dimanche 28 septembre 2014

Les chrétiens d'Irak : "Les Kurdes ne nous ont pas protégés, le gouvernement irakien ne nous a pas protégés"

Moyen Orient et Monde
« Nous ne sommes pas très nombreux, mais notre foi est grande »

Reportage

Abandonnés par les peshmergas, les chrétiens d'Irak forment leurs propres milices.
OLJ/AFP
27/09/2014

Menacés par l'avancée du groupe État islamique (EI), des chrétiens d'Irak commencent à former leurs propres milices, estimant que les forces kurdes ou fédérales ne les ont pas protégés face aux jihadistes qui ont pris plusieurs villes et villages chrétiens.

Sharafya, dans le nord de la plaine de Ninive. Les jihadistes qui avaient pris ce village en ont été délogés mi-août, mais un mois plus tard, ses rues sont toujours vides. Les combattants de l'EI ne sont qu'à quelques kilomètres, dans le village de Tel Kef, et seuls quelques hommes en uniforme arpentent le secteur. Au premier abord, ils ressemblent aux peshmergas, les forces kurdes : uniforme kaki et kalachnikov en bandoulière. Mais brodé sur la manche ou porté fièrement sur la poitrine, un écusson les distingue : le drapeau assyrien, barré de deux fusils.

Ces hommes appartiennent à une toute nouvelle brigade assyrienne, un peuple chrétien installé depuis des millénaires dans la plaine de Ninive. Formée le 11 août et baptisée Dwekh Nawsha (Futur martyr) dans le dialecte araméen local, elle compte une centaine d'hommes, selon le lieutenant-colonel Odicho. « Nous ne sommes pas très nombreux, mais notre foi est grande », dit-il, avant de retourner travailler à former les nouvelles recrues, pour l'heure loin d'être prêtes.

(Lire aussi : « Je ne veux pas y retourner. Nous avons vu la mort. Je veux partir en Europe »)


Chez les FL de Geagea
Selon le Mouvement démocratique assyrien, l'un des partis politiques assyriens de la région, 2 000 hommes se sont déjà portés volontaires pour combattre l'EI, un groupe extrémiste sunnite responsable de multiples exactions contre les minorités notamment chrétienne. Mais les armes, les uniformes et l'entraînement manquent.

Pour tenter de renforcer les rangs, une délégation d'Assyriens irakiens s'est rendue au Liban rencontrer les Forces libanaises (FL), la principale milice chrétienne durant la guerre civile au Liban (1975-1990), a indiqué une source au sein des FL à l'AFP. Samir Geagea, le chef des FL, a affirmé que son parti était prêt à « soutenir toute décision prise par les chrétiens d'Irak » pour rester dans ce pays, selon cette source.

La création de « brigades » chrétiennes en Irak rappelle en outre l'engagement des Assyriens en Syrie voisine, où ils ont formé le Conseil militaire syriaque, qui se bat activement au côté du parti YPG des Kurdes syriens, pour tenter de renverser le régime.


(Pour mémoire : Dix mille chrétiens ont déposé une demande de visa au consulat de France à Erbil)


À quelques kilomètres de Sharafya se trouve la ville chrétienne d'al-Qosh, posée à flanc de montagne, à l'ombre du monastère Rabban Hermizd. Aucun membre de l'EI n'y a posé un pied, mais la population a fui début août, quand les jihadistes se sont emparés de plusieurs villages en contrebas.
Au milieu des rues désertes, impossible de rater le bâtiment du Mouvement démocratique assyrien. Son violet (la couleur du parti) tranche avec la couche de sable qui recouvre une grande partie de la région. À l'intérieur du bâtiment, des hommes en uniforme, armes aux pieds, sont assis autour de thés fumants. Ils sont tous chrétiens, civils dans leur immense majorité, et ont décidé de rester pour défendre al-Qosh. À peine assis, leurs voix se mêlent les unes aux autres dans une litanie d'où ressort la même chose : si nous sommes là, c'est parce que les forces kurdes nous ont abandonnés.

Le récit est pareil : dans la nuit du 6 au 7 août, quand les jihadistes ont avancé vers les villages, les peshmergas sont partis, sans prévenir la population. « Ils ont laissé les hommes du village seuls », accuse Athra Kado. « Deux jours avant, ils nous avaient dit que nous n'avions pas besoin d'armes, qu'ils nous défendraient », renchérit un de ses compagnons. « Les Kurdes ne nous ont pas protégés, le gouvernement irakien ne nous a pas protégés », lance un troisième. Une centaine d'hommes en tout patrouillent de jour et restent alertes la nuit. Pourtant des peshmergas sont revenus et gardent désormais l'entrée du village. Mais « peut-être qu'ils vont fuir à nouveau, alors on reste », dit Athra Kado.
Source : http://www.lorientlejour.com/article/888321/-nous-ne-sommes-pas-tres-nombreux-mais-notre-foi-est-grande-.html

Voir également : EIIL : le double jeu des peshmerga de Barzani

Irak : la persécution des Assyro-Chaldéens par les Kurdes

Le problème kurde : le nettoyage ethnique dans le "Kurdistan" irakien

Sud-est de la Turquie : le gouvernement turc tente de protéger les chrétiens de Tur Abdin des attaques kurdes (notamment du PKK et du Hizbullah kurde)

Le christianisme assyro-chaldéen/syriaque à Mardin

De plus en plus de chrétiens irakiens se réfugient en Turquie, pays soi-disant "oppresseur"

vendredi 26 septembre 2014

En plein délire complotiste et antisémite, Abdullah Öcalan (PKK) déclare que l'Etat islamique est un "projet israélien"

"Öcalan: There is a high intensity war
ANF - ISTANBUL 24.09.2014 09:30:22

Kurdish People’s Leader Abdullah Öcalan has described ISIS attacks as "high intensity war”, calling on the Kurdish people to act accordingly. Öcalan said Turkey’s Rojava policy was a "policy of war against the Kurds".

The DİHA news agency has published details of a visit made by Mr Öcalan’s guardian Mazlum Dinç to Imralı island on Monday.

Öcalan said: "Davutoğlu said two or three years ago that he would not recognise Rojava and its autonomy. What does non-recognition mean? It means ‘I will fight against you.’ It means it will not permit an administration to come into being and will do everything to bring about its collapse.”

To save something from ISIS needs practical action against ISIS

Öcalan added: "Barzani says: ‘I will save Rojava’. In fact this statement has a different meaning. To save Rojava from ISIS involves taking military action against the genocidal ISIS attacks. Otherwise, waiting for the defeat of the PYD resistance rather than of ISIS means saving Rojava from the PYD.”

ISIS attacks have connections to Israel

Öcalan said the ISIS attacks have links to Israel, adding: “The intention is to create an Israel in that territory. The place names in this area. For instance, Suruç comes from the Hebrew name Saruch,who was aa ancestor of Abraham and Moses. Harran comes from the name of Moses’ brother, Haroon. All these names are in the Torah. There has always been a wish to found an Israel here. The GAP [South East Anatolian Project] serves this. When the GAP project began in 1978 I was in Urfa. The project was designed to seize the land and water of the people. No one can oppose the policies of Israel. Ecevit wanted to, but they stopped him. ISIS is an Israeli project. The AKP cannot resist against this. They threatened him and the government was almost toppled.”"

Source : http://web.archive.org/web/20140925124937/http://en.firatajans.com/news/news/ocalan-there-is-a-high-intensity-war.htm

Voir également : La biographie du terroriste polpotiste Abdullah Öcalan

Israël et le problème du terrorisme kurde

Comment les nationalistes kurdes dissimulent hypocritement le volet raciste (aryaniste) de leur idéologie sous un verbiage humanitaire

Ils sont prêts à se prostituer pour n'importe quelle puissance extérieure : le terrorisme kurde dans le jeu des puissances de l'Axe (Italie et Allemagne)

Le racisme aryaniste des nationalistes kurdes

Juifs et Kurdes à Diyarbakir

L'antisémitisme kurde

Amerli : les Turkmènes chiites s'opposent à la mainmise kurde sur leur territoire

Shiite Militia Groups Attack Kurds in Amerli
18.09.2014

Omar Awara
BasNews, Kirkuk

After liberating a number of towns from Islamic State militants, a number of Shiite militia groups that have settled south of Kirkuk have begun to cause problems for Kurds in the area.

The Shiite groups have set up a network of checkpoints and stop Kurdish travelers and ask them for IDs and investigate them.

Friyad Amin Abdullah is a citizen of Khurmatu, one of the areas the new militias have been controlling, told BasNews about the actions of those Shiite militia groups.

“Now, these militias cause problems for the residents of the areas and ask for their IDs. If they find out the person is Kurd, they make travels for them, triggering Kurdish residents’ anger to fight,’ said Abdullah.

“Due to the behavior of Shiite militias toward Kurds in the city, now Kurds visit public places and markets less frequently, staying more often in the strictly Kurdish neighborhoods,” added Abdullah.
 
Khurmatu Policeman Chief Neriman Rahim pointed out that “putting checkpoints in the city and asking for residents’ ID, especially Kurds, is a plan pushed and encouraged by Turkmens of the city.”

 
“Turkmens believe that Kurds have occupied the city and they have to leave, especially Kurdish Peshmerga forces that have been deployed in the area,” added Rahim.


BasNews spoke with one of the commanders of those Shiite militia groups named Hussein Hadi, who stated: “We can’t make decisions on our own unless we are ordered by those who are above us. We came from southern of Iraq to the area, and we don’t have any experience in the city.”

On Thursday, Investigation Officer in Khurmatu Police Office Odi al-Bayati confirmed the news and told BasNews: “those militias have entered the city without the permission of the city’s administration and independently put checkpoints as well as starting to check and investigate people. Five militia members were detained in the city and so far had to be released.”
 
Earlier this month, Amerli and other surrounding areas were freed from Islamic State Militants and according to reports Shiite and Iranian militia groups came in big numbers in to the area.
Source : http://basnews.com/en/News/Details/Shiite-Militia-Groups-Attack-Kurds-in-Amerli/34539

Voir également : Irak : vives tensions entre peshmerga kurdes et miliciens arabo-chiites à Amerli

EIIL : le double jeu des peshmerga de Barzani

Irak : les intérêts des Kurdes et des Arabes chiites (représentés par al-Maliki) divergent de plus en plus à Kirkouk

Les réfugiés turkmènes dans le Kurdistan irakien : "Nous ne voulons pas rester dans la région kurde parce que nous ne sommes pas bien traités par les Kurdes"

Le problème kurde : le nettoyage ethnique dans le "Kurdistan" irakien

Frontière turco-syrienne : l'armée et la police turques viennent en aide aux malheureux réfugiés kurdes



















La Turquie ouvre ses portes à une vague de réfugiés kurdes syriens

Une partie des réfugiés yézidis préfèrent émigrer en Turquie que de rester dans le Kurdistan soi-disant "démocratique" de Barzani

De plus en plus de chrétiens irakiens se réfugient en Turquie, pays soi-disant "oppresseur"

Question des réfugiés syriens : "La Turquie a épargné à l'Europe une catastrophe humanitaire"

La Turquie : une zone de refuge et d'assistance humanitaires

La Turquie, terre d'accueil massif des réfugiés kurdes d'Irak

lundi 22 septembre 2014

Syrie : un Kurde de Diyarbakır est mort au combat dans les rangs de l'Etat islamique

Kurdish IS-member killed on 11 September in Aleppo
 Part of channel(s): Syria (current event)

Takva Haber is reporting a Kurdish ISIS member from Diyarbakir called Usame el Kürdi killed fighting against PKK in Syria. Confusing times.
Source : http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=dfd_1411302093

L'article de Takva Haber : http://www.takvahaber.net/dunya/pkk-ve-oso-bir-kurt-mucahidi-sehid-etti-h9740.html

Voir également : Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Wassim Nasr : "on trouve même des Kurdes, notamment dans la ville d’Halabja, qui rejoignent les rangs des djihadistes de l’Etat islamique"

Syrie : davantage de djihadistes en provenance de Russie et de France que de Turquie (pays majoritairement musulman et contigu)

Turquie : l'afflux de réfugiés kurdes syriens a dépassé le seuil des 130.000 personnes

130,000 Syrian Kurds fleeing ISIS reach Turkey

By Staff writer | Al Arabiya News
Monday, 22 September 2014

Turkish deputy PM says more than 130.000 Syrian Kurds have crossed the border into Turkey over the past few days, fleeing the brutality of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), according to Reuters news agency.

"We are prepared for the worst scenario, which is an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees," Numan Kurtulmus told reporters in the capital Ankara.

The figures released by the Turkish government come shortly after the United Nations said the number of refugees was around 100,000.

The refugees have arrived since Thursday.

Syrian Kurds were leaving the area around Ain al-Arab, or Kobane, as the town is known in Kurdish, which is under attack by ISIS forces.

Until now, Kobane, the third biggest Kurdish population centre in Syria, had been relatively safe and had taken in 200,000 people displaced from elsewhere in Syria.

Last Update: Monday, 22 September 2014 KSA 11:29 - GMT 08:29
Source : http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/09/22/U-N-100-000-Syrian-Kurds-have-fled-to-turkey.html

Voir également : 45.000 Kurdes de Syrie se sont réfugiés en Turquie

La Turquie ouvre ses portes à une vague de réfugiés kurdes syriens

Une partie des réfugiés yézidis préfèrent émigrer en Turquie que de rester dans le Kurdistan soi-disant "démocratique" de Barzani

De plus en plus de chrétiens irakiens se réfugient en Turquie, pays soi-disant "oppresseur"

Question des réfugiés syriens : "La Turquie a épargné à l'Europe une catastrophe humanitaire"

La Turquie : une zone de refuge et d'assistance humanitaires

La Turquie, terre d'accueil massif des réfugiés kurdes d'Irak

Le Kurdistan irakien serait mêlé à la contrebande de pétrole organisée par l'Etat islamique

"Who Buys Isis Oil?

The issue of who buys the stolen oil is very contentious: the opposition blames government, and vice versa. It appears ISIS sells through a mafia of middlemen who truck it to refineries in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey and Iran. A greater amount of the crude from Iraq goes through brokers than in Syria. ISIS also uses makeshift refineries, which allows them to sell the products more easily and locally."

Source : http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/15203

"And despite the heavy fighting between Islamic State and Kurdish forces called peshmerga, the U.S. government suspects Kurdish involvement in the trade, said a U.S. intelligence official who agreed to speak only on background.

"The area in Iraq where ISIL is operating is associated with long-standing oil smuggling networks which have traditionally had a Kurdish component," the official said, using the abbreviation for the government's preferred name for the group - Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. "So, nobody should be surprised if there were Kurds involved in bringing ISIL-controlled oil to market."

These small cash deals swapped across the hands of multiple buyers along routes long used for black market trades are difficult to monitor.

"Even if you were able to flesh out the networks and figure them out, how would you then disrupt it?" said Matthew M. Reed, vice president of Foreign Reports, a Washington-based consulting firm that analyzes Middle East oil markets."

Source : http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Terror-group-may-make-3-million-a-day-selling-oil-5768002.php

"Black market oil is often refined at plants in Iraqi Kurdistan that are partly the byproduct of the tensions between Kurdish leaders and Baghdad. In recent years the Kurdistan Regional Government looked the other way as homegrown refineries popped up to supply the local market after Baghdad banned the export of petroleum products without its consent.

This means that the Kurds are potentially helping put money in the coffers of the jihadi group that its own peshmerga forces are fighting. “It’s now possible that Isis could be selling crude [via middlemen] to these knock-off refineries,” says Bilal Wahab, an energy expert at the American University of Sulaymaniyah. “The KRG is unwilling to shut them down because it would have to raise the price of gasoline. It can’t raise the price of gasoline because it can’t pay salaries, and it can’t pay salaries because the central government hasn’t given the KRG its budget in eight months. Yes, it’s illegal. Yes, it’s bad. But it is what greases the wheels of the economy.”"

Source : http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/34e874ac-3dad-11e4-b782-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3E2Kpg2HB

"Les pays européens ont-ils profité de ce trafic?

Toujours selon l'ambassadrice de l'Union européenne en Irak, Jana Hybaskova, plusieurs pays européens se seraient directement fournis auprès de l'Etat islamique en hydrocarbures, à prix cassés. Pour autant, elle ne souhaite pas divulguer clairement les pays de l'Union européenne visés par cette accusation. Cette contrebande transiterait par le biais de la Jordanie, le Kurdistan, la Turquie ou encore l'Iran"

Source : http://www.itele.fr/monde/video/des-pays-europeens-ont-ils-achete-du-petrole-a-letat-islamique-94672

"Comment l'EI parvient-il ensuite à revendre cet or noir ? En cassant les prix. " D'après ce qu'on sait, ils vendent au tiers du prix du marché", précise encore Pierre Terzian. En utilisant les vieilles méthodes irakiennes de l'époque de Saddam Hussein lorsque le pays était sous embargo.
Des centaines de camions citernes transitent ainsi vers le Kurdistan irakien et même vers la Turquie ou le pétrole brut est mélangé au pétrole d'autres provenances.

Mais depuis une semaine, les choses ont changé. La Turquie a durci sa position. La police turque a ainsi saisi du diesel de contrebande dans une quarantaine de stations-service du pays. De plus, les frappes américaines rendent désormais plus difficile l'exploitation de cet or noir. Le pompage dans les six champs pétroliers contrôlés par l'EI à Deir Ezzor a ainsi  été stoppé par peur des frappes américaines, selon des militants."

Source : http://lci.tf1.fr/monde/moyen-orient/etat-islamique-le-petrole-lui-rapporterait-3-millions-de-dollars-8491785.html

Voir également : Construction d'un mur à la frontière turco-syrienne, pour empêcher les intrusions et la contrebande

EIIL : le double jeu des peshmerga de Barzani

Les Kurdes et l'EIIL

Wassim Nasr : "on trouve même des Kurdes, notamment dans la ville d’Halabja, qui rejoignent les rangs des djihadistes de l’Etat islamique"

samedi 20 septembre 2014

Syrie : la répression du PKK-PYD-YPG contre les partisans du PDK de Barzani

Représailles du PDK contre des médias et journalistes pro-PKK sur fond de conflit syrien
Publié le mercredi 4 juin 2014.

Dans un contexte régional fortement perturbé par la guerre en Syrie, les tensions historiques entre le Parti démocratique du Kurdistan (PDK) au Kurdistan irakien et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) en Turquie sont ravivées, ce qui n’est pas sans conséquences pour les journalistes et les médias, et plus largement pour la liberté de l’information.

Le 19 mai 2014, en réaction aux exactions du Parti de l’Union démocratique (PYD) - branche du PKK en Syrie, et principale force politique dans les zones à population kurde du nord du pays - contre les institutions pro-PDK en Syrie, notamment l’expulsion de politiciens proches du leader du PDK, Massoud Barzani (également Président du gouvernement régional du Kurdistan), les forces de sécurité du PDK ont pris pour cible huit institutions pro-PKK dans les villes d’Erbil, Dohuk et Zakho (contrôlées par le PDK), parmi lesquelles des médias. L’agence d’informations turque Dicle News Agency (DIHA) ainsi que le mensuel Rojava Welat ont alors été fermés et leurs journalistes interpellés pendant quelques heures. Le 3 juin 2014, une manifestation a été organisée devant le Parlement à Erbil notamment par l’Organisation des femmes libres au Kurdistan (RJAK), également visée par l’opération du 19 mai.

Pour Wahbi Damir, responsable de DIHA au Kurdistan irakien, cette fermeture ne repose sur aucun fondement légal. “Aucun mandat ne nous a été donné”, déclare-t-il à Reporters sans frontières, ajoutant avoir été menacé s’il venait à faire des déclarations à la presse. “Les forces de sécurité ont fermé nos bureaux, alors que tout notre matériel journalistique s’y trouve”. Contactée par RSF, Najiba Umlar, co-présidente du Parti pour la solution démocratique du Kurdistan (PÇDK), dont les bureaux ont également été attaqués et fermés, a déclaré que le PDK empêche son parti et les médias pro-PKK de travailler librement dans les zones que le parti contrôle. Elle estime que “le PDK ne tolère pas nos opinions sur le mouvement nationaliste kurde en Turquie et en Syrie”.

Les médias pro-PDK connaissent eux des difficultés à fonctionner et à travailler librement dans les zones contrôlées par le PYD en Syrie.


Reporters sans frontières exhorte les différents partis politiques à respecter le travail des journalistes. De leur côté, les médias et les professionnels de l’information doivent faire preuve d’indépendance et de professionnalisme, jouant leur rôle de contre-pouvoir, en n’alimentant pas les tensions et différends politiques historiques.
Source : http://fr.rsf.org/represailles-du-pdk-contre-des-04-06-2014,46392.html

Voir également : Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions

Violente campagne de dénigrement du PKK-YPG contre le PDK de Barzani

7 août 2014 : l'assassinat d'Osman "Şoreş" Baliç (dissident du PKK) et de sa fille (de 3 ans) au Kurdistan irakien

Echec du pankurdisme : le projet de conférence nationale kurde repoussé aux calendes grecques

13 personnes d'une même famille tuées dans le village de Matiniya : un nouveau massacre de civils par le PKK-YPG ?

Kurdish YPG kills family of 13 near Qamishli
 Local   
2014-09-19

 (Zaman Al Wasl)- At least 13 people from the same family have been killed near Qamishli city, northeast Syria, by Kurdish militant group, people of al-Matiniya village said they found their bodies buried in mass graveyard.

The new massacre followed killing of 42 people, including women and children, in Arab-inhabited villages of Tal Khalil and al-Hajiya, last Sunday by fighters of the People Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) over accusations of supporting the Islamic State of Iraq ans Syria (ISIS), activists told Zaman al-Wasl.

On Thursday, ISIS fighters backed by tanks have captured 21 Kurdish villages near the Turkish border, prompting civilians to flee their homes amid fears of retribution by the extremists sweeping through the area, AP said.

For more than a year, the Islamic State group and Kurdish militias have been locked in a fierce fight in several pockets of northern Syria where large Kurdish populations reside. The clashes are but one aspect of Syria's broader civil war — a multilayered conflict that the U.N. says has killed more than 190,000.

Since Wednesday, Islamic State militants appear to have gained the upper hand in Syria's northern Kurdish region of Kobani, also known as Ayn Arab, overrunning 21 Kurdish villages, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said. It said there were casualties on both sides, but that Kurdish civilians were fleeing their villages for fear that Islamic State group fighters "will commit massacres against civilians."

The fighting forced nearly 3,000 people to try flee to Turkey and gathered near the border Turkish district of Suruc, according to the private Dogan News Agency. A video released by the agency showed Syrian refugees walking to the border with some Kurds asking to be allowed to cross to stay with relatives on the Turkish side of the frontier.

Like many fronts of Syria's civil war, momentum in the fight between the extremists and the Kurds has swung back and forth. Earlier this week, for example, Kurdish fighters captured 14 villages from the Islamic State in other parts of Syria.

The fighting around Kobani is part of the Islamic State's wider battle in Syria as the extremists look to seize control of the few areas in the northeast still outside of their hands.

The U.S. has been conducting airstrikes against Islamic State fighters in Iraq since early August. President Barack Obama last week authorized strikes against the group in Syria as well, and his administration is currently trying to cobble together an international coalition to go after the group. The U.S. is already flying reconnaissance missions over Syria. (With AP)


Zaman Al Wasl
Source : https://www.zamanalwsl.net/en/news/6682.html

Voir également : La Coalition nationale syrienne maintient que le PKK-YPG a commis un massacre de civils dans la région d'Hasaka

Syrie : le PKK-YPG tue des dizaines de civils à Hasaka

Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions

45.000 Kurdes de Syrie se sont réfugiés en Turquie

45.000 Kurdes de Syrie se sont réfugiés en Turquie pour fuir les jihadistes d’EI
Rédaction en ligne
Mis en ligne il y a 13 minutes

Quelque 45.000 Kurdes de Syrie se sont réfugiés en Turquie depuis jeudi pour fuir les combats entre les jihadistes du groupe de l’Etat islamique (EI) et les combattants kurdes dans le nord-est de la Syrie, a annoncé le vice-Premier ministre turc, Numan Kurtulmus. «A l’heure où je vous parle, 45.000 Kurdes de Syrie ont franchi la frontière et sont entrés en Turquie en huit points de passage différents», a déclaré M. Kurtulmus à la presse, un jour après l’ouverture de leur frontière par les autorités turques.
Source : http://www.lesoir.be/659471/article/actualite/fil-info/fil-info-monde/2014-09-20/45000-kurdes-syrie-se-sont-refugies-en-turquie-pour-fuir-jihadistes-

Voir également : La Turquie ouvre ses portes à une vague de réfugiés kurdes syriens

Une partie des réfugiés yézidis préfèrent émigrer en Turquie que de rester dans le Kurdistan soi-disant "démocratique" de Barzani

De plus en plus de chrétiens irakiens se réfugient en Turquie, pays soi-disant "oppresseur"

Question des réfugiés syriens : "La Turquie a épargné à l'Europe une catastrophe humanitaire"

La Turquie : une zone de refuge et d'assistance humanitaires

La Turquie, terre d'accueil massif des réfugiés kurdes d'Irak

vendredi 19 septembre 2014

La Turquie ouvre ses portes à une vague de réfugiés kurdes syriens

La Turquie ouvre sa frontière à des milliers de Kurdes syriens fuyant l'Etat islamique

Le Monde.fr avec AFP | 19.09.2014 à 14h42 • Mis à jour le 19.09.2014 à 15h56

La Turquie a ouvert vendredi 19 septembre sa frontière à quelque 4 000 Kurdes syriens fuyant la poussée des djihadistes dans le nord-est de la Syrie. Depuis jeudi, des centaines de Kurdes syriens s'étaient massés à la frontière de la Turquie, qui, dans un premier temps, avait refusé d'accueillir les déplacés, préférant leur porter assistance sur le sol syrien.

L'offensive persistante des extrémistes sunnites de l'Etat islamique (EI) vers des zones proches de la frontière turque a poussé Ankara à reconsidérer sa politique et à ouvrir ses portes vendredi. « Nous avons ouvert notre frontière. Nous allons évidemment porter assistance à ces gens », a déclaré le premier ministre de la Turquie, Ahmet Davutoglu.

« MERCI À LA TURQUIE »


« Nous allons aider tous les déplacés avec tous nos moyens, mais notre objectif principal est de les aider, si possible, dans les limites des frontières syriennes », a-t-il ajouté.

A la suite de cette décision, des centaines de personnes, principalement des femmes, des personnes âgées et des enfants, mais aussi des handicapés transportés difficilement par leurs proches, se sont ruées à la frontière pour entrer en Turquie
sous l'œil vigilant des forces de sécurité et des caméras de télévision.

« Merci à la Turquie ; que Dieu vous bénisse. Je suis parvenue malgré tout à sauver mes deux enfants », disait en kurde une jeune femme en pleurs sur la chaîne Haber Türk. Une autre déplacée a expliqué sur la même chaîne que les djihadistes tuent sans discrimination dans les villages dont ils se sont emparés et « persécutent » surtout les femmes, évoquant des viols.

La Turquie accueille depuis le début du conflit en Syrie, en 2011, environ 1,5 million de réfugiés syriens, et ses capacités d'accueil sont dépassées depuis longtemps. De ce fait, elle a décidé d'accueillir les réfugiés à la lisière de ses frontières.
Source : http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2014/09/19/la-turquie-ouvre-sa-frontiere-a-des-milliers-de-kurdes-syriens-fuyant-l-ei_4490857_3218.html

Voir également : Une partie des réfugiés yézidis préfèrent émigrer en Turquie que de rester dans le Kurdistan soi-disant "démocratique" de Barzani

De plus en plus de chrétiens irakiens se réfugient en Turquie, pays soi-disant "oppresseur"

Question des réfugiés syriens : "La Turquie a épargné à l'Europe une catastrophe humanitaire"

La Turquie : une zone de refuge et d'assistance humanitaires

La Turquie, terre d'accueil massif des réfugiés kurdes d'Irak

jeudi 18 septembre 2014

Diyala : des tribus arabes sunnites se retournent contre l'Etat islamique... et contre les peshmerga

Sunni tribes turning on ISIS and Peshmerga

By Mohammed Hussein, Patrick Osgood, Rawaz Tahir, CHRISTINE VAN DEN TOORN and Staff of Iraq Oil Report
Published Tuesday, September 16th, 2014

Iraq's newest initiative to convince Sunnis to fight alongside the government has combusted into a volatile, multi-sided conflict in northern Diyala province – a strong indication of how difficult it will be to build and maintain a national coalition against extremist militants.

The biggest flashpoint has been around Jalula, a town in Diyala along the disputed border between the autonomous Kurdistan region and Arab-dominated southern Iraq.


Since Saturday, Sunni Arab tribesmen aligned with the Shia Arab-dominated Iraqi government have been shelling Kurdish Peshmerga forces, who have suffered at least three casualties and have returned fire.

The tribesmen and the Peshmerga are supposed to be nominal allies in a fight against the so-called Islamic State (formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS), which captured Jalula last month. But long-standing ethnic rivalries and conflicts over territorial control appear to be trumping their mutual enmity for ISIS.

Many of the tribesmen recently turned on ISIS. They make up a reconstituted local emergency defense force called Tawiri, which in the past was under the Ministry of Interior but is now reporting to the Tigris Operations Command, under a deal reached last week.

"The gunmen who shelled Peshmerga bases in the area of Benzene Khana and Wadi Osaj on the evening of Sept. 13, 2014 are from the newly formed Arab tribal force in Jalula," said a senior Peshmerga intelligence officer in the town, referring to two neighborhoods east of Jalula. The events were confirmed by local leaders from both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the two most powerful Kurdish political parties, as well as three other Peshmerga officials and an Iraqi army official.

The Iraqi ministries of defense and interior did not respond to several requests for comment.

The conflict in Jalula underscores a serious challenge for newly elected Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his U.S.-influenced security strategy, which depends on convincing Sunni tribesmen to turn against ISIS. Abadi has proposed creating a National Guard force that could incorporate not only Sunni tribal fighters but also Shia militiamen, theoretically uniting many disparate armed groups against ISIS, under the banner of the Iraqi government.

Consistent with this initiative, the Iraqi Army is in the process of training and arming about 700 fighters from Sunni tribes to the south of Jalula, according to an army officer based in the provincial capital of Baquba.

The agreement was agreed between the Jalula tribes and the Tigris Operations Command – a controversial body that coordinates various security forces in three northern provinces and reports directly to the prime minister. The Baquba-based officer said that 200 fighters are currently training at Camp Ashraf, with two additional groups slated to begin soon.

"The agreement also provides that this newly formed force is given the management responsibility for the area in question [Jalula], instead of the Peshmerga forces," the officer said.

Jalula sits within a belt of territory stretching across northern Iraq that was subjected to violent campaigns of ethnic cleansing and gerrymandering under Saddam Hussein, leaving a legacy of resentment, distrust, and conflicting claims among Arabs, Kurds and Turkomen. These territorial disputes have been so sensitive and bitter that they have defied resolution, despite a 2007 deadline to implement a reconciliation process outlined in the Iraqi constitution. Frustrated by the delay, Kurds hope that by taking territory they can wrest the initiative over the fate of these areas from Baghdad.

"Jalula is ours, and it belongs to us," said Mahmoud Sangawi, the Peshmerga leader in the Garmian district, in a Sept. 13 statement. "We will never accept any [other] military forces in Jalula. Regardless of who creates the military force there, we will treat them as ISIS."

Iraq's Kurds claim Jalula is historically a Kurdish majority town. It was certainly impacted by Saddam Hussein's Arabization campaign, and at the time of the ISIS invasion only around a fifth of the population was Kurds, the remaining majority Sunni Arab, a demographic that Kurds have all but labeled ISIS collaborators.

Positioned on a trunk road to the majority Kurdish towns of Kifri, Kalar and Khanaqin further north, it is an important strategic buffer for Peshmerga forces.

Since ISIS invaded the area on June 14, Jalula has seen some of the fiercest fighting between Peshmerga forces and militants from ISIS. The Sunni southern neighborhood of Tajnid has been especially difficult for Peshmerga to clear. At one point, the Peshmerga held the whole town, only to surrender it after their own reinforcements failed to materialize due to conflicting chains of command.

According to Khalil Khudadad, the PUK leader in Jalula, after three months, Jalula is "almost abandoned, especially southern and eastern neighborhoods." ISIS snipers pick off wandering animals who otherwise set off mines ISIS has laid for anyone hoping to recapture the town, he said.

It was not immediately possible to confirm accounts from Kurdish military and political official that the attacks on the Peshmerga were deliberately ordered by the same forces that recently aligned with the Iraqi government. It is possible that some tribal fighters in the area remain allied to ISIS, or that they have not yet been given orders from tribal leaders to switch sides, which could account for the ongoing shelling.

"There are still a lot of ISIS militants in Jalula," said Kamaran Hamajan, the KDP leader in Jalula. "After their defeats in Sulayman Beg and Amerli, many of their militants came to Jalula and Tibj," a town southwest of Jalula.

Hamajan believes those firing on the Peshmerga still "belong to ISIS. It is not clear yet who and how many of them have joined the newly formed Arab tribal force."

But regardless of whether the tribes are fighting ISIS or not, Kurdish security officials said they expected the Peshmerga to be targeted.

"I know it is confusing to figure out who they fight for," said a senior Peshmerga intelligence official in Jalula. "They easily shift their directions and loyalties, but the shifting does not change their actual duty, which is fighting Peshmerga in Jalula."

The deal

Iraqi and U.S. defense officials say the only way of destroying ISIS in Iraq is to win back disenfranchised Sunni communities with political reconciliation. Early steps by the new Abadi government have been met with limited praise from Iraq's Sunni Arabs and American officials alike.

Last week, Iraq's newly installed Cabinet ordered the drafting of a law to establish a National Guard force. Over the weekend, Abadi said he ordered an end to Iraqi army air attacks on ISIS in civilian areas, one of the most urgent demands of Sunnis, especially in Anbar province.

President Obama in his Sept. 10 speech announcing an expansion of U.S. military bombing and other assistance in Iraq, allegedly predicated on formation of an inclusive government, said the U.S. would "support Iraq's efforts to stand up National Guard units to help Sunni communities secure their own freedom from ISIL's control."

On Sept. 11, Iraqi Army Lt. Gen. Abdulamir al-Zaidi, the head of the Tigris Operations Command, appears to have taken early initiative. He met with tribal leaders and reached a deal that could be a massive hit to ISIS, according to two Peshmerga officials in the Jalula area.

The two officials said the meeting took place in Baquba, while a third Peshmerga official said the meeting took place at a military base known as Kir Kush, 70 kilometers east of Baquba.

Zaidi "met with a big group of tribesmen and militant delegations from tribes of Qarawi, Lhebi, Jabouri and Qubaisi," a senior Peshmerga intelligence official said. "He successfully persuaded them to kick the ISIS organization out of their area."

According to the main points of the agreement, which was shown to Iraq Oil Report, any family from the tribes who have pledged to the Tawari that has more than three sons of fighting age must send at least one to fight; the Iraqi army must provide logistics and financial support to the Tawari, give general amnesty to those who have joined ISIS in the past three months, and hire into the security forces anyone who joins the Tawari.

Over the weekend, members of the crucial Qarawi tribe returned to Jalula and Sadiya from Baquba. Khudadad and the senior Peshmerga intelligence official said Jalula and Sadiya recruits have already begun training in a military base in Khan Bani Saad, south of Baquba.

The Tawari Battalions are not new. They were first formed in 2003, reporting to the Interior Ministry, and were trained and deployed in each province during emergency situations when order could best be restored by locals.

The new Tawari Battalions essentially have the same role, but with much more at stake: fighting ISIS, using former ISIS fighters to be incorporated into a formal security force structure, without setting off a sectarian fight between Arabs and Kurds.

"Zaidi's agreement is with local ISIS militants in both Jalula and Sadiya as well as leaders of the tribes," said a senior Peshmerga intelligence official in the Jalula area. Sadiya is a town 12 kilometers south of Jalula. "Their main goals are to end local gunmen cooperation with ISIS and bring back the towns into Iraqi federal government control, in addition to prevent Peshmerga forces to enter the towns."


Kurdish security officials worry that the deal Zaidi struck to secure the tribes' commitment implies government approval to fight the Peshmerga so long as ISIS also remains in their crosshairs.

"The second phase of the agreement is about preventing Peshmerga forces from entering the towns and fighting any rising Kurdish influence after the ISIS crisis," the second Peshmerga official said. "We will never tolerate this force in Jalula."
Source : http://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/sunni-tribes-turning-isis-peshmerga-13350/

Voir également : Un peshmerga dans la ville de Makhmour : "Nous les tuerons [les Arabes] dès que les caméras ne seront plus là"

Irak : vives tensions entre peshmerga kurdes et miliciens arabo-chiites à Amerli

Irak : les intérêts des Kurdes et des Arabes chiites (représentés par al-Maliki) divergent de plus en plus à Kirkouk

Un peshmerga dans la ville de Makhmour : "Nous les tuerons [les Arabes] dès que les caméras ne seront plus là"

Middle East
'We Will Kill Them as Soon as the Cameras Aren't Here': Anti-Arab Sentiment On Rise In Iraqi Kurdistan

By John Beck
September 15, 2014 | 2:10 pm

The Islamic State (IS) militants that overran the majority Kurdish town of Makhmour, northern Iraq in August had help. Local residents say that a number of local Sunni Arabs helped the extremists in the lead up to the attack, supplying them with information on terrain and security forces in the area as well as with food and fuel.

IS are now gone. Kurdish forces retook the town a few days later, and it is once again controlled by local peshmerga militia. Resentment over this betrayal, however, is still strong. On a tattered sofa in courtyard of a base which IS had briefly occupied, one grizzled peshmerga fighter smoked cigarettes in the harsh sunlight and calmly explained to VICE News that he and others would like to expel all Arabs from the region in the most ruthless way possible.

"90 percent of Kurds are now dedicated to the same brutality towards Arabs as they showed to us... We want the destruction of those dogs. We will kill them as soon as the cameras aren't here," he said referring to the influx of media that descended on the region when IS launched a shock offensive into Kurdish territory.

The fighter's resentment towards his Arab neighbours was not new. He said he had battled the troops of former Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein in the 1990s and rolled up his sleeves to show scars from where they had tortured him. The latest collaboration with IS, however, was insufferable. "We tolerated them before… but now we will take our revenge… We will kick all Arabs out. A war of ethnic identities is approaching."

It is an extreme sentiment, but one that is symptomatic of a general increase in anti-Arab feeling amongst some Kurds since the rise of IS, leading to demonstrations, social media campaigns and increasingly harsh treatment from members of the security forces.

Of course this is not universal, nor is it official policy, although rumours of tighter employment and residency laws for Arabs circulate. Lawmakers stress that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) embraces all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups. KRG President Masoud Barzani said that "the terrorists will not be able to damage the relations between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its Arab brothers" during an August meeting with French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. In another statement, his office said that "Kurdistan Region has been an outstanding model of stability, democracy and peaceful coexistence in Iraq during the last decade," adding that it was "a safe haven" for all Iraqi's ethnic and religious groups, including Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians.

Meanwhile, Makhmour's mayor, Ibrahim Sheikh-Allah, said in an official statement that both Kurdish and Arab residents had returned following the fighting. However, locals recently told VICE News that Arabs were, in fact, being blocked from doing so. One 36-year-old Arab who once ran a shop in the town and gave his name as Abu Omar said he left his home the day that IS attacked and fled to the KRG capital of Erbil to stay with a Kurdish friend. When Kurdish forces recaptured the town and families began to trickle back he was was stopped from joining them by local security forces, known as Asayish, supposedly for his own safety. "I was informed by the Asayish forces that Arabs are not allowed to go back to Makhmour. They told me that the situation is not good enough for the Arabs to go back to Makhmour, since there are people who are hostile to Arabs at the moment."

Resentment is certainly still high. Karwan, a Kurdish resident who declined to give his surname confirmed that there were currently no Arab families in the town, and said that none should be allowed to return.
"They were the reason for the fall of Makhmour… they caused too much pain for the people... during these past weeks. He was sceptical even of Arabs who had fled to the KRG. "I don't know about them, but for now there are only Kurds here in Makhmour and we are really living in peace and security…. I think even the innocent ones [Arabs] should not come back for a while since people of Makhmour are really angry."

A member of the Asayish, who declined to give his name, told VICE News that he had orders not to let Arabs back into the town.
He speculated that this was partly because Kurds were still resentful, and partly because if IS launched another assault, then the presence of Arabs would be seen by the peshmerga as a risk. "Everyone knows that some Arab families helped IS to take Makhmour and gave them information before they attacked it," he said.

Peshmerga commanders appear to share this concern. Ali Faté, a peshmerga veteran who heads forces on the front just outside the town told VICE News shortly after the town had been retaken that the security situation meant the presence of Arabs was a danger. "You can't say that all Arabs are cooperating with IS, but it's a state of war..." he said, trailing off.

This suspicion is widespread. When VICE News was stopped at a checkpoint on the way into Kurdish territory from the disputed northern Iraqi town of Kirkuk, a peshmergera fighter looked inside the vehicle, asked "Any Arabs?" and when told there wasn't, waved it on with no further questions.

Arabs report being held up far longer at checkpoints and treated with hostility by those manning them. Worries of IS spies has meant that entire families were turned away at border crossings while attempting to seek refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. A source close to senior peshmerga commanders at the frontline between Erbil and IS-held Mosul who spoke on the condition of anonymity told VICE News that a number of internally displaced Arab Iraqis, including young children, had been refused entry to the KRG on the suspicion that they were IS informants. "They often use children to do their spying for them, we have caught several," he said.

Meanwhile, anti-Arab rhetoric is mounting amongst civilians. As well as allegations of IS sympathies, the vast influx of refugees fleeing the fighting has pushed up housing and commodity prices. KRG minister for social affairs Muhammed Kader Hawdeyani said in July that crime too had risen as a result of the new arrivals, according to local BasNews.

In response, a now removed Facebook page calling for Arabs to be expelled from Iraqi Kurdistan quickly racked up thousands of likes, while a number of protests with the same demands were held, including one in Erbil which reportedly involved makeshift checkpoints looking for Arabs. Cars with Mosul license plates have been vandalised whilst some business have apparently refused Arab customers or charged them more.

The reason for this current enmity may be new, but as the peshmerga fighter alluded to, there is longstanding Kurdish resentment against Arabs. This is partly due to their brutal treatment under Hussein's rule, which saw thousands killed and the enactment of an "Arabization policy" that forcibly resettled thousands of Arabs in Kurdish regions and evicted Kurds from their homes.

Security was also stepped up after a September 2013 attack on security forces in Erbil, and local media reported that Arabs — particularly single men — were turned away at borders into Iraqi Kurdistan.


Today, there are more positive signs too. Anti-Arab demonstrations have been blocked by authorities, whilst in a Kurdish-run IDP camp on the outskirts of Erbil those who had fled IS — Arabs and members of Iraq's minority groups alike — praised the treatment they had received from local Kurds.

Nevertheless, Kurdistan has long prided itself on being more tolerant, prosperous and safer than the rest of Iraq. It will likely to continue to be so, but if recent trends continue, this history of tolerance, at least, may be at risk.

Additional reporting by Mohammed Rasool

Follow John Beck on Twitter: @JM_Beck
Source : https://news.vice.com/article/we-will-kill-them-as-soon-as-the-cameras-arent-here-anti-arab-sentiment-on-rise-in-iraqi-kurdistan

Voir également : Le problème kurde : le nettoyage ethnique dans le "Kurdistan" irakien

mercredi 17 septembre 2014

La Coalition nationale syrienne maintient que le PKK-YPG a commis un massacre de civils dans la région d'Hasaka

Tuesday, 16 September 2014 12:02
Syrian Coalition Condemns the YPG’s Massacre against Civilians in Al Hasaka

The Syrian Coalition condemns the massacres perpetrated by the Kurdish YPG militias against women and children and unarmed civilians in Al Hasaka province. "These inhumane acts, which serve the Assad regime only, have pitted the YPG against the principles of the Syrian Revolution.” The Syrian Coalition warns the Democratic Union Party (YPD) that “these actions if continued serves the Assad regime’s plans to create chaos and strife among the components of the Syrian society, and also encourages the growth of sectarian and ethnic extremism in the region." The Syrian Coalition’s statement comes after activists said that the Kurdish YPG’s militias summarily executed 34 civilians, including eight children and three women in the villages of Tel Khalil and Al Hajiya in rural Al-Hasakah. An entire family were killed when a RPG shell hit their house, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.
Source : http://en.etilaf.org/all-news/news/syrian-coalition-condemns-the-ypg-s-massacre-against-civilians-in-al-hasaka.html

Voir également : Syrie : le PKK-YPG tue des dizaines de civils à Hasaka

Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions

Turquie : des sympathisants du PKK attaquent au cocktail Molotov des écoles

Three schools vandalized by PKK supporters in eastern Turkey
MUS - 14.09.2014 15:34:42

A large group of people who are believed to be supporters of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party attacked three schools with Molotov cocktails and fireworks in the southeastern province of Muş on Saturday.

The group, consisting of around 60 people, firstly gathered in front of a primary school and began to attack school building with Molotov cocktails.
The school became unavailable after the incident since the assailants burned all of the equipment in the building. Two more primary schools were also destroyed by the PKK supporters on the same evening. All three schools will not start education on Monday.

Fire brigade worked hard to extinguish fire in the schools for long hours. Security forces remained incapable to intervene in the incidents.
Source : http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/Three-schools-vandalized-by-PKK-supporters-in-eastern-Turkey_4573-CHMTUzNDU3My8kbmV3c01hcFZhbHVlLntjYXRlZ29yeS5pZH0=

Voir également : Turquie : nouveaux enlèvements d'enfants par le PKK

Sud-Est de la Turquie : des familles réclament le retour de leurs enfants kidnappés par le PKK

Pourquoi le PKK est une organisation criminelle et terroriste : actes terroristes indiscriminés, attentats-suicides, kidnappings, trafic de drogue, trafic d'êtres humains, extorsions de fonds, blanchiment d'argent

Qui sont les victimes du PKK ?

La biographie du terroriste polpotiste Abdullah Öcalan

Le PKK et le trafic de drogue

Les principaux arguments contre un Kurdistan unifié

The Case Against a Unified Kurdistan
Encouraging Kurdish secession would only spread regional chaos and strife to those few places still free of it.

By Philip Jenkins • September 15, 2014

Daniel Pipes has announced his conversion to the cause of an independent Kurdistan, to be built on the foundations that ethnic group has established in Northern Iraq. In the 1990s, he says, he doubted the idea on multiple grounds, not least that “it would embolden Kurds to agitate for independence in Syria, Turkey, and Iran, leading to destabilization and border conflicts.” Now, though, he greets the prospective new nation with a hearty “Hello, Kurdistan!”

As the U.S. becomes ever more deeply involved against ISIL, we are going to hear many such calls to support a free Kurdistan. By the standards of the region, the Kurds are undoubtedly the good guys, the closest thing we might have to an actively pro-Western state. The problem is that defining this nascent Kurdistan is a fiendishly difficult project, which at its worst threatens to spread massacre and ethnic cleansing to parts of the region that are presently relatively safe. Actually, we should listen closely to the wise words of the unreconstructed Pipes, version 1.0.

You can make an excellent case for supporting the independence of a Kurdistan in roughly its present location in Northern Iraq. But the Kurdish people are spread widely over the region, with communities in Syria, Iran, and Turkey, and the eight million Iraqi Kurds constitute only a quarter of the whole.

With commendable frankness, Pipes takes his ambitions to the limit. As he asks, “What if Iraqi Kurds joined forces across three borders—as they have done on occasion—and formed a single Kurdistan with a population of about thirty million and possibly a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea?” He presents a map of the new mega-Kurdistan, which is produced by “partially dismembering its four neighbors.” Yes, he says, this would dismay many, but the region “needs a salutary shake-up.”

This is not dismaying, it’s actively terrifying.

As Syria and Iraq are already in dissolution, little additional damage would be caused by tearing off extra fragments of their territory. In Iran, though, any attempt at Kurdish secession would of necessity generate a bloody civil war, but that prospect does not deter Pipes: secession “would helpfully diminish that arch-aggressive mini-empire.” Turning relatively stable Iran into a fragmented failed state would be music to the ears of U.S. and Israeli hawks, but it is a recipe for escalating carnage for decades to come.

But it is in Turkey that any Kurdish ambitions meet a massive reality check. The country has 15 million Kurds, around a fifth of the whole population, spread over the southeastern third of the country. Turkey’s revolutionary PKK, the Kurdish Workers Party, is an extremely active and dangerous movement, and its decades-long nationalist guerrilla struggle is currently on hiatus. While rightly stressing that the Kurdish state has rejected the terrorist tactics used by Turkish groups, Pipes specifically notes schemes by the Kurdish military to ally with the Turkish Kurds, and his imagined mega-state incorporates huge swathes of present Turkey.

A renewed secessionist movement in Turkey would be catastrophic. It would cause many thousands of deaths and cripple one of the region’s most successful societies. Beyond civil conflict and terrorism, expect a rash of outright wars between the new and emerging mini-states. Violence would likely spread into Turkish and Kurdish communities in Western Europe.

Why on earth does Pipes think such an outcome is worth risking? The only seeming benefit is to punish Turkey’s President Erdoğan, who has shown undemocratic ambitions. More to the point, though, he has become a harsh critic of Israel and of Western policies in the Middle East. As Pipes writes, “Kurds’ departing from Turkey would usefully impede the reckless ambitions of now-president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” Even if you assume the very worst of Erdoğan, he still falls very far short of the region’s dictators and demagogues, making Pipes’s proposed solutions wildly disproportionate, and, yes, reckless.

A salutary shake-up is one thing. Provoking a regional cataclysm is quite another.

Philip Jenkins is Distinguished Professor of History at Baylor University and serves as Co-Director for the Program on Historical Studies of Religion in the Institute for Studies of Religion.
Source : http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-case-against-a-unified-kurdistan/

lundi 15 septembre 2014

Les korucu (gardiens de village) à Tunceli : des femmes kurdes prennent les armes contre le PKK

Pourquoi le PKK est une organisation criminelle et terroriste : actes terroristes indiscriminés, attentats-suicides, kidnappings, trafic de drogue, trafic d'êtres humains, extorsions de fonds, blanchiment d'argent

"Criminal Code Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 11)
- F2012L01697
Repealed/Ceased
Bookmark: this version | latest version
SLI 2012 No. 195 Regulations as made
This regulation amends the Criminal Code Regulations 2002 to specify Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a terrorist organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of 'terrorist organisation' under subsection 102.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995.
Administered by: Attorney-General's
   
Made     16 Aug 2012
Registered     17 Aug 2012
Tabled HR     20 Aug 2012
Tabled Senate     20 Aug 2012
Date of Ceasing     09 Apr 2013
Reason for Ceasing     Repealed by
Attorney-General's (Spent and Redundant Instruments) Repeal Regulation 2013

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Select Legislative Instrument 2012 No. 195

Issued by the authority of the Attorney-General

Criminal Code Act 1995

Criminal Code Amendment Regulation 2012 (No. 11)

Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Act) provides that the Governor‑General may make regulations prescribing matters required or permitted by the Act to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to the Act.  The Schedule to the Act sets out the Criminal Code (the Code).

Division 102 of the Code sets out the offences in relation to terrorist organisations, which are: directing the activities of a terrorist organisation; being a member of a terrorist organisation; recruiting persons to a terrorist organisation; receiving training from or providing training to a terrorist organisation; being an associate of and receiving funds from or making available funds, support or resources to a terrorist organisation.

Offences in Division 102 of the Code apply to conduct (or the results of such conduct) constituting the alleged offence whether or not the conduct (or the result) occurs in Australia.

A ‘terrorist organisation’ is defined in subsection 102.1(1) of the Code as:
 
    an organisation directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act occurs) (paragraph 102.1(1)(a)); or
    an organisation specified in the regulations (paragraph 102.1(1)(b)).
(...)

Details of the organisation

Objectives

The PKK was formally established by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978. The organisation adopted a communist ideology but from its inception was primarily committed to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in south-eastern Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. After the end of Cold War, the PKK increasingly emphasised its role as a Kurdish nationalist movement. The group periodically has sought to increase its popularity by exploiting the religious sentiment of the Kurdish community, but the organisation remains predominantly secular.

The PKK’s objectives have changed over time, in line with Turkey’s evolving political environment. The organisation now calls for autonomy for Kurds within Turkey and seeks to promote and advance the rights of Kurds living in Turkey, specifically the right to maintain ethnic identity.  The PKK has consistently demonstrated a willingness to use violence in order to achieve these objectives.

Leadership and Membership

Abdullah Ocalan, currently serving life imprisonment in Turkey, is still considered the leader and figurehead of the PKK; however, in practice, the group’s day-to-day affairs are run by Murat Karayilan. Other key leaders include Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan, Fehman Huseyin and Riza Altun.

The precise strength of the PKK is not known; however, it is widely believed the group numbers approximately four to five thousand militants, the majority of whom are based in northern Iraq. Additionally, the group draws on considerable logistical support from a large number of sympathisers among the Kurdish community, particularly in south-east Turkey, but also in Syria and Iran.

Funding and recruitment

The PKK derives most of its financial resources from drug trafficking, which is reported to generate hundreds of millions of US dollars for the group. At different times, the PKK is assessed to have controlled up to 80 per cent of the European illicit drug market.

In January 2012, under the US State Department’s Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated three Moldavia-based individuals as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers for acting for or on behalf of the PKK. One individual was identified as a high-ranking PKK member.


The PKK also generates income through extortion, illegal immigration, human trafficking, money laundering and prostitution rackets. Revenue is also raised by collecting ‘taxes’, through voluntary means or coercion, from Kurdish diaspora communities around the world. PKK-related criminal activity is especially prevalent in Europe. The European Police Office warned in its European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2012 that the PKK remains committed to using Europe as a logistical support base for funding, as well as for recruitment, training and propaganda. Funds are also raised through publication sales, grants, aid campaigns and fundraising activities organised by PKK branches in Europe.

Most PKK members are recruited from the main Kurdish areas in south-east Turkey; however, some are drawn also from cities in the country’s west. In addition, the group recruits from the Kurdish population in Iran and Syria and from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. Most recruitment in rural areas of Turkey occurs through personal acquaintance. In urban areas and in Europe, a network of PKK members and sympathisers working in non‑governmental organisations and predominantly Kurdish political parties manage the recruitment process. The group’s external recruitment practices were highlighted in February 2010 when police in France and Italy detained at least 20 people for alleged involvement in training and recruitment for the PKK.

Terrorist activity of the organisation

Directly or indirectly engaged in the doing of terrorist acts

The PKK has continued to have extensive, direct involvement in most terrorist acts occurring in Turkey since the group was last listed in 2009. The group has been particularly active since February 2011 when it ended a unilateral ceasefire in place since April 2009. Most attacks appear to be very specifically targeted, for example, armed assaults against Turkish military forces using small-arms fire. However, there also have been several indiscriminate, mass‑casualty attacks employing both suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED). While most attacks have targeted Turkish security forces in the southeast, a number have targeted places frequented by civilians or tourists, including a shopping area in Ankara and a major shopping, tourist and leisure district in Istanbul. The PKK also was responsible for a ferry hijacking in the Marmara Sea, near Istanbul.

The PKK has also conducted kidnappings, including of Westerners. In the latest incident on 2 June 2012, a British tourist reportedly was kidnapped but was released the following day.

Significant recent attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by or reliably attributed to the PKK include:

·         1 March 2012: Fifteen police officers and a civilian were wounded in a remotely controlled IED attack by suspected PKK militants targeting a police bus in the Imrahor Street area of Istanbul. The explosion reportedly occurred as the bus passed the headquarters of the ruling Justice and Development Party.

·         24 November 2011: Three Turkish employees of a Canada-based energy company were killed by PKK militants in an attack targeting the Selmo oil field at Kozluk, Batman province.

·         11 November 2011: A PKK militant carrying a suspected explosive device hijacked a passenger ferry and took hostage 18 passengers and six crew members in the Marmara Sea, near Istanbul.

·         29 October 2011: At least two people were killed and as many as 20 others wounded when a suspected PKK suicide bomber detonated her explosives outside a teahouse near the office of the Justice and Development Party in the town of Bingol in Bingol province.

·         27 September 2011: PKK militants kidnapped a total of eight teachers and a village guard in five armed attacks in the Pulumur district of Tunceli province; in the village of Gundogdu in Elazig province; and in the villages of Ciftlibahce, Dolunay and Cavundur in Diyarbakir province.

·         17 August 2011: Eight soldiers and a village guard were killed and a further 14 soldiers wounded when suspected PKK militants detonated four IEDs consecutively against a military convoy on the Hakkari-Cukurca highway in the Cukurca district of Hakkari province.

·         14 July 2011: Thirteen soldiers were killed and seven others wounded when PKK militants ambushed a security patrol with small-arms and grenades in Silvan district, Diyarbakir province.

·         26 May 2011: A police officer and seven civilians were wounded when suspected PKK militants detonated an IED at a bus stop near the Akmerkez shopping centre in the Etiler district of Istanbul.

·         4 May 2011: At least one police officer was killed and two others wounded in a combined small-arms and IED attack by suspected PKK militants targeting a bus transporting security force personnel on the outskirts of the city of Kastamonu in Kastamonu province. The attack occurred shortly after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan held an election rally in the city.

·         31 October 2010: Thirty-two people were wounded – including 15 police officers – when a suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying police officers in Taksim Square, Istanbul. An IED planted nearby failed to explode.

·         19 June 2010: Nine soldiers were killed and 14 others wounded when PKK militants attacked an army border unit in the Semdinli area of Hakkari province. A further two soldiers were killed in a separate IED incident in Hakkari on the same day.

Directly or indirectly preparing or planning the doing of terrorist acts

Under the HPG alias, the group issued a statement in January 2012 declaring that “2012 will be the year of a struggle to ensure a free Leader and Free Kurdistan through an effective resistance and a Popular Revolutionary War”.  A military intelligence report, which was made public in mid-February 2012, warned also of a PKK plan to escalate its terrorist campaign. PKK leaders had reportedly discussed their intentions to conduct large-scale attacks throughout the south-east, with the aim of inflicting major losses on the Turkish military. The group also planned to attack police and civilians in urban areas using homemade explosives.
Conclusion

On the basis of the above information, ASIO assesses the PKK continues to directly and/or indirectly engage in, prepare, plan, assist, advocate or foster the doing of terrorist acts involving threats to life and serious property damage. This assessment is corroborated by information provided by reliable and credible intelligence sources.

In the course of pursuing its objectives, the PKK is known to have committed or threatened action:

·         that causes, or could cause, serious damage to property, the death of persons or endangers a person’s life; and

·         with the intention of advancing  the PKK’s political, religious or ideological causes; and

·         with the intention of intimidating the public and sections of the public.

Other relevant information

Links to other terrorist groups or networks

The PKK maintains close links with its Iranian affiliate, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Like the PKK, PJAK has training camps in northern Iraq. Iran has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation and both Iran and Turkey are reported to have conducted probable coordinated military operations against both groups in their shared border areas.

Links to Australia

There are no known PKK links to Australia; however, it is likely elements of Australia’s Kurdish community remain sympathetic to the Kurdish nationalist cause.

Threats to Australian interests

There are no known direct threats from the PKK to Australian interests. The PKK is not known to be engaged in any peace or mediation processes.

Proscription by the UN and other countries

The PKK is listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by many governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand. The organisation is proscribed by the United States government under the name of Kongra Gel. The PKK is listed by the European Union for the purposes of its anti-terrorism measures."
 
Source : http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012L01697/Explanatory%20Statement/Text

(site présentant la législation et la réglementation en vigueur en Australie)

Voir également : Qui sont les victimes du PKK ?

La biographie du terroriste polpotiste Abdullah Öcalan

Le PKK et le trafic de drogue

"Le PKK, c’est aussi la terreur pour certains Kurdes."

7 août 2014 : l'assassinat d'Osman "Şoreş" Baliç (dissident du PKK) et de sa fille (de 3 ans) au Kurdistan irakien

Former PKK Commander Killed in Iraqi Kurdistan
10.08.2014

BasNews, Zakho

A former Commander of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Osman Balic, known as Shorsh, has been killed in Zakho, Duhok province in his home with his three-year-old daughter.


On Thursday night at 10:00 pm, two unknown militants with Kalashnikovs entered Shorsh’s house, killing him and his daughter and injuring his wife.


A former member of the PKK Leadership Council that wanted to remain anonymous told BasNews, “After Shorsh left the PKK, he protected his neutrality, but wrote many articles for Kurdish press and newspapers about the situation in Kurdistan cities in Turkey as well as criticizing the current policies of PKK, hence he was often threated by PKK officials.

“Shorsh was threatened and messages were sent to his Facebook account where he was called a “betrayer” or “traitor” and ultimately it was written on his house’s wall that his death was getting close,” said the Former PKK member.

“Because Shorsh had confidential information about the policies of PKK, he was often scared. Thus, he was living secretly because he knew that someday the PKK will take revenge against him for his resignation from the PKK,” added the former PKK member.

In one of Shorsh’s articles, he stated that: “For many years, the PKK’s policies and objectives were in the interest of Kurdish nation, but after a while, the PKK diverted from this interest and started to serve one person or political party.”

Shorsh was born in the Cizire area of Turkey and joined the PKK in1988. After a short time, he was promoted to commander of PKK guerillas. In 2004, with many other PKK leaders and members, he left the party and settled in Zakho, Duhok.

In the PKK, his brother and nine other family members have been killed previously. Another brother of Shorsh called Shahin Balic entered the PKK in the early days and soon become a famous commander in the party. After an attack by the PKK in 1988, many civilians were killed. Balic criticized the leadership of the PKK,  believing killing civilians is not in the interest of the PKK.

Therefore, the PKK leadership accused him of violating the principles of the PKK and was investigated later on the decision of jailed Kurdish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Source : http://basnews.com/en/news/2014/08/10/former-pkk-commander-killed-in-iraqi-kurdistan/

PKK kills former member, 3-year-old daughter

September 14, 2014, Sunday/ 18:01:28/ EMRULLAH BAYRAK / ANKARA

The terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) allegedly shot dead Osman Baliç, a former PKK member, and his 3-year-old daughter Rewshen in the Zaho city of northern Iraq on Aug. 7, according to Kurdish media reports.


İbrahim Güçlü, a Kurdish intellectual who does not follow the PKK line, has said the killing should be seen as part of a bigger plan that aims to destabilize democracy in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq.

PKK terrorists broke into Baliç's house on the night of Aug. 7, killing him and his daughter, who were later buried in Zaho. Baliç's wife and other children were not harmed in the attack.
Following the murder of Baliç, who was also known by his Kurdish name, Şoreş, Kawa Baliç, his brother, wrote on his Facebook account that the victim had earlier been threatened for criticizing the PKK.

Noting that Baliç had long been targeted by the PKK and other groups for his criticism of their actions, Kawa said that Osman had been threatened countless times by armed people since leaving the PKK.

Baliç, who left the PKK in 2004 with the group of Nizamettin Taş, who was formerly a leading figure in the PKK, settled in Zaho and married there. Osman Baliç is also the younger brother of Şahin Baliç, who was killed in 1991 at a PKK training camp in the Beqaa Valley, Lebanon.

More PKK actions may follow in the region, according to Güçlü, who believes that the PKK aims to prevent Kurds from establishing a state of their own.
Source : http://www.todayszaman.com/_pkk-kills-former-member-3-year-old-daughter_358721.html

Voir également : Qui sont les victimes du PKK ?

La biographie du terroriste polpotiste Abdullah Öcalan

Les zones contrôlées par le PKK-PYD-YPG en Syrie : arrestations arbitraires, torture, meurtres inexpliqués et disparitions