYD and the YPG battle against ISIS as legitimate, even though the PYD is the Syrian affiliate of the PKK, which is on the terror list of many countries, including the U.S., EU and Turkey. The PKK has engaged in a long war against Turkey with the aim of separating Turkey's southeast to establish an independent Kurdistan that will contain Kurdish areas in Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey began a reconciliation process by investing in the area and presenting democratization packages.

Despite the ongoing peaceful era, which has recently run into trouble with the PKK organizing violent protests and killing innocent people, Turkey considers the PKK and its factions as a threat, and demands its allies regard the concerns of the organization.
Kurds have become a significant part of the war and gained the capability to change the balance of the war after Kobani, a Kurdish town, was besieged by ISIS last year. Unified Kurdish factions defeated the militant group. The PYD, which allied with the Syrian regime and opposes the Syrian revolution, has begun allying with some local armed groups loyal to the FSA.

*Didem Atakan contributed to the report
Source : http://www.dailysabah.com/mideast/2015/06/19/syrian-kurdish-ypg-threatens-arab-populations-with-coalition-airstirkes

Kurds triumph in latest advance, but fears grow among other Syrians

By Roy Gutman

McClatchy Foreign StaffJune 19, 2015  
ISTANBUL — An enormous yellow flag with a red star in the middle hangs over the main square in Tel Abyad, the Syrian border town just seized from Islamic State extremists by a U.S.-backed Kurdish militia.

For Syrian Kurds, it’s a symbol of triumph. Other Syrians, though, fear the flag is the harbinger of expulsion and possibly the breakup of Syria.

Aided by U.S. airstrikes, the People’s Protection Units, or YPG, took over the strategic town Tuesday after weeks of fighting in surrounding villages. But there was no battle of Tel Abyad, for the Islamic State forces departed without a fight, U.S. officials said.

State Department officials called the fall of the town a “significant victory.”

There’s little question that the Kurds’ advance has closed the gateway for foreign volunteers flocking to join the Islamic State, whose self-styled capital is in Raqqa, 60 miles to the south. And few Syrians, no matter their origin, will miss the black flag of the extremists, nor their harsh rules and brutal punishments.

But they also fear the Kurdish militia. As the YPG approached Tel Abyad, Arabs and Turkmen, who comprise 90 percent of the town’s population, fled to other Syrian villages or to Turkey, which registered 25,000 refugees in one week, adding to the estimated 2 million-plus already there.

The YPG is the Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which has long sought an independent Kurdish state and had been designated a terrorist group in the U.S., the European Union and Turkey.

The new arrivals in Turkey told reporters they feared that non-Kurds will be mistreated or expelled. This already has occurred in nearby Hasaka province and near Kobani, the Kurdish town 35 miles west of Tel Abyad that was save from Islamic State capture last autumn by a massive wave of U.S. airstrikes.

With U.S. help, the Kurdish militia now controls over 90 percent of neighboring Hasaka province, U.S. officials say, and there is now a land link between Qamishli in the east, the most populous Kurdish city in northern Syria, and Kobani. Only Afrin, in northwest Syria, remains unconnected.

The YPG and its parent organization, the PKK, favor creation of a Kurdish state of Rojava, or West Kurdistan. Kurdish gains have raised tensions with the hundreds of thousands of Arabs, Turkmen and other minorities who to do not share the dream of a Kurdish state.


The Syrian opposition coalition, which groups the political forces opposed to Syrian President Bashar Assad, announced Thursday in Istanbul that it is sending a fact-finding committee to look into allegations of “ethnic cleansing” in Tel Abyad and surrounding villages.

The Obama administration, which has used the YPG as its “silver bullet” for fighting the Islamic State in Syria, this week voiced public concern about the Kurdish militia’s treatment of non-Kurds.

White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Wednesday that forces fighting the Islamic State should make “concerted efforts to protect local populations and property and secure the human rights of all citizens.” That message is one “that we continue to deliver to all of our partners,” he said.

The U.S. Central Command, which coordinates airstrikes with the Kurdish militia, has told the group that it will not tolerate “any inhumanity, even perceived,” said a U.S. official who was not authorized to speak on the record to journalists.

Kurdish officials have acknowledged indirectly that most civilians have left Tel Abyad, saying they will be welcome to return as soon as the militia has cleared it of mines. Salih Muslim, the co-president of the Democratic Union Party, the political wing of the Kurdish militia, promised in an interview with a Turkish newspaper to set up a local parliament and then promised that all Kurdish militia forces would leave the city.

That could be a long time off. Muslim said Kobani still has not been cleared of mines, and 50 people there have been killed by mines.

The rising tensions between Kurds and other Syrians, which can be tracked on social media, already have caused a rift in the Syrian Journalists Union, set up in 2012 in opposition to the Assad regime. Kurdish journalist Massud Ikko, the deputy chairman, posted a notice this week on Facebook that he would seek a federal government in Damascus or a separate state for Kurds, and he compared the Kurds to the Palestinians, who he said deserve their own state. At least four journalists quit immediately in protest.

Still to be explained is why the Islamic State decided to conserve its forces after its dramatic takeovers of Ramadi, the capital of Sunni northern Iraq, and Tadmur and Palmyra, strategically important towns in eastern Syria.

According to the U.S. official, prior to entering Tel Abyad, the Kurdish militia sent an advance party to determine the level of resistance it would face, only to learn that the Islamic State was retreating en masse. As the Islamic State fighters moved out, the Kurdish militia moved in, said the official.

One possible reason the Islamic State abandoned Tel Abyad was to avoid turning it into a killing field for its forces, as occurred in Kobani.

Syrian observers noted that the first signs of an Islamic State pullout from Tel Abyad coincided with a deployment of its forces near Azaz, 110 miles to the west. There, in a region where the U.S. military rarely conducts airstrikes, the Islamic State mounted an offensive apparently aimed at closing off a principal border crossing for supplying northern Syria, including weapons destined for moderate rebel forces.

McClatchy special correspondents Mousab Alhamadee in Istanbul, Duygu Guvenc in Ankara and Zakaria Zakaria in Sanliurfa, Turkey, contributed.
Source : http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/06/19/270609/kurds-triumph-in-latest-advance.html

Voir également : Frontière turco-syrienne : les YPG empêchent des réfugiés syriens de retourner à Tell Abyad

Une quinzaine de groupes rebelles syriens accusent le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique à Tell Abyad

Tell Abyad : "inquiétude" des Américains après les témoignages de réfugiés arabes et turcomans quant au nettoyage ethnique accompli par le PYD-YPG


Selon un responsable de l'ASL, l'offensive de l'EI sur Azaz a pour but de favoriser l'expansion du PYD au détriment de la rébellion syrienne

En 2013, Salih Muslim (leader du PYD) annonçait son intention d'expulser les "colons" arabes

Syrie : le PYD-YPG a chassé des milliers de civils arabes en incendiant leurs maisons

La Coalition nationale syrienne condamne les crimes du PYD contre les populations arabes et kurdes à Hassakeh
 
Ras al-Ayn : le PYD-YPG provoque l'exode des populations arabes

Selon Siraj al-Din al-Hasakawi (activiste syrien), les YPG veulent modifier la carte démographique de la région d'Hassaka    

Le gouvernement intérimaire syrien condamne les exactions des YPG à Hassaka
 
Sham News Network confirme que les YPG ont incendié des villages arabes à Tall Hamis

Tall Hamis : les YPG pillent et incendient des villages arabes

Carnegie Endowment : "il existe des rapports sur des civils arabes fuyant l'avancée de l'YPG plus au Sud"
 
Syrie : le PKK-YPG tue des dizaines de civils à Hasaka
 
La Coalition nationale syrienne maintient que le PKK-YPG a commis un massacre de civils dans la région d'Hasaka
 
13 personnes d'une même famille tuées dans le village de Matiniya : un nouveau massacre de civils par le PKK-YPG ?

L'opposition syrienne (dont fait partie le Conseil national kurde) accuse le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique
 
Irak : diverses sources confirment l'existence d'exactions perpétrées par le PKK-YPG dans des villages arabes

Frontière turco-syrienne : les YPG empêchent des réfugiés syriens de retourner à Tell Abyad

Les PYD empêchent des réfugiés syriens de rentrer dans leur pays

18 Juin 2015 18:12 (Dernière mise a jour 18 Juin 2015 18:15)
Les "Unités de Protection du Peuple" ont bloqué le point de passage frontalier avec la Turquie de Tel Abyadh.

 AA / Şanlıurfa (Turquie)

Les «Unités de protection du Peuple» kurdes ont bloqué, jeudi, le point de passage frontalier avec la Turquie de Tel Abyadh, face aux nombreux syriens désirant retourner chez eux.

Selon le correspondant d’Anadolu, des groupes de Syriens qui avaient récemment fui les combats dans la ville de Tel Abyadh, se sont rassemblés, jeudi matin, du côté turc des frontières devant le point de passage de Akçakaleyê qui fait face au point de passage syrien de Tel Abyadh, après que les responsables turcs leur ait accordé l’autorisation de rentrer chez eux.

La même source a ajouté que les unités de protection du peuple relevant du Parti syrien de l’Union Démocratique kurde (PYD), qui contrôlent la région de Tel Abyadh depuis quelques jours, ont bloqué le point de passage, empêchant ainsi les réfugiés de rentrer dans leur pays.

Empêchés de retourner chez eux, de nombreux Syriens ont exprimé leur colère. Hamad al-Aly, un des Syriens interdits de passer, a dit «attendre depuis des heures, tout en observant le jeûne, pour rentrer dans son pays. Cependant, la fermeture du point de passage l’en a empêché».

A son tour, Mariem Issa, qui patiente sous un soleil de plomb, accompagnée de ses enfants en bas âge, ne décolère pas. Elle a lâché au correspondant d’Anadolu : «Quel type d’êtres humains sont-ils ? N’ont-ils pas peur de Dieu ? Ils ont pris le contrôle de la région et expulsé ses habitants», allusion faite aux unités du PYD.
Source : http://www.aa.com.tr/fr/u/540231--les-pyd-empechent-des-refugies-syriens-de-rentrer-dans-leur-pays

Voir également : Une quinzaine de groupes rebelles syriens accusent le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique à Tell Abyad

Tell Abyad : "inquiétude" des Américains après les témoignages de réfugiés arabes et turcomans quant au nettoyage ethnique accompli par le PYD-YPG

En 2013, Salih Muslim (leader du PYD) annonçait son intention d'expulser les "colons" arabes

Syrie : le PYD-YPG a chassé des milliers de civils arabes en incendiant leurs maisons
 

La Coalition nationale syrienne condamne les crimes du PYD contre les populations arabes et kurdes à Hassakeh
 
 
Ras al-Ayn : le PYD-YPG provoque l'exode des populations arabes
 

Selon Siraj al-Din al-Hasakawi (activiste syrien), les YPG veulent modifier la carte démographique de la région d'Hassaka    
 

Le gouvernement intérimaire syrien condamne les exactions des YPG à Hassaka
 
 
Sham News Network confirme que les YPG ont incendié des villages arabes à Tall Hamis
 

Tall Hamis : les YPG pillent et incendient des villages arabes
 

Carnegie Endowment : "il existe des rapports sur des civils arabes fuyant l'avancée de l'YPG plus au Sud"
 
Syrie : le PKK-YPG tue des dizaines de civils à Hasaka
 
La Coalition nationale syrienne maintient que le PKK-YPG a commis un massacre de civils dans la région d'Hasaka
 
13 personnes d'une même famille tuées dans le village de Matiniya : un nouveau massacre de civils par le PKK-YPG ?

L'opposition syrienne (dont fait partie le Conseil national kurde) accuse le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique
 
Irak : diverses sources confirment l'existence d'exactions perpétrées par le PKK-YPG dans des villages arabes

Selon un responsable de l'ASL, l'offensive de l'EI sur Azaz a pour but de favoriser l'expansion du PYD au détriment de la rébellion syrienne

ISIL offensive on Azez aims to expand PYD control in the region: FSA

The ISIL offensive in the Azez town, which is now controlled by the FSA-aligned groups, aims to help the PYD exercise its power in an expanded area along the Syrian border in the north, according to the Syrian largest opposition group
Yeni Şafak |  | 18 June 2015, 13:59

A senior fighter from Syria's largest rebel alliance, the Free Syrian Army, or FSA, said that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levants, or ISIL, has embarked on a fresh offensive on the Syrian town of Azez, which is currently controlled by the FSA-aligned groups, in order to expand the areas which Syrian Democratic Union Party controls.

The fighter, Abo Mustafa, said that PYD is determined to drive out all of its opponents out of the region where it is eager to have a stronger autonomy. “That's why, they have dispersed all opponent elements from Tel Abyad. Currently, Kurdish armed groups have ensured a firm control in the region," he said.

Mustafa also warned against some collaborators who have served interests of the PYD while pretending to be supporters of the FSA.

The latest wave of attacks is believed to be an early stage of a larger strategy which aims to hand over control of a large area to the PKK's offshoot along the country's northern border.

Further mass influx of Syrian refugees looming

Another systematic displacement campaign is imminent to target refugees, who have packed makeshift camps in a region stretching out from the Afrin town on the Syrian-Turkish border to Atma town in İdlib in northern Syria, according to another FSA fighter.

“They want to see a mass influx of refugees towards to the Turkish border. There are over one million people living in these camps," the fighter said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“They expect refugees living in these areas to mass along the Turkish border, while the U.S.-led coalition jets pretend to pound the ISIL targets along the region," he explained, citing local sources.

“This influx will give another opportunity to the PYD, who is eager to exercise its power along the Syria's northern border."

Turkmen commanders fighting in the regions earlier said that the PYD's armed wing, Popular Protection Units, YPG, run over the Tel Abyad to link-up all Kurdish-held cantons for a stronger autonomous state with the support of U.S.-led air strikes.

The latest in the string of assaults began after ISIL handed control of the Tel Abyad province to Syrian Democratic Union Party, or PYD, a PKK offshoot in Syria, as part of its political ambition, according to local sources.

ISIL militants have launched intensive attack to take control of the Bab al-Salam crossing, currently controlled by the Syrian opposition groups, and some opposition-held areas in the region, close to the border with Turkey.

Bab al-Salam border gate in the Syrian territory is the exit point of Turkey's Öncüpınar crossing in its border province of Kilis.
Only two Syrian border gates -- Bab al-Hawa in İdlib and Bab al-Salam in Aleppo – are now controlled by the armed groups, who are aligned with the Free Syrian Army. If and when ISIL seizes control at Bab al-Salam crossing, the opposition forces will have only one crossing to control.

Not unlike Turkmen commanders, the FSA suggest that ISIL has planned to hand over the control of the Azez to the Kurdish self-rule in the event that the province falls because it has been fighting for PYD's interests.

The FSA also propound that ISIL has specifically intended to weaken the hands of the rebel groups from the very beginning of the civilian war in 2011, so that either the regime forces or Kurdish militia will deploy in the area where the opposition groups are being quelled.
Source : http://english.yenisafak.com/news/isil-offensive-on-azez-aims-to-expand-pyd-control-in-the-region-fsa-2169268

Voir également : Tell Abyad : "inquiétude" des Américains après les témoignages de réfugiés arabes et turcomans quant au nettoyage ethnique accompli par le PYD-YPG

Une quinzaine de groupes rebelles syriens accusent le PYD-YPG de nettoyage ethnique à Tell Abyad

Contrairement au mensonge des ultra-nationalistes kurdes sur les réseaux sociaux, la Turquie d'Erdogan ne soutient pas l'EI à Tell Abyad mais l'ASL (équipement)

Syrie : l'amertume de l'ASL (Armée syrienne libre) après les livraisons d'armes aux terroristes kurdes du PYD-YPG

Syrie : le favoritisme pro-kurde des Américains provoque la colère des révoltés arabes de la tribu Shaitat

Un leader des rebelles syriens du Front islamique (anti-EI) qualifie les combattants YPG d'ennemis

Selon le journaliste kurde Reshid Sekvan, il est arrivé à l'EI de passer des accords pragmatiques avec les "combattants kurdes" (YPG ou peshmerga ?)

Quand les forces nationalistes kurdes s'acoquinaient avec l'EIIL

Selon une carte, le trafic de pétrole de l'EI passe par Hassakeh (contrôlée par le PYD et Assad) et le Kurdistan irakien

mercredi 17 juin 2015

Diyala : encore des tensions entre peshmerga kurdes et forces chiites

Tensions en Irak entre combattants kurdes et chiites
Publié le 12-06-2015 à 21h07

BAGDAD, 12 juin (Reuters) - Un incident sérieux a opposé vendredi combattants kurdes et chiites dans l'est de l'Irak, illustrant les difficultés du gouvernement central à coordonner la lutte contre les djihadistes de l'organisation Etat islamique.

Les tensions se sont matérialisées dans la province de Diyala, au nord-est de Bagdad, dans le secteur de deux villes, l'une tenues par les peshmergas kurdes, l'autre par les chiites.

Des informations contradictoires circulent sur les événements qui se sont produits vendredi.

D'après des sources policières, l'accrochage a pour origine le creusement d'une tranchée entrepris par des combattants kurdes entre Jalawla, la ville sous leur contrôle, et Saadiya, distante d'une dizaine de kilomètres, sous contrôle chiite.

Un responsable de la police a fait état d'un bilan de cinq morts.

Mais Mahmoud Sangawi, commandant des forces kurdes dans le secteur, a affirmé qu'il n'y avait eu aucun décès. Les deux parties ont tiré des coups de feu de sommation, a-t-il dit, tout en reconnaissant que la situation était tendue. "Nous n'avons aucun problème avec eux, mais nous ne les laisserons pas nous attaquer", a-t-il ajouté.

Ce n'est pas la première fois que des incidents opposent les forces kurdes et chiites d'Irak, deux composantes essentielles pourtant dans la lutte engagée depuis un an contre l'organisation Etat islamique. (Bureau de Bagdad avec Isabel Coles à Erbil; Henri-Pierre André pour le service français)
Source : http://www.challenges.fr/monde/20150612.REU8147/tensions-en-irak-entre-combattants-kurdes-et-chiites.html

Voir également : Kurdistan irakien : plusieurs partis kurdes rejettent les ingérences du PKK et des milices chiites

Selon un parlementaire kurde irakien, les milices chiites sont plus dangereuses que l'EI

Kirkouk : hostilité des peshmerga au déploiement de forces chiites

Le GRK veut enquêter sur une vidéo censée montrer le meurtre sous la torture d'un officier peshmerga par une milice chiite

La nouvelle menace pour les peshmerga : les milices arabo-chiites

Touz Khourmatou : des manifestants accusent les miliciens chiites du meurtre d'un imam kurde

Un officiel du PDK : les milices chiites "incendient les maisons des Kurdes et des Arabes sunnites"

Jalawla : rivalité entre peshmerga kurdes et milices chiites

Les autorités religieuses du Kurdistan irakien accusent les milices chiites de provocations dans la région de Garmiyan

Diyala : un commandant des peshmerga se plaint du problème posé par les milices chiites

Le Kurde Hoshyar Zebari (PDK) reproche au pouvoir arabo-chiite de Bagdad d'avoir soutenu à fonds perdus des milices chiites ultra-violentes

La régression militaire des peshmerga irakiens

Snapshot June 14, 2015 IraqStrategy & Conflict   

The Peshmerga Regression
How U.S. Aid Is Undermining Years of Progress Professionalizing the Force

By Maria Fantappie

The West, believing that Iraq’s Kurdish forces, known as the peshmerga, are its best hope in Iraq, has been sending them millions of dollars in weapons and training. But because of the way in which those weapons have been channeled to the Kurds, the assistance is undermining the U.S.-led campaign and threatening to undo a decade of progress in turning the peshmerga into a professional force. Ultimately, it will render the Kurds a less effective partner.

The military aid is uncoordinated, unbalanced, unconditional, and unmonitored. Because of the lack of oversight on weapons’ allocation, and because the weapons come with no strings attached, officials can direct them to their own affiliated peshmerga forces, empowering loyalist officers and entangling the rest of the officer corps in petty rivalries. All this distracts the peshmerga from the real task at hand: assessing, preparing for, and countering terrorist threats. To fix the problem, the U.S.-led coalition should place any assistance under a single command, under civilian control and away from political rivalries.  

THE WILD 90S

Efforts to reform these peshmerga into a professional defense force had been long underway by the time ISIS took over swathes of territory along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan in June 2014. In the 1990s, after the Kurdish region gained de facto autonomy from Baghdad, and following several years of internecine conflict, the two strongest Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), established rival military academies in their respective territorial strongholds of Qala Chwalan and Zakho.

Both parties enrolled Kurdish former Iraqi army officers, who broke away from the Iraqi army during Saddam Hussein’s rule. They helped organize peshmerga fighters into battalions and the top staff leadership into military ranks. Each force focused on defending their own territories from the Iraqi army incursions, which increased Kurdistan’s autonomy from Baghdad—and their independence from (and enmity toward) each other. 

After Saddam was ousted in 2003, the peshmerga began to take on the trappings of a real army. Qala Chwalan and Zakho turned into new Iraqi army military academies, providing an entire generation of Kurdish officers with a military education and even integrating some of them into the new Iraqi army. Peshmerga leadership began to include both senior party militants as well as junior officers who, even if they entered the academies through party connections, were not necessarily party members. The end result was a new generation of Kurdish officers who were loyal to the KRG as a whole rather than to either of the competing parties. Younger Kurds’ rising criticism of the parties’ grip on KRG institutions furthered the trend. 

Reforming civil-military relations was far more challenging. Officers—regardless of whether they were party members—were expected to take orders from the party leaders to whom they owed their careers. In 2009, the KDP and PUK agreed to create a joint Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs to centralize administrative tasks, establish joint KDP–PUK brigades commanded by academy graduates, and increase cooperation between their respective intelligence agencies. However, despite the new institution, party politics continued to dictate officer recruitments, promotions, force deployments, and the handling of sensitive information.

COORDINATION GAMES

ISIS’ surprise attack last June exposed these deep-rooted problems and created new ones. It catapulted a combination of senior officers and younger party figures to command positions on the front lines, marginalizing those academy graduates who did not enjoy similar party-connections. Meanwhile, with both parties’ leaders aging, the two factions are embroiled in internal succession struggles. Emerging contenders are soliciting external support, notably from Turkey and Iran, to help them secure land and resources in territories disputed with the central government and to arm their own forces that operate under the peshmerga umbrella. For instance, in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, prominent KDP and PUK leaders have deployed their network of affiliated commanders—each pursuing a different agenda. 

The West has failed to consider both the evolution of the peshmerga and Kurdish politics in general. It has conditioned weapons deliveries to the KRG on the approval of Baghdad, a policy designed to keep the Iraqi capital sovereign and to discourage total Kurdish independence. But the policy is outdated. Today, the PUK is ascendant in Baghdad, so channeling weapons to the Iraqi government has only further alienated the KDP from the central government. In turn, KDP officials have made increasingly provocative calls for independence and solicited direct arming to cut out Baghdad, which it views as being dominated by Iran. Western policymakers might shrug, believing that such divisions will at least prevent the parties from successfully joining together to press for an independent Iraqi Kurdistan; in reality, these divisions prevent Kurdish parties from effectively participating in the Iraqi state.

Things get more complicated after Baghdad approves Western aid. After the coalition receives Baghdad’s approval, military assistance is channeled through the KRG’s Peshmerga Ministry, with no follow-up on where the weapons actually go. Not surprisingly, party figures use the weapons to build up their private vigilantes’ corps, or to empower loyal officers at the expenses of the most professional ones.

All this undermines the West’s fight against ISIS and the KRG’s goal of preserving its region’s relative security. The more intelligence agencies remain divided, the less information reaches the frontline on time. A break in the information chain can lead to miscalculations and cause major setbacks, as happened last August, when ISIS forces overran the KDP frontline, approaching the Iraqi Kurdistan’s capital of Erbil. KDP leaders were quick to place the blame on the younger officers’ inexperience, or lack of sufficient armory, but the root cause was these leaders’ internal rivalries. Last August, failures to share intelligence (within the KDP and between KDP and PUK) about impending ISIS attacks in Sinjar and Ninewa’s eastern territories, allowed fighters to catch KDP peshmerga forces unprepared, paving the way for jihadist militants to advance towards Erbil.

That’s why the West should tie military aid to reform of the civil-military relationship. Weapons must be exclusively delivered to the joint KDP-PUK brigades that were established in 2009—and in a way that re-empowers academy-graduated officers and builds on the party leaders’ previous efforts to set aside their differences and integrate their forces. To date, Baghdad’s approval over weapons deliveries has only served to keep the capital nominally sovereign without preventing Kurdish forces from unilateral operations in the disputed territories. A “one Iraq” policy should begin with a common KDP-PUK strategy in Bagdad, coordinating the central government military operations with Kurdish forces and encouraging a sustainable political order in the country.

The coalition has focused too narrowly on the long-term risk of Kurdish independence, neglecting the extent to which intra-Kurdish divisions nurture conflicts within Iraq’s borders now. A fragmented Kurdish polity will inevitably pave the way for personality-based fiefdoms, which resort to private militias and compete with each other and with other Iraqi factions over land and resources. At a time of political flux, the KRG should invest in a generation of peshmerga officers that stays clear of party intrigues. A fragmented, competitive, and personality-driven security apparatus will undoubtedly put Iraqi Kurdistan at a far greater risk than ISIS ever did.
Source : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-06-14/peshmerga-regression?cid=soc-tw-rdr

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Irak : les peshmerga sont dans l'incapacité d'avancer profondément dans les zones arabo-sunnites

Les peshmerga kurdes ne méritent pas leur haute réputation militaire

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Kurdistan irakien : réseaux clientélistes et pratiques politiques autoritaires