dimanche 18 septembre 2011

Qu'est-ce que le "drame kurde" ?

Georges Corm, La Méditerranée, espace de conflit, espace de rêve, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 84 :

"En réalité, le drame kurde, comme auparavant celui des Arméniens, réside dans les directions politiques de caractère patriarcal ou autoritaire, qui se laissent entraîner dans les jeux géopolitiques qui dépassent largement leur propre capacité d'autonomie et de compréhension des comportements des grands Etats manipulateurs. L'appui de la puissance extérieure constituant un élément indispensable du maintien et de l'accroissement du pouvoir des chefs de factions communautaires, souvent en désaccord entre eux, les communautés deviennent encore plus otages des jeux géopolitiques régionaux. Le cas dramatique des Arméniens en est une illustration ancienne ; les Kurdes, quant à eux continuent d'être victimes du jeu des puissances qu'épousent leurs chefs. Leur soulèvement généralisé en Irak au cours de la Guerre du Golfe, sur invitation de la coalition alliée, aura causé non seulement d'innombrables et vaines souffrances, mais aussi entraîné les Kurdes de Turquie dans la spirale de la violence déstabilisatrice et aggravé les antagonismes entre factions kurdes d'obédiences diverses."

jeudi 15 septembre 2011

La famille Aloyan : des Yezidis persécutés en Arménie et menacés d'un retour forcé dans ce pays non-sûr

P1978 - Pour la famille ALOYAN
SOUTIEN / PETITION

La famille Aloyan , originaire d’Arménie.

La famille Aloyan , originaire d’Arménie, a dû quitter son pays, car elle fait partie d’une minorité ethnique persécutée, les « Yézidis ».
Elle vit à présent à Dieppe, depuis 6 ans. Ce couple, Harutyun , le père et Delale, la mère , a reçu une «  Obligation de Quitter le Territoire Français » (OQTF) le 13 juillet dernier. Ils ont une petite fille de 4 ans, née en France prénommée Chichack scolarisée à l’école maternelle Vauquelin du Pollet à Dieppe. Mr Aloyan a reçu une promesse d’embauche dans le bâtiment (un CDI) et il participe activement aux jardins partagés. Son épouse qui parle  4 langues dont couramment le français s’est mobilisée avec le Secours Populaire pour Haïti..

Cette OQTF empêcherait leur enfant de poursuivre sa scolarité en France et un retour forcé dans leur pays les mettrait en danger. Nous nous y opposons et nous demandons la régularisation de cette famille afin qu’elle puisse vivre sereinement sur le sol français.
Source : http://www.educationsansfrontieres.org/article38316.html

Voir également : Auray : une famille de réfugiés kurdes yezidis témoigne des persécutions, violences et discriminations à l'encontre de leur communauté en Arménie

samedi 10 septembre 2011

Coopération contre le PKK : visite de Feridun Sinirlioğlu à Bagdad prévue

Circle tightening on PKK from two fronts
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Friday, September 9, 2011
ANKARA – Hürriyet Daily News

Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu will travel to Baghdad on Saturday to discuss measures against an outlawed terrorist group before holding similar talks with Iraqi Kurdish officials in Arbil on Sunday, a ministry spokesman has said.


The senior Turkish official’s visits in Iraq come amid speculation that Turkey is considering a cross-border ground operation against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK’s, bases in northern Iraq.

“Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioğlu will travel to Baghdad on Saturday to hold talks with Iraqi authorities as part of regular consultations between Turkish and Iraqi ministries. He will proceed to Arbil later. His talks will focus on Turkey-Iraq relations as well as the fight against terrorism,” Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Selçuk Ünal said in a press briefing Friday.

Iraqi Kurdish official Nechirvan Barzani reportedly wanted to visit Ankara next week, but Foreign Ministry officials did not confirm his application to come to Turkey, instead reminding that Sinirlioğlu was already set to pay a visit to Arbil on the same issue.

Earlier this week, the president of the Regional Kurdish Administration in northern Iraq, Massoud Barzani, called on Kurdish militants to end their armed fight and instead seek their goals through diplomacy. “We are in a difficult situation because there are two countries [Iran and Turkey] telling us to control our borders so there will be no problems,” Barzani said in Arbil. “[But] we are afraid to send forces to the borders for fear of a Kurdish-Kurdish war. I call on the two sides to stop the idea of obtaining their rights through military means.”

The announcement of Sinirlioğlu’s visit coincided with a visit by Turkey’s military chief, Gen. Necdet Özel, and other top commanders to a military unit located near the southeastern city of Hakkari, close to the Iraqi border. The commanders recently visited other military units in Malatya, Batman, Siirt and Şırnak.

Following a recent increase in terror attacks, the Turkish military launched aerial operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq, killing as many as 160 militants in August. The Iraqi government has, however, expressed uneasiness about the airstrikes in its territory.

The PKK uses its bases in northern Iraq to launch attacks on Turkey. The last major Turkish air and ground offensive against PKK bases in northern Iraq was in early 2008.

The PKK’s alleged Iranian wing, the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan, or PJAK, which operates mostly in Iran from bases in northern Iraq, has also recently been confronted by a tough response from Iranian security forces. Regional Kurdish Administration head Barzani reportedly plans to pay a visit to Iran to discuss the issue.
Source : http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=circle-tightening-on-pkk-from-two-fronts-2011-09-09

jeudi 8 septembre 2011

Irak : les intérêts des Kurdes et des Arabes chiites (représentés par al-Maliki) divergent de plus en plus à Kirkouk

Shiite–Kurdish Relations Get Strained over Talabani Statement on Kirkuk

Posted by Reidar Visser on Thursday, 10 March 2011 14:11

There are basically two ways of looking at the relationship between the dominant Shiite and Kurdish political parties in Iraq since 2003. One view emphasises converging interests – such as constructing a black and white narrative of the country’s past as “Sunni Arab discrimination” against everyone else; systematically playing up ethno-sectarian identities in politics; distributing leadership posts not on the basis of merit but according to ethno-sectarian quotas; and generally keeping any tendencies of the re-emergence of a strongman ruler in Baghdad in check. The contrarian position is to emphasise differences between the two, such as the tendency of many Shiites to maintain at least a façade and rhetoric of Iraqi nationalism (even if recruitment patterns may well be sectarian in practice), hold on to the vision of a mostly centralised state ruled by a strong prime minister in Baghdad, and reject the multiplication of new federal entities south of Kurdistan as well as Kurdish moves to annex additional territories outside the ones recognised as part of the Kurdistan Regional Government in the Transitional Administrative Law of 2004.

Key developments since 2005 present a mixed scorecard as far as these two competing perspectives are concerned. The new constitution of 2005 itself was of course basically the creation of the Shiite and the Kurdish parties, but there are two trends within that constitution. Some clauses favour the Kurdish view of unlimited decentralisation, which at the time resonated with the views of at least one Shiite party (SCIRI). The very limited powers of the central government and the award of residual powers to both governorates and federal regions in article 115 point in this direction, as do the provisions for creating new federal regions south of Kurdistan in what could theoretically turn in to a cycle of perpetual federalisation. On the other hand, other constitutional articles such as 121–122 point towards a more centralised form of government south of Kurdistan. Similarly, the constitutional arrangements for the end of the transitional veto-wielding presidency after the first five-year parliamentary cycle foreshadowed a potentially strong prime minister with a centralist and Iraqi nationalist language emerging in the future. Later on, the failure of the Shiite and Kurdish parties in 2007 – arguably at the point of their greatest influence – to amicably agree between themselves on an oil law and the disposition of the disputed city of Kirkuk highlighted the extent to which centralist ideals continued to make themselves felt in the Shiite camp, at the expense of Kurdish interests.

At one point between 2008 and 2009 it looked as if Nuri al-Maliki was making decisive moves towards establishing himself as the nationalist centralist enabled by the 2005 constitution, again to the detriment of the Kurds. But with the re-emergence of sectarian politics in the autumn of 2009, the Shiites refrained from re-entering into conflict with the Kurds over Kirkuk during the debate of the elections law. More recently, as Maliki emerged with a poorer result than he had hoped for in the March 2010 parliamentary elections, he saw no other option but to turn to the Kurds for support and has recently made conciliatory moves regarding Kurdish oil exports.

It is interesting, therefore, that the latest statement on Kirkuk by Iraq’s president, Jalal Talabani, a prominent Kurdish leader, seems to have once more created strains in the Shiite–Kurdish relationship. Talabani said Kirkuk was the “Jerusalem of Kurdistan”. This prompted strong reactions from Iraqis south of Kurdistan – Sunnis and Shiites alike – who objected to the connotations of “occupation” assigned by Talabani to the current situation (in which Kirkuk at least formally remains part of the central-government domain) and the concomitant discourse of an ethnic “liberation campaign” that would appeal to ethno-racial Kurdish sentiment to annex the area to Kurdistan.

Significantly, today there is a strong condemnation of Talabani’s statement by Maha al-Duri, a Sadrist leader. In a press statement also published on her website, she says that Talabani’s statement was “irresponsible”. Moreover, she went on to escalate the issue by saying that if Talabani considered Kirkuk his Jerusalem, it would “force Iraqis to consider Kurdistan their Jerusalem”. She seemed to modify that perspective somewhat when she went on to say that all of Iraq should be considered “occupied” (by the Americans) and that Talabani should understand the need for US forces to leave.

It is significant that this statement is not coming from the usual suspects. On Kirkuk and Kurdish issues more broadly, certain people close to Maliki are in the habit of making strong statements apparently without being able to influence the overall direction of policy to a significant extent. This includes Turkmen leaders like Abbas al-Bayati. Duri, on the other hand, is considered a high-ranking politician among the Sadrists who unexpectedly fell silent during the debate (or, more correctly, the non-debate) on Kirkuk during the passage of the revised election law in parliament in autumn 2009. A 38 year-old mother from Baghdad who graduated top of her class from Baghdad’s leading veterinary college in the late 1990s, Duri stands out as one the few female deputies who has asserted herself beyond women’s affairs.

Duri’s statements are not an isolated case either. Today in parliament, an interesting echo was produced by Mansur al-Tamimi, a Basra deputy from State of Law, who called for expanded powers for the governorates, but “with a strong supervisory role for the prime minister”. This prompted a Kurdish outburst and charges that Tamimi had failed to recognise the “federal” character of Iraq. Parliament speaker Usama al-Nujayfi of Iraqiyya duly sustained the objection and confirmed the standard ittihadi (“federal”) adjective for describing Iraq. But among the Shiites, those who vocally protest against “excessive centralisation in Iraq” now mostly seem to belong to ISCI, which after all is a small minority. A more immediate and material dimension to the whole affair has been provided by the recent influx of Kurdish peshmerga troops into Kirkuk, presumably to deal with potential disturbances, but a breach of past protocol according to which they have stayed away from the city.

Prime Minister Maliki himself was present  in parliament to give an update on the progress of the government and its programme. He sounded somewhat exhausted when he finally uttered the mandatory “federal” word towards the end of his speech. The Kurds may remain his best friend in troubled times, but at a juncture when the nationalist Iraqiyya is remarkably silent on Kirkuk (they are still seeking the good offices of the Kurds in their dealings with Maliki and have not said much except from some criticism from members who are themselves from Kirkuk), he is probably increasingly aware of the challenge from Iraqi Shiites who prefer to speak in the name of the centralist state.
Source : http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/03/10/shiite-kurdish-relations-get-strained-over-talabani-statement-on-kirkuk/

L'Iran aurait physiquement éliminé le numéro 2 du PJAK

L'Iran dit avoir tué le n°2 du PJAK
Publié le 07/09/2011 à 10:44

Les forces iraniennes ont tué le 3 septembre le commandant en chef adjoint du PJAK, principal mouvement kurde de lutte armée contre le régime de Téhéran basé en Irak, ont annoncé ce mercredi les Gardiens de la révolution iraniens dans un communiqué.

"Majid Kavian, alias Samakhou Saraldan, commandant en chef adjoint du groupe terroriste PJAK, a été tué samedi", a indiqué ce communiqué de la force d'élite du régime qui ne donne pas de précision sur les circonstances de cette mort.
Source : http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2011/09/07/97001-20110907FILWWW00357-l-iran-dit-avoir-tue-le-n2-du-pjak.php

dimanche 4 septembre 2011

Offensive militaire de l'Iran contre les activistes kurdes

Offensive militaire de l'Iran contre les Kurdes

Par Europe1.fr avec Reuters

Publié le 3 septembre 2011 à 15h11 Mis à jour le 3 septembre 2011 à 15h11

L'Iran a lancé une nouvelle offensive militaire contre les activistes kurdes à sa frontière avec l'Irak, rapporte la chaîne de télévision officielle Irib, samedi.

Ces opérations de l'armée iranienne interviennent quelques jours après une série de frappes aériennes conduites en territoire irakien par la Turquie contre les rebelles du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) qui ont fait près de 160 tués parmi les insurgés. L'offensive annoncée samedi a été menée par des unités des Gardiens de la Révolution, corps d'élite de l'armée iranienne, au terme du ramadan.
Source : http://www.europe1.fr/International/Offensive-militaire-de-l-Iran-contre-les-Kurdes-699851/